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THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES

*Their Future Relations and Joint
International Obligations*

BY

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1754-1765," *etc.*

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PREFACE

Some twenty years ago, when the question of a formal political connection between the British Empire and the United States for the advancement of the general interests of the English-speaking peoples was quite prematurely raised, Admiral Mahan contributed to the discussion a characteristically thoughtful essay, entitled "Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion." The distinguished historian welcomed the "unmistakable growth of mutual kindly feelings between Great Britain and the United States" and pointed out that "this reviving affection well might fix the serious attention of those who watch the growth of world questions, recognizing how far imagination and sympathy rule the world." He likewise emphasized the common political traditions and moral ideals of the kindred peoples and, above all, "that singular combination of two essential but opposing factors — of individual freedom with subjection to law — which finds its most vigorous working in Great Britain and the United States." Naturally, the interpreter of sea power did not fail to point out that, of the Great Powers these two alone were by geographical position exempt from the burden of large armies, "while at the same time they must depend upon the sea, in chief measure, for that intercourse with other

members of the body upon which national well-being depends."

Though recognizing the great potency of these converging forces and "though desirous as any one can be to see the fact accomplished," Admiral Mahan rejected the project as premature, because neither nation, but more especially the American, had as yet sufficiently realized its own interest in the sea and the identity of these separate interests. This identity, he said, "cannot be established firmly in men's minds antecedent to the great teacher, Experience." "The ground," he concluded, "is not prepared yet in the hearts and understandings of Americans, and I doubt whether in those of British citizens."

A great gulf separates 1917 from 1894 when Admiral Mahan wrote these words. Since then all the unifying forces have been constantly at work and the needed lessons of "Experience" have come from an unwelcome war. Nor is the bitter process of education yet concluded. The question of the future relations of the English-speaking peoples has in consequence assumed an entirely different aspect. What in 1894 was unripe and academic, has to-day become urgent and practical. The purpose of this book is to examine the question in a comprehensive manner, though on a compact scale, taking into account not only the obligations and interests of the peoples immediately concerned, but also the future of civilization as a whole.

The opinions expressed therein have not been impro-

vised. They are the result of prolonged and intensive study of the relations between the two great branches of the English-speaking people. Ten years ago, in an account of British colonial policy during the critical years of the old Empire's history, the writer said: "It is easily conceivable, and not at all improbable, that the political evolution of the next centuries may take such a course that the American Revolution will lose the great significance that is now attached to it, and will appear merely as the temporary separation of two kindred peoples whose inherent similarity was obscured by superficial differences resulting from dissimilar economic and social conditions." It is not the object of this book to discuss the possibility of such a political reunion. If this outcome be in the lap of the gods, it will come in the fulness of time, be the date near or far. Any premature forcing of the pace would probably merely retard such an eventual consummation, which in itself should be welcomed by all who realize that the effective extension of law and justice can be accomplished only by the voluntary integration of progressively larger political entities. Hide-bound as we are by the traditions of the sovereign state demanding from its citizens supreme and undivided dedication, the world does not yet realize the possibilities of new forms of political organization which will permanently unite in a common co-operative purpose different nations and at the same time allow free play to distinct, but not discordant, loyalties of great intensity. However this may be, the object of this book

is the more immediate one of explaining the advisability and necessity of a co-operative democratic alliance of all the English-speaking peoples, from which may possibly in time be developed such a new type of permanent political association.

The co-operation of these culturally kindred peoples in the present war is patently a step in this general direction and is a happy augury. It calls to mind the inspired lines from the "Areopagitica," that inalienable heritage of all English-speaking people, whatever be their physical race or geographical origin. "Methinks I see in my mind," so Milton describes his purely English vision which it is hoped will be realized jointly by all the associated English-speaking peoples, "a noble and puissant Nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks: Methinks I see her as an Eagle muing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazl'd eyes at the full midday beam; purging and unscaling her long abused sight at the fountain it self of heav'nly radiance."

When so broad a range of fact and of theory is covered in a limited space, it is impossible even by the free use of qualifications to give the intermediate shades that so vastly outnumber the blacks and whites of history. Even with the best of intentions a complex fact cannot be summarized in a brief sentence. Every effort has, however, been made to state the facts accurately and to weigh them impartially. But apart from its historical and scientific background, this is essentially a *livre de*

circumstance, devoted to the discussion of public policy and hence dealing largely with an unpredictable future. The arrangement of the material and the relative degree of emphasis upon the various phases of the subject were naturally conditioned by the fact that the writer is, in the main, addressing his fellow citizens of the United States. It may seem strange to append to a volume of this character a series of notes. Their function is in part to acknowledge indebtedness for fact or thought and, in part also, to substantiate and corroborate the text. Their chief purpose, however, is to furnish a running bibliography to easily accessible and non-technical literature for such of the readers whose interest may be stimulated to inquire further into matters that could be discussed only summarily in the text itself. In conclusion, it should be mentioned that some of the material in this book had already appeared in *The Political Quarterly*, *The New Republic*, *The Forum*, *The Annals of the American Academy* and elsewhere.

GEORGE LOUIS BEER.

New York,
June first, 1917.

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I

INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY,

“ Or, aujourd’hui
Nul ne peut plus vivre pour lui
Seul, loin des autres.
Tout ce qui est d’autrui devient aussitôt nôtre ;
Qu’il s’accomplisse à l’autre bout de l’océan
Tout recul, tout progrès, ou minime ou géant,
Importe à mon pays, à ma race, à mon être ;
L’univers tournoyant m’assiège et me pénètre,
Et mon cœur est coupable et fou, s’il s’interdit
D’écouter tressaillir et penser l’infini.”

— EMILE VERHAEREN, *L’Angleterre.*

“ Remota justitia, quid regna nisi magna latrocinia ? ”
— ST. AUGUSTINE, *De Civitate Dei.* .



THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES

CHAPTER I

INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY

Introductory — Mediæval Unity — Modern System of Sovereign States — International Law — Its Nature and Sanction — Its Limited Content — Its Ambiguity — Treaties — International Commissions and Unions — Conferences and Congresses — Alliances.

THE present world-wide war, both in its outbreak and in its devastating course, has forcibly driven into the minds of most thinking men the firm conviction that the existing system of international relations is out of harmony with the fundamental facts of modern life. In all quarters where the problems of the present and future torment the soul and perplex the mind of man there is the keenest of realizations that western civilization will in the future continue to be grievously imperilled unless some measures be devised to limit at least, if not entirely to eliminate, recourse to the ordeal by battle in the adjustment of interstate disputes.

Some considerable measure of good will probably come from the holocaust. Presumably, the future boundaries

of Europe will be determined more in consonance with the wishes of those most directly interested than was the custom of a past when strategic considerations and dynastic interests played an unfortunately large part in the disposition of voiceless peoples. Subject nations, exploited politically and economically by dominant races, seem to be on the verge of emancipation and are looking forward to complete independence or to the guaranteed assurance of full opportunities for self-expression under a system of federal autonomy. The spirit of nationality is again working with that of democracy. Russia has already burst the fetters of autocracy, and the leaven of liberalism is not only working in a Prussianized Germany, but it is also quickening the democratic impulse in those countries that stand pre-eminently as the champions of freedom.

Some of these anticipated benefits, possibly the most far-reaching ones — such as the democratization of Russia, the unification of the British Empire, and the final healing of the breach between the two great branches of the English-speaking people — if they be realized, cannot be attributed to the war, which will merely have hastened the course of already progressing movements. Their consummation was dependent upon different factors. But other expected advantages, such as the re-unification and re-establishment of the Polish nation in an autonomous state, the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or its reorganization so that the suppressed Slav nationalities may be freed from Magyar and Austro-German oppres-

sion, the emancipation of the Armenians from the murderous Turkish yoke, could not have been effected except by force of arms under the existing international dispensation.

Provided the lesson of the present agony be indelibly seared in the heart and mind of future ages, the coming generations will be able to lead a fuller and a freer life. In a measure the war has not only purified the peoples who have met the onslaught against the fundamental principles of western civilization,¹ but it may also chasten the spirit of the militaristic aggressor as soon as defeat has afforded the leisure for reflection. There is every prospect that the selfishness, materialism, and class-feelings so prevalent in all present-day communities will be markedly lessened by the intimate association of all ranks and classes in unmeasured sacrifices for a high purpose and by the resulting orientation of the mind and spirit towards quite other than predominantly self-regarding aims.

The war may prove to be a turning point in the world's history. If it result in the definitive vindication of the democratic concepts of liberty and law, future generations will probably somewhat overlook the evil from which the good has sprung. But for the portion of living mankind subjected to its destructive blast, the war is an almost unqualified evil of most momentous dimensions. No matter what be the exact military outcome, even if right fully prevail against might, the war cannot but cause misery in almost equal measure to both vanquished and

victor. If it be only by such self-immolation that western civilization can be purged of the evils of military aggression then the outlook is indeed dark. Civilization is bankrupt if free peoples can preserve their liberties only at such heavy cost. The supreme good that can come out of the war is the complete demonstration of its baleful nature and the consequent determination of free peoples to devise effective means of preventing in the future a recurrence of the evil even if as a result a measure of their cherished, but somewhat illusory, independence of action should have to be sacrificed.

In the great intellectual travail engendered by this well-nigh universal abhorrence of the present dominion of force throughout the world, there is one point of almost complete agreement. It is generally recognized that, apart from the distinct condemnation that unequivocally attaches itself to those whose imperious will to power either thwarted all efforts toward peaceful composition or welcomed the arbitrament of force, the war is a direct outcome of the prevailing international anarchy and of the current selfish nationalism that is intimately connected with this lack of organization. That such a calamity was at all possible is due both to an actual condition and to a closely related state of mind. All states are in varying degrees infected with the self-regarding nationalism of the day. No one is quite free from it. The stress ordinarily placed upon so-called national interests with its almost inevitable concomitant, the tendency to disregard the conflicting rights of other states, the

marked propensity to base foreign policy upon the mere enforcement of national rights to the neglect of their inseparable complementary obligations, has inevitably enshrouded interstate intercourse with a murky atmosphere of fear and suspicion. But even if the mental attitude were far other, there is no organization in which the international mind can express itself. The lack of any interstate political system, the prevailing international anarchy, leaves the world's peace at the mercy of whichever one of the Great Powers is dissatisfied with existing territorial arrangements and is willing and prepared to employ force to gain its ends. So long as the community of states remains unorganized, "the will to war" of one of its members will always be able to thwart the pacific purposes of the majority.

This international anarchy is the direct product of modern historical development. In mediæval thought, mankind was generally conceived as constituting one vast community, a universal church-state with no territorial limits.² There were, it is true, endless and acrimonious disputes as to the respective positions of Church and State in this world-wide commonwealth, but both Papalist and Imperialist agreed in regarding mankind as constituting one society.³ According to Dante, a pre-eminent member of the latter group, general peace was the indispensable prerequisite of man's perfect existence and this condition was obtainable only by a unified governmental system.⁴ This mediæval ideal, which was by no means ever realized, was generally discarded after the

rise of the national states of Western Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Despite superficial analogies, the gulf that separates the modern from the mediæval political system is profound. "The change is from a world-empire to a territorial State, and from ecclesiastical to civil predominance."⁵ The mediæval ideal of an inclusive unity was replaced by the modern view that the political world is composed of distinct communities "entirely independent, territorially omnipotent, and to some extent morally responsible."⁶

The governments of the national states — England, France, Spain — whose consolidation marks the dawn of the modern era successfully claimed for these bodies politic absolute freedom from all external control. Although basing their views to a considerable extent upon actual political facts and influenced largely by the analogy of the *plenitudo potestatis* that the Papacy had taken over from the Roman Empire, a series of remarkable thinkers — Machiavelli, Luther, Bodin, and Hobbes — deductively developed an abstract theory of unlimited state sovereignty both in internal and in external affairs. Mankind, instead of being regarded as one all-embracing community, was divided into distinct and separate political units connected by no legal bonds. Even the existence of moral ties was not infrequently denied. Politics, if not completely divorced from ethics, led intermittently a separate life; and *raison d'état* was held to be sufficient justification for heinous deeds and gross breaches of faith. This theory of unlimited state sovereignty still

largely holds sway. In the political world of to-day the concrete realities are the sovereign states, each one of which is conceived by its government to be more or less a law unto itself.

With their uncritical worship of success, historians have, as a rule, seen nothing but good in the downfall of mediævalism and the rise of the modern system of sovereign states. Some ten years before the present war so conclusively opened the eyes of many to the fundamental defects of existing interstate relations, the present Master of Balliol somewhat cautiously questioned whether the substitution of modern disunion for mediæval unity had been all for the best and he denied the necessity of assuming "that anarchy and disruption are things good in themselves."⁷ But almost from the very outset it was recognized that the Renaissance theory of state sovereignty led logically to the continuous warfare that was then devastating Europe and that some limits had to be set to the self-regarding actions of the sovereign state if civilization were to perdure. In fact, just as the mediæval ideal of unity was never realized in practice, equally little was its superseding ideal of a world of self-sufficing, isolated political units in complete harmony with actual facts. The great Dutch thinker of the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius, perceived this clearly and, in contradistinction to Machiavelli and his followers, asserted that "human life is essentially a society, and that certain laws, of which fidelity to plighted word is the most important, are therefore as immutable as human

nature.”⁸ With this idea in view, he elaborated a system of rights and duties governing the relations of state to state. Grotius’s work was essentially a protest against the international anarchy of his day, but his conclusions were by no means fully accepted by the statesmen and publicists of the three following centuries. His assertion of the binding force of natural law in interstate relations⁹ has met with scant acceptance in practice. Yet it was recognized that some palliatives had to be adopted to restrict the war of all against all that was rapidly ruining great sections of seventeenth-century Europe. Hence, largely upon the basis of Grotius’s epoch-making book, was gradually erected the structure of modern international law.

It is idle in this connection to enter upon the vexed question whether international law is really law at all. For obviously, the answer depends primarily upon the definition of law that is adopted. International lawyers, partly as the result of something akin to the hero-worship that animates most biographers, naturally as a rule maintain the affirmative of this proposition. Such also is the contention of so notable a jurist as Sir Frederick Pollock.¹⁰ But other equally eminent authorities dissent.¹¹ It is unquestionably true that international law has in great part developed gradually through custom, just as has the most vital portion of municipal law. But whereas the common law is regularly enforced by courts with authority to impose the judgments, international law has not passed beyond the customary stage.

There are in existence no tribunals for its general enforcement and, no matter how strong or weak be its authority, its sanction is distinctly moral rather than legal in nature. Whether in its essence it be law or not, it certainly differs radically from what English-speaking peoples confined to a tongue that does not distinguish between *jus* and *lex*, *Recht* and *Gesetz*, *droit* and *loi*, understand by that term. An intrepid champion of the claims of international law to full legal recognition virtually concedes that there is a vital distinction when he says that "as, however, there cannot be a sovereign authority above the several sovereign states, the Law of Nations is a law *between*, not above the several states."¹² In actual practice, international law is merely a code of rules to which the states profess general adherence, but to which they actually render only a somewhat reluctant and fitful obedience. As a profound student aptly expressed it:

"International Law is like schoolboy honour or good form, it does not destroy selfishness or quarrelling or cheating; but it proclaims that certain things are to be avoided and others are obligatory, and it unites even those most sharply divided as members in a single society. It does not solve the problem of man in society, but it recognizes it."¹³

When one turns from the nature and sanction of international law to its content, one cannot but be struck by its limited scope. The fundamental function of law is to establish the rule of reason and justice in the relations of man to man and of group to group. But inter-

national law has made scant progress toward such a consummation. In considerable part, it is merely a code of etiquette prescribing the punctilio of interstate intercourse in times of peace. But in possibly even greater measure it is devoted to the formulation of the rules of war.¹⁴ Although international lawyers insist that war is no illegality, still there is a distinct inconsistency between war and law because, no matter whether the decision reached by such a contention of hostile forces be just or unjust, the means themselves are the negation of reason and are in no way adapted to securing an equitable issue of the dispute. If it be admitted that justice is "the effort to eliminate from our social conditions the effects of the inequalities of Nature upon the happiness and advancement of men,"¹⁵ then war is its very antithesis, for its so-called "biologically just decisions" allow these inequalities full sway.

So restricted in its scope is international law that the most vital questions do not come within its purview. The most fundamental issues, such as are most likely to lead to war, as for instance the open door in the dependencies of European states and in other backward, but still independent, countries, the Monroe Doctrine, the far-reaching problems involved in the attempts of Asiatics to settle within Caucasian communities, are outside its narrow range. It is of the utmost significance that all political subjects, whether of such contentious nature or otherwise, were rigorously excluded from the discussions at the Hague Conferences and that the general arbitra-

tion treaties which have been adopted, as a rule, absolutely exclude from such adjudication all questions involving the vital interests, the independence, or the honour of the parties to them.¹⁶

Not alone is the moral sanction of international law only intermittently effective and not alone is its scope decidedly inadequate, but the existing war has furnished complete demonstration that much of its content is ambiguous. This criticism applies even to that part of international law which is embodied in general treaties. This is entirely apart from the fact both that the binding force of such treaties has not infrequently been challenged with impunity,¹⁷ and also that the Hague Conventions are not binding on the signatories if any one of the belligerents, no matter how insignificant,¹⁸ be not a party to them. In addition, these treaties, which constitute what might be called the statutory as opposed to the customary part of international law, are not infrequently open to contradictory interpretations. This is in part due to the fact that at times no agreement at all could have been reached if the terms had been absolutely explicit and the document was signed only because from the very outset the diplomats were interpreting its meaning differently. A conspicuous instance is the Treaty of London of 1867 guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg. When this question came up for European decision, Bismarck was insistent that the guarantee should bind each one of the signatories individually, while the British statesmen were tenaciously unwilling to assume

such unlimited obligations. In this impasse the Russian representative suggested a phrase susceptible of different interpretations, "collective guarantee,"¹⁹ whose exact meaning has to this day remained undetermined.²⁰ Similarly, there is some confusion as to the treaty of 1839 neutralizing Belgium. There are, of course, no qualifications whatsoever as to the obligations assumed by the parties of the treaty to respect the neutrality of that kingdom, but questions have frequently been raised as to the duties of the signatories to proceed against those delinquent in this respect. Gladstone especially was insistent in maintaining that Great Britain had not assumed an unlimited obligation, one that was irrespective of circumstances, to proceed by force of arms against any and all violations of Belgium's neutrality.²¹ Other British statesmen have taken the same view.²²

Naturally even more indefinite than are these treaties, is that portion of international law based upon custom. Sharp differences of opinion that existed in an academic state before the war have since then become acute. Apart from the German practice that rests upon the anarchic, non-moral, and purely self-regarding precept that neither the usages nor the laws of war should be allowed to obstruct military ends,²³ it is in general true that when military needs demanded a measure, some more or less cogent argument or some more or less pertinent precedent could as a rule be found to justify its application. Especially contentious are the questions arising out of the inevitable conflict between the rights of bellig-

erents and those of neutrals. The disputes about contraband, continuous voyage, blockade, neutral mails, all testify to the indefiniteness of international usage. Under such circumstances, when the allegation of illegality can be so readily denied, if not completely refuted, it is not surprising that states should refrain from opposing such actions on the part of other states as do not immediately affect their own interests.

But only to a minor extent is such non-action the result of the vagueness of interstate usage. Under existing conditions, a state does not as a rule feel justified, even if it be so inclined, to raise its voice against the most heinous and palpable violation of international law unless it itself is wronged. Much less does it recognize an obligation to intervene by act. While a crime within the body politic is deemed an injury to society as well as to the individual adversely affected, a violation of international law is not considered an offence against the community of states. It is plain that until this condition changes, until the community of states has become organized, the rule of law as the approximate embodiment of justice and reason cannot be said to obtain in international relations. In the present unorganized world, there prevails an anarchy somewhat tempered on the one hand by international law, but even more so, on the other, by moral inhibitions that are recognized in varying degrees by the different states. This is the unavoidable result of the modern system based upon the absolute sovereignty of the independent state.

While this abstract theory of sovereignty divided the world in sharply segregated politico-legal units, each one of these states was developing distinct interests outside its territorial confines and the intercourse between their respective citizens was becoming ever closer and more vital. In response to the need for some regulation of these important relations, there was developed not only the restricted and indefinite system of interstate usage known as international law, but there were also concluded between the states a lengthy series of special treaties granting to their respective citizens civil, commercial, and property rights within each other's territorial limits. In addition to such special treaties, others of broader scope were passed regulating the navigation of the Danube, the Congo, and the Suez Canal, controlling interstate communications by post, telegraph, and other means, giving international protection to commercial, artistic, and literary property. In these instances, as well as in others, permanent international offices have been established for the administration of these interstate interests.²⁴

Many have hopefully, and possibly too sanguinely, welcomed these international organs, which have increased rapidly in numbers and in effectiveness since the middle of the nineteenth century as the real beginnings of international government. Be such optimism well or ill-founded, it should always be remembered that these international administrative bureaus are largely economic and exclusively non-political in nature. They have, how-

ever, not only accomplished an immensely important work, but they have also greatly decreased interstate friction by removing from the diplomatic field many subjects that might have given rise to dispute. While not infrequently contentious, the questions handled in this way are such as do not affect what really are, or delusively are held to be, the vital interests of the state.

Such interests are not handled by these international unions and commissions, but they are the subject of direct negotiation between the immediately interested parties or an attempt is made to decide them by general international conferences. Only very rarely and then virtually solely when the matter in dispute turns upon a question of fact or upon a well-defined legal principle, is there recourse to arbitration. If these means fail, the settlement is left to the adjudication of arms. In the all-pervading atmosphere of a world-wide war, it is not generally realized to what an extent interstate disputes have been settled by peaceful means. Arbitration has played a significant part, however minor a one it be, in such settlements. The saying of the Greek philosopher that war is the father of all things is decisively contradicted by the fact that all Africa has in the past hundred years been divided up by peaceful negotiations between the European Powers. Other territorial changes elsewhere and even in Europe, though not on so vast a scale as this one, have likewise been peacefully effected. These facts should give pause to those who oppose a supernational world organization merely on the ground that it would perpetuate an existing status

that in time would become increasingly out of accord with the changing conditions of the world. This argument could with equal validity be directed against the state itself. If, as a rule, the state's organization can without violence be readjusted to dynamic conditions, so could that of the world state whose ultimate advent has been the hope of many a prescient philosopher, poet, and statesman.

Direct negotiations between the Great Powers have disposed of many fundamental questions in all quarters of the globe. It is only necessary to mention the frontier between the United States and Canada, Heligoland, Persia, Morocco, Siam, and the South Sea Islands. But even more important is the work that has been performed by international congresses and conferences. After the collapse of Napoleon's attempt to establish a military dominion over all Europe, the war-weary Powers tried to perpetuate their alliance in order to give permanent peace to Europe.²⁵ The Holy Alliance, a project of the Tzar Alexander to which Austria and Prussia gave their adherence, was based upon lofty ethical principles, but it quickly proved impracticable in a world dominated by ideals far different from those of its mystic progenitor. But, at the same time, another plan with similar though more limited objects in view was developed by the less visionary statesmen of Europe. One of the articles of the coalition treaty of 1814 against Napoleon provided that the four contracting Great Powers — Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia — should remain in alliance

for twenty years in order to maintain "the Balance of Europe, to secure the repose and independence of the Powers, and to prevent the invasions which for so many years have devastated the world." As the war was waged against Napoleon, not against France, within a few years of his overthrow, that state was admitted to this league of the Great Powers.

Despite what would seem to have been the best of auspices, this scheme soon broke down. It was somewhat faulty in construction, in that it was based upon the hegemony of the Great Powers and disregarded the legitimate rights of minor states. They were left voiceless. However important in principle be this defect, in practice it proved only a very minor difficulty because no effective opposition to the united will of the Great Powers was possible. The fundamental trouble, however, was that no attempt was made to draw a line of demarcation between matters that were exclusively or pre-eminently domestic in character and such as were of international concern. Probably no such line can ever be rigidly drawn; it must certainly shift with changing circumstances. At all events, when the various conferences of the Great Powers met, they began to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. And, as reactionary influences in Austria and Russia were constantly becoming more powerful, this interference was in favour of the established autocratic systems and hostile to the growing movement for constitutional liberty throughout Europe. In 1822, the Great Alliance met at Verona, where the

Congress devoted its chief attention to the revolutionary uprising in Spain. France was prepared to send an army to suppress this movement, provided the support of the other Powers were given. The Continental members of the Alliance favoured the plan, but Great Britain refused to assent. This refusal, followed by British recognition of the independence of the Spanish-American colonies and by British diplomatic assistance to the Greek insurgents, meant the breakdown of the attempt by the Great Powers to control the affairs of Europe.

To Canning, the British statesman responsible for this outcome, this was a welcome result, as he would not allow his country to be a party to the suppression of Spanish liberalism or to the re-imposition of Spanish rule in South America. Under the circumstances, his well-known words: "Things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all. . . . The time for Areopagus and the like of that is gone by," express comprehensible, even if short-sighted, relief. While the body was dead, the spirit remained and from this abortive attempt at a confederation of Europe survived the principle of European co-operation in the settlement of many matters that threaten the public peace. As has truly been said, "from the pacifist's point of view the nineteenth century should be remembered as much for its Conferences, its Congresses, and its Concert of Europe as for the growth of arbitration."²⁶

Only a few years after Canning's memorable words, Great Britain, France, and Russia agreed in a series of

conferences upon what seemed to them to be an equitable solution of the difficulties between Greek and Turk and compelled both parties to accept this settlement. The special authority thus acquired by these three Powers to regulate the affairs of Greece and her relations with Turkey was exercised on a number of subsequent occasions, of which the one not least important has been during the present war. This method of procedure was later extended to the affairs of the other Balkan states and the group of intervening powers was greatly expanded. In this manner grew up the Concert of Europe, whose special function was to prevent the Balkan problem from embroiling all Europe in war.²⁷ This system involved "a negation of the right of any one Power and an assertion of the right of the Powers collectively to regulate the solution of the Eastern question." It has been applied to a number of other questions that transcended the interests of the contiguous states or threatened the peace of Europe. By such action of the Powers in Congress assembled the neutrality of Belgium was effected in 1839 and, a generation later, that of Luxemburg. Such joint deliberation and decision was applied as well to the Congo region in Central Africa and later, at Algieras, to Morocco. It was the refusal of Austria, supported by Germany, to admit that her dispute with Serbia was a question of general European interest that precipitated the present war.²⁸

Apart from what has been accomplished at the Hague Conferences, mainly in codifying the laws of war, it is

plain to every one acquainted with the outlines of modern European history that these congresses and conferences have settled many questions and have on many occasions obviated war. Their acts have at times been flagrantly violated, as by Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Similarly, during the disputes about Morocco from 1906 to 1911, but scant attention was paid to the Algeciras Act.²⁹ Finally, the outbreak of the war was marked by the German invasion of Luxemburg and Belgium, whose neutralization formed two of the vital corner-stones of the emerging European polity.

If we look somewhat closer into this European system, the causes of its ultimate failure will become patent. It is plainly evident why these conferences and congresses have not solved the problem of substituting law and justice for force in the settlement of interstate disputes. In the first place, in the background of all diplomatic negotiations is the sword, be it merely resting in the scabbard, half-drawn, or brandished with a threatening gesture. In the second place, as a direct consequence of the theory of sovereignty, the states meet as equals in these assemblies, no matter how disparate be their size and political importance. Hence, each state has merely one voice and as it is logically held that a majority cannot bind a minority without infringing a state's sovereignty, unanimity is essential. Finally, it should be noted that in such conferences as have settled important political questions, mainly in the Balkans, the states most directly

affected were as a rule not represented. The will of Europe, as interpreted by the Great Powers or by only a combination of some of them, was imposed upon Greece and Turkey. In other words, the Concert of Europe has been effective only when the questions at issue concerned others far more directly than themselves. Under the existing system, it is scarcely conceivable that such questions as those of Ireland, the Philippines, Schleswig, Alsace-Lorraine, Finland, Poland, Bohemia, or Croatia can come before an international congress unless war has thrown them into the crucible. No one of the Great Powers will permit what it deems is a vital question to be determined by the vote of its peers.

Of such vital questions, that of transcendent importance is the independence of a state — not only its security from forcible subjection to another, but also the maintenance of its influence and its relative freedom of action. The two score international commissions and unions that have been established in the past fifty years were not designed to protect the liberties of Europe. Nor is international law in itself a more effective defender of public right. Liberty and freedom have been upheld by other means. On the one hand, the Great Powers have guaranteed the neutrality of certain weak states, notably Switzerland and Belgium; and, until the German invasion of Luxemburg and Belgium in August of 1914, this had been regarded as an adequate safeguard. But the main rampart of European liberty has been the doctrine of the balance of power and the alliances that have been formed

to maintain it. Since the outbreak of the present war, it has become the fashion to cast stones at this system. But it does not follow that, because this system was unable to prevent the calamity, it was the cause thereof. A careful examination of modern history would demonstrate that the opposite was the case. Criticism, however valid for the most part it be, should not necessarily imply utter condemnation. The root of the trouble lies elsewhere, in the prevailing international anarchy. The failure to create any supernational authority is the fundamental cause of the catastrophe. The inevitable outcome of a world divided into sovereign states is the system of the balance of power with its alliances and armaments. It was an attempt to secure some measure of justice in interstate relations by preventing the strong from oppressing the weak.³⁰ It is obvious that, if each state remains isolated, free from protecting alliances, each would be at the mercy of the stronger and that ultimately one would absorb all the rest. Even if the weaker states were not actually conquered, their freedom of action would be grievously impaired. It was this that Sir Edward Grey had in mind when, on July 30, 1914, in reply for Germany's bid for British neutrality during the impending war, he wrote: "France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy."³¹ Hence, under the modern state system, a Great Power cannot preserve its freedom without defensive armaments and alliances. Without both of

these, it can have no security or freedom, and the world would soon be dominated by whatever political aggregate cherished such ambitions.³² The determining factor would be merely the relative size of the respective states, which is largely a fortuitous matter and no indication of the degree of civilization attained. No one would contend that the civilization of Rome could compare to that of its small victim, Syracuse. Nor would the outcome give any promise of the predominance of the best; it would only mean wide-spread, if not universal, slavery.

The most vital and real facts in interstate relations are these alliances. They condition and limit the state's freedom in the most far-reaching manner and, at the same time, they alone have preserved that measure of freedom of action that the so-called sovereign states do actually enjoy. They more than anything else have tempered international anarchy and made life bearable. This system of the balance of power with its alliances has by no means always or even generally worked equitably or effectively. It has not always prevented war, though it has distinctly lessened the rule of force. Its aim is not the negative one of preserving peace, but that of protecting the liberty of the various states of Europe. In this, with most noteworthy exceptions, it has been successful. On every occasion when Europe was threatened by the absolute domination of a great military power, this system ultimately safeguarded freedom.

Such was its record against Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon. As Hans Delbrueck says, all Europe needed

England in the struggle against Louis XIV, for without England the freedom of Europe could not be defended against France.³³ The same fundamental issue was at stake a century later in the struggle against the military despotism of Napoleon.³⁴ The military preponderance of Germany after the Franco-Prussian war and the far-reaching aims of the post-Bismarckian leaders have again raised the same fundamental issue and again the same system has spontaneously arisen to cope with it.³⁵ If it be successful in the end, as it promises to be — and otherwise the outlook would be most dismal for the entire world — the co-operative principle underlying this system of alliances will gain fresh vitality. Although one may totally reject Prince von Buelow's political creed, one cannot deny his acumen and insight and, when he says that "it betokens an unscientific and unpractical mode of thought to assume that after this world-war an era will dawn, which in its broad outlines as in its details is diametrically opposed to the past decades before the war,"³⁶ he is uttering a truth that cannot with impunity be ignored in all the prevalent elaboration of schemes for international reconstruction.

It has often been asserted, and equally often denied, that there is no half-way house between a world state and the existing system of sovereign states. If such a structure ever be erected, it will unquestionably not be proof against storm and weather. This will prove true whether it take the form of a reinvigorated and reconstructed Concert of the Great Powers,³⁷ or that of a

League of Nations to Enforce Peace. Both have great possibilities; neither is a permanent abode, but only a temporary shelter. And even so, the Great Powers will not avail themselves of such protection to the exclusion of other means, until the foundations have been thoroughly tested. During this interval, the system of alliances cannot be abandoned by a world that tenaciously clings to the theory of the sovereign state. This will probably become even more apparent if the bases of modern nationalism be examined and if due recognition be given to the exacerbation of national feelings resulting from the internecine war.

II

NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY

“ Une nation est une âme, un principe spirituel. Deux choses qui, a vrai dire, ne font qu’une, constituent cette âme, ce principe spirituel. L’une est dans le passé, l’autre dans le présent. L’une est la possession d’une riche legs de souvenirs, l’autre le consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble, la volonté de faire valoir l’héritage qu’on a reçu indivis.”

—ERNEST RENAN, *Qu’est ce qu’une Nation?* (1882).

“ Present facts, then, demand the recognition of continuous and normal interdependence of States. The nature of the State is to be understood, at least in part, from its relations with other States: and all philosophies which even imply that the State is isolated are out of date. Indeed, one may say that the modern State *must* be understood by this external reference.”

—C. DELISLE BURNS, *The Morality of Nations*, p. 50.

CHAPTER II

NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY

The Theory of Sovereignty — Its Disaccord with Actual Facts — The Unity of Western Civilization — Cultural and Economic Interdependence — The Rise of Large Political Aggregates — Their Significance — Nation and State — Modern Nationalism — Effect of the War upon National Feeling — International Government and the System of Alliances.

THE stern obstacle to the political organization of the world is the sovereignty of the state. This legal doctrine is the fundamental corner-stone of the modern state-system; and, until it is totally abandoned or at least radically altered, there is no possibility of a really effective super-state political system securing justice and right. The most essential attribute of sovereignty is that it is supreme and unlimited, which means that it is subject to no earthly authority. A limited sovereignty would patently be an unavoidable contradiction in terms. Hence its absoluteness. As to this, there has been a general agreement among political scientists, but in recent years there has arisen some serious questioning as to whether the state does actually exercise unlimited authority either within the body politic¹ or in its relations with other states.²

The literature on the subject is almost as voluminous

and as subtle³ as is that on determinism and free will; and the questions are somewhat akin. While it is unquestionably true that the limitations imposed upon the state are not legal in nature, they are, on the other hand, by no means mere self-limitations from which the state can escape at will. Just as the freedom of the individual is restricted by a thousand circumstances and conditions over which he has absolutely no control, so the state's activities are constantly being determined by forces outside it. It can be cogently argued and proven that legally the state is subject to no superior earthly authority, but of what avail is this legal sovereignty, if in practice the state is far from being a complete free agent? The theory of sovereignty serves to some extent merely to veil the real facts and to perpetuate a condition of international anarchy that is becoming increasingly hazardous.

The indivisible sovereignty that is ascribed to the state has two distinct aspects, an internal and an external one. On the one hand, it predicates the absolute authority of the state over all individuals and groups within its territorial limits. With this aspect, we here are not directly concerned. Its corollary is, however, of immediate importance, for sovereignty implies not only the absolute independence of the state, but logically also its isolation in an anarchic world of equally independent politico-legal units. It is an atomistic conception of the world that was even at the time of its formulation out of harmony with the actual facts and which has become increasingly so with the passing centuries.

This disharmony between actual fact and legal theory has increased at an accelerated pace since the mechanical inventions of the past century have made mankind a unit in a concrete sense never before realized. As a result of the improved means of transportation and communication, the world has virtually shrunk to a fraction of its former size and but little can happen anywhere that has not its reflex action in the remotest corners of the globe. This is especially true in the economic field. At the present day, values have been equalized throughout the world and a crop failure or a financial panic in one country has repercussions of varying intensity in most distant regions. Though artificial barriers in the form of protective tariffs somewhat prevent the full realization of this process, the world of to-day — in contrast with that of the past, when there were no steamers, cables and wireless — constitutes an economic unit. Such unity is not equally apparent in the cultural field, for to a modified degree East is still East, and West is still West.

But within the ever growing unity of all mankind resulting from constantly increasing intercourse, there is a more clearly defined entity composed of the states of western civilization. When Romain Rolland speaks of "*l'unité morale de l'Europe*,"⁴ he is not merely using a glittering phrase, but one that corresponds to a reality. Apart, however, from the fact that Europe is the radiating centre of western civilization, this unity actually includes as well all states created by European forces, whether they be in Europe, in Africa, in Australasia, or in

America. There is no absolutely uniform level of civilization in these states. Some, conspicuously a number in South and Central America, as well as in Eastern Europe, are still markedly backward; and there are notable and even portentous differences between others on approximately the same level; but all in all, they constitute a unity because their similarities in fundamentals far outweigh their divergences in detail.⁵ So true is this, that a war between the most advanced representatives of this group is in the nature of a civil war.

Despite marked differences that are of the utmost significance, that relieve what otherwise would be a depressing uniformity and by their interaction stimulate a wholesome progress, the spiritual and moral lives of these western peoples conform to standards that are, broadly speaking, common. There is a substantial uniformity in the general ethical code of the western man, whether he professes a formal religion or be an agnostic. Art, literature, science, and philosophy, have likewise become international. New forms and modes of expression spread quickly; discoveries and inventions by one are quickly adopted by all. The general content of western thought is essentially one. Unless differences are unduly emphasized, as they can readily be, and even must be if a deeper and fuller understanding is to be reached, it is undeniable that the peoples of western civilization have been developing on ever more closely converging cultural lines.

As a result, binding cultural ties have been established,

but far more concretely cohesive are the bonds resulting from the commercial and financial interdependence of the western world. A large proportion of the citizens of every state have direct or indirect interests beyond the bounds of their own country; and the well-being of entire sections is determined by conditions among remote peoples owing an entirely distinct political allegiance. The welfare of England is largely dependent upon the food-stuffs and the cotton derived from America. That of the United States has hitherto depended in great part upon the willingness of Europe to furnish capital to assist in developing its resources and to build its railroads. The policy of Russia toward her Jewish population has had important effects upon the United States and so likewise has had the immigration from Italy.⁶ In like manner, the return of the partially Americanized immigrant to his native land has had significant political and economic effects in Italy and in the Balkans.⁷ Insurance, banking, shipping, manufacturing, and commerce have become to a marked extent international and state boundaries are ignored by large financial, industrial and commercial organizations that have their establishments in various countries. Furthermore, as a result of the system of incorporated companies with a joint stock, men of most diverse national and political ties often share in the risks and profits of one common enterprise. Englishmen, Canadians, Americans, Germans, as well as citizens of other states, are joint owners of such undertakings as the Canadian Pacific Railway. Instance upon instance

might be cited to illustrate this internationalization, which has progressed to such an extent that many a man's chief economic interests are in foreign countries. Furthermore, to an increasing extent, citizens of one state are more or less permanently domiciled within the limits of another; and, with the downfall of the older doctrine of perpetual allegiance, citizenship is shifted with great facility. There has taken place a significant interpenetration of nations.

As a result of this process, both in the general cultural field and in the narrower economic one, mankind tends to become divided along horizontal lines of various nature, cutting across those vertical divisions demarcated by state frontiers. The development in this direction, especially in the socio-economic field, has not been so marked as to some it seemed likely to be a generation ago, but it is clearly apparent.⁸ Many international organizations of most diverse character, some scientific, some commercial, others devoted to the interests of labour, have developed out of the inexorable needs of the situation. It is of the utmost significance that in the year before the war no fewer than 135 such international congresses met.⁹ This interdependence has also, as has already been pointed out, necessitated the formation of international organs for the administration of certain interests common to all states.

As a result of these intricate and vital ties binding together citizens of most diverse states in a network of intimate relations, a condition of interdependence has

arisen that is at variance with the legal sovereignty of state. The state can no longer be held to be a completely free agent either in internal or in external affairs. The fiscal system of one state, its labour legislation, its regulation of emigration and immigration, its shipping laws, to mention only a few out of many policies, profoundly affect at times other states and shape their legislative enactments. Similarly, the military preparations of one state largely determine those of others. It was not of its own free volition, but as a consequence of conditions in Europe, that the United States in 1916 felt obliged to increase its armaments and, as a result, imposed a series of taxes whose social effects may be far-reaching. In the same way, Germany's naval programme obliged England during the past decade greatly to expand her fleet and to divert large funds from other public services.

Still less in the international field does the state enjoy that absolute independence and unfettered freedom of action predicated by its sovereignty. In some matters of common concern, international unions with deliberative and administrative functions are already almost in full control.¹⁰ But even in the still unorganized part of the international system, the state's independence and freedom are conditioned by the wills and wishes of other states. In so far as sovereignty implies freedom of action and complete independence, it is inconsistent with a world of equal states each one of which conditions and limits the actions of the others. Pushed to its logical conclusion, the theory of absolute sovereignty means that

the state should be so powerful that it is able to work its will regardless of its fellows. But the outcome of this would be that there would be really only one sovereign state, while all the others would lose even the relative freedom and independence that they now enjoy. In the world of to-day, the state must perforce in part regulate its conduct by the wishes, interests and rights of other states, and the extent of this restriction of its freedom of action tends, as a rule, to be in indirect proportion to its resources in men, in treasure, and in armaments. Furthermore, all pretence to the complete freedom of action implicit in the concept of sovereignty must be abandoned in a Europe bound in a network of alliances which can force a state into war about an immediate issue in which it may not be at all concerned. Just as the individual cannot be explained apart from the community that conditions his every act, so the state cannot be comprehended if its environment be ignored. The isolated state is an unreal abstraction that obscures fundamental facts.¹¹ Furthermore, just as the individual can actually obtain real liberty only from membership in a community which necessarily restrains his complete freedom of action, so the state cannot secure independence and liberty in isolation, but only by co-operation with its fellows.

While it is probably patent from the foregoing that the independence implied by the legal sovereignty of the state is largely fictitious and is inconsistent with a world that has become a unit, yet the political world tenaciously

clings to the existing system which draws sharp legal lines between groups that are socially and economically interdependent. As yet the states have evinced a decided unwillingness to submit themselves to a supernational authority. But without such an authority there is no method of establishing the rule of law in interstate relations. Individual man, however, yearns for such an outcome and the permanent peace that will come with it. It was predominantly in response to this desire and need that, ever since the rise of the modern state system, there has been a constant tendency toward ever larger political aggregates. It is, as has been well said, pre-eminently necessary that "self-governing groups of men should be enabled to work together in permanent harmony and on a great scale." "In this kind of political integration," to quote John Fiske again, "the work of civilization very largely consists."¹² For only in this manner can peace be established on a comparatively permanent basis. Civil war is always a possibility. But, unless peaceful conditions approximate to permanency, there can be only slight progress in civilization. Chronic warfare almost absolutely bars advance. It was primarily in response to such need for peaceful co-operation that the larger political groups have arisen. The demands of the situation led to the unification of France, Spain, Germany, and Italy. Similar factors made necessary the union of Scotland and England and are manifest even in the formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. They are plainly visible in the history of the United States

and also in the unification of Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Furthermore, although such is not widely recognized to be the case, these same factors were the fundamental ones in creating that amorphous aggregate misleadingly designated as the British Empire, but more appropriately described as "a Commonwealth of Nations." In contradistinction to some other attempts to erect a similarly extensive and intricate political structure, the British Empire was predominantly the result of private initiative and individual enterprise. The Empire was not constructed on plans carefully elaborated by prescient statesmen, but grew as an inevitable consequence of the wide-spread activities of British pioneers. Territorial acquisitions were not systematically and deliberately planned by the government, but were, in general, either the somewhat accidental result of European wars into which Britain had been drawn or the unavoidable consequence of antecedently established interests that a not infrequently reluctant government, dreading further responsibilities, could not ignore. The entire development has been admirably summarized by Mr. Philip H. Kerr, when he says:

"The British Commonwealth, indeed, has come into being, not through any consciously Imperial design, not, as Seeley said, in a fit of absence of mind, or by accident, but because it has supplied the needs of the people within it. Where chaos, or tyranny, or callous exploitation, or perpetual war and robbery reigned before, it has established peace, order, and justice. Under the protection of its laws one-quarter of the people of the earth live in peace and unity. It guarantees to every individual, of whatever race or colour, an equal liberty before the law.

It protects them from devastation from without, and from disorder within. It bridges, in its laws and its institutions, the gulf between East and West, between white and black, between race and race. It is even able to give full liberty to nationalism, and yet combine it with loyalty to a greater Commonwealth. To all it promises not good government only, but eventual self-government. . . . It is easy to point to defects in its administration and its institutions. The room for improvement and progress is infinite. None the less it does, in its imperfect human way, meet an essential human need, and that is why it exists, and why it must continue to exist.”¹³

However inadequately it be organized and however incompletely as yet means have been found safely to extend the sphere of self-government, this vast Commonwealth, comprising one quarter of the world's population of most varied races and creeds, of all stages of civilization, is in itself proof of the ultimate possibility of a world-community, “reconciling the freedom of individuals and of individual states with the accomplishment of a common aim for mankind as a whole.” The great barrier to this ultimate goal outlined by Kant and in fact to the necessary steps toward the preliminary integration leading to it, such as the voluntary coalescence of Great Powers in a greater body politic — for instance, the merger of the British Commonwealth and the United States, or that of Austria and Germany — is not merely the legal doctrine of state sovereignty, but those forces with which it is intricately intertwined and which are summed up in the inclusive term, nationalism.

In political discussions considerable confusion not infrequently results from the use of terms in a varying and

undifferentiated sense. The ordinary interchangeable use of the words, state and nation, is a case in point. In this instance, the confusion could readily be avoided as the concepts are quite distinct. But in other instances, the poverty of the English language admits of no such escape. It is patent that, when we speak of international relations we mean those obtaining between states, yet the more accurate term, interstate, is not sanctioned by general usage. Likewise, the expression, supernational, is commonly used when super-state is really meant. The tyranny of language has led to considerable muddled thinking in these instances, but this evil has been even more manifest in the discussion of nationalism. The psychological forces denoted by nationalism are two-fold in nature, both those springing from membership in a cultural group and those arising from allegiance to a common flag. It is obvious that these two sets of gregarious feelings are quite distinct in nature. But as a result of the rise of the national state, they have in varying proportions become merged and have produced modern nationalism. Both forces are usually co-existent, but the diverse manifestations of nationalism are sometimes predominantly the result of group solidarity based upon the nation and at other times they spring mainly from similar feelings toward the state. Thus what is known as economic nationalism is only to a minor extent the expression of national feeling, but is predominantly the attempt of men united in a state to further the economic interests of that particular political unit. Similarly,

when one speaks of Swiss or of Belgian nationalism, what is meant is chiefly the patriotic devotion of men of diverse language and origin to a common body politic. On the other hand, the Southern Slav movement is based primarily upon the gregarious instinct of the politically separated fragments of that nation. Not only is nationalism a most complex force, but its content varies in nearly every instance. Further analysis and exposition will probably make this clearer.

Though frequently and misleadingly confused in common practice, state and nation are two fundamentally distinct concepts. The former is an exclusively politico-legal concept and, roughly, is merely a definite segment of mankind united in one body politic. On the other hand, the nation is etymologically an ethnical, but more accurately, a cultural concept, and is a similar portion of humanity bound together by other than mere political ties. From the physical standpoint nation and state are never absolutely identical, for their boundaries do not follow the same geographical lines. A state is frequently composed of a number of nations or parts of them, and in turn, nations are often split up into a number of states. This is true even of Western Europe, though not to the same extent as in the eastern section of that continent. Considerable portions of the Teutonic nation are under the rule of Austria and Switzerland, and the German Empire as constituted in 1871 embraced fragments of the French, Danish, and Polish nations. Likewise, parts of the French nation are included within Belgium, Ger-

many, and Switzerland. The Italian nation, similarly, extends beyond the boundaries of the territorial state. This intersection of national and political lines is the direct consequence of the more or less artificial determination of state frontiers according to dynastic, political, economic, and strategic considerations. It has been a fertile source of trouble, especially in the border-lands between nation and nation, because the pattern made there by these intersecting lines is so extremely complicated and intricate as to render well-nigh impossible a solution along national lines of the problems of Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, Bohemia, Macedonia and Transylvania — to mention only a few of the questions that the existing war has thrown into the crucible. In virtually every instance, there must remain a minority that will fret under the political affiliations which even the keenest sense of justice might assign to it.¹⁴

What are these deeply rooted cultural ties that bind together individuals into groups distinct from the political associations known as states? It is essentially true that mankind is akin and that its common humanity constitutes a primary unity. But this basic unity is as yet less energetic as a political force than are those differences that divide mankind into distinct groups. Of these the most important politically, though possibly not the most fundamental, are those physical differences, primarily the colour of the skin, that constitute unmistakable fissures in mankind's unity. The white, black, and yellow races have distinct physical characteristics that strike the

eye, however much one might be inclined to ignore them. But within these primary divisions — and politically they are still primary, however factitious and superficial they may seem to be from an ideal standpoint — are less marked distinctions that establish definite groups within them. One such primary division is the Caucasian race, which is a definite entity that has produced the clearly defined European or western type of civilization. But it is a unity embracing infinite diversity and these divergences have led to the evolution of minor groups known as nations. A nation may be described as a group of men united by a consciousness both of common likeness to one another as well as of difference from others. The resulting consciousness of belonging together, apart from the political bond of the state, is the product of many factors, of which the most important are common, almost identical, moral standards, ideals, traditions, customs, and political instincts. As this unity in the fundamental content of thought is most likely to be attained by means of a common language, its possession is generally the most significant outward sign of nationality. Far less important than this essential like-mindedness toward basic values, is race unity or community of blood. For race, in so far as divisions within the Caucasian group are concerned, is primarily a cultural not a physical fact. The Slav brought up in a purely Teutonic environment is apt to become a typical German, and this tendency will become overpowering if both he and his associates are ignorant of his racial origins. This holds true as well of

Englishmen, Germans, and Italians under the same circumstances. Treitschke, the most Prussian of Prussians, was a Saxon of Tzech descent; and Nietzsche, the unconscious prophet of Prussianism, prided himself on his Polish blood. In this connection also, it is decidedly significant that, during the fateful twelve days of 1914, British interests at Berlin and Vienna were in charge of men whose not remote ancestors were Germans.

But the use of a common speech with its ensuing like-mindedness and community of civilization both in essentials and in details, though they be the basic facts of true nationality, do not always establish the existence of a nation. In addition, there must be among the individuals what Sidgwick called "a consciousness of belonging to one another, of being members of one body, over and above what they derive from the mere fact of being under one government."¹⁵ In other words, in ultimate analysis, nationality is predominantly a psychological fact.

The demand of such self-conscious national groups for full expression dominated the history of the nineteenth century and gave rise to the doctrine of nationalism. This creed, as Mr. C. Delisle Burns has lucidly demonstrated, was the joint product of two preceding ideals, Renaissance state-sovereignty and eighteenth-century revolutionary rights.¹⁶ To the concept of sovereignty, according to which each state was politically and legally a self-sufficient unit, was joined the doctrine of the French Revolution, that every people has an inalienable

right to the form of government it desires, and that the imposition upon it of another rule is inherently indefensible. This doctrine justified each segment of mankind in establishing its own form of government and in seeking self-centred isolation by means of complete political separation from other groups of varying differences in mind. The resulting nationalism was the basis and justification for the movement that led to the independence of the English and Spanish colonies in America as well as to the successful revolts of Greece and of the other Balkan states against Turkish dominion. It was on the strength of this principle of nationalism, then generally accepted by progressive thinkers, that many Englishmen of the liberal school espoused the cause of the South during the beginning of the American Civil War, since, in the absence of any clear and avowed intent on the part of the North to uproot negro slavery, it seemed merely an attempt of one group of men to force a distasteful system of government upon others of a kindred, but clearly divergent, type.¹⁷

But nationalism is not only a disintegrating factor. The same forces that led to Greece's independence were predominant in the unification of Italy and of Germany. Consciousness of kind binds the like together and divides the unlike. But as absolute identity is never attainable, even if it were desirable, there are innumerable gradations of likeness and dissimilarity — myriad co-existent foci of attraction and repulsion between individual and individual, between group and group. Hence, national-

ism may at one and the same time be a consolidating and a disintegrating force, not only as between two nationally kindred states, but even within the same body politic.

Nationalism is, however, primarily a disintegrating force, because the average man's imagination and outlook are restricted and his sympathies and co-operation are more readily enlisted for the affairs of his immediate neighbours than for those of the larger community. It is predominantly outside pressure and the necessity of uniting to withstand it that compel small communities to unite into larger aggregates for the defence of their common interests. It was the alien Austrian rule and the dread of its re-imposition that made and kept modern Italy united. Similarly, from joint military action in the war against France sprang, as Bismarck had shrewdly calculated, modern Germany. Secretary of State Seward likewise relied upon the consolidating effect of such pressure from without when, shortly after the secession of the Southern States, he urged upon President Lincoln the advisability of provoking a foreign war as the most efficacious means of restoring the union.¹⁸ In final analysis also, the marked trend toward greater cohesion in the British Empire during the past decades has been the direct reaction to the international tension and, in especial, to the German menace.

Manifestly, the differences that divide the Caucasian race into separate nations are not always sharply defined. They are frequently impalpable in that they are predominantly psychological, for the saying that a man

belongs to the nation to which he thinks he belongs is essentially true. Between some of the nations, as for instance the Spanish Republics of South America, the differences in civilization are so slight that these states may be described as almost constituting one nation split by the memory of past quarrels and by present conflicting interests into separate political entities. The same is essentially true of Great Britain and the United States. As Professor John W. Burgess expressed it, "a nation may be divided into two or more states on account of territorial separation — as, for example, the English and the North American — and one of the results of this division will be the development of new and distinct national traits."¹⁹

That the English-speaking and Spanish-speaking nations are largely inchoate and are not more vital realities is due primarily to the fact that the respective peoples of these two clearly defined groups are far from being fully conscious of their common nationality. Such consciousness is essential. Under these circumstances and in the absence of outside pressure compelling them to join forces for the purpose of withstanding an imminent and common danger, distinct antagonisms based upon historical causes and mutual rivalries may even establish themselves. While economic facts do not determine nationality and the economic units into which some economists divide the world are predominantly historical and political products, nationalism is prone to seek expression in economic policy. Attempts of the state to

make itself economically strong, and thus politically powerful, accentuate in turn whatever divergent interests may exist between politically separated but kindred national groups. By such means are intensified differences that under a system of free trade would have scarcely more disruptive tendency than the competitive economic rivalry between man and man within the state. Economic conditions are not a constituent factor of nationality,²⁰ but the economic policy of the state may still further disintegrate the inherent unity of a nation divided into separate political entities; and it may, on the other hand, give some measure of unity to a state composed of distinct and even antagonistic nationalities. Conflicting political ambitions and economic interests, the memories of past strife, self-regarding particularism, or even the mere dread of change, may keep kindred nations politically apart. But, at the same time, similar forces, above all the fear of more powerful neighbours, may keep mutually repellent nations within the same body politic. Before the war, Magyar and German-Austrian detested one another in full sincerity, but their common opposition to Russia, their combined ambitions in the Balkans, and their joint exploitation of the Slavonic and other subject nationalities that constituted a majority of the Dual Empire, preserved the unity of Austria-Hungary.

Throughout the nineteenth century there was a well-defined tendency to accentuate the differences between man and man. Local institutions, provincial history and

antiquities were cherished and studied with a painstaking care, almost incomprehensible to those outside the range of these interests. Declining or moribund languages, like Tzech, Hungarian, Dutch, Flemish, and Gaelic, have been revitalized, despite the fact that they are a distinct handicap in that their use is necessarily confined to small numbers.²¹ In some instances, mere dialects have been nurtured into literary languages. Many minor groups, little nations or fragments of larger ones, known as nationalities, have been called into distinct self-consciousness. Even in France, where nation and state are possibly most completely identified, voices are raised claiming that Brittany is in spirit a nation, though an inseparable part of a larger one, and demanding recognition of this fact in the political field as well as the public teaching of the Celtic tongue such as obtains in the schools of Wales.²²

This process of differentiation with its particularistic tendencies may to a great extent be attributed, as has been done by Lecky, to the spread of education and to the ensuing increased interest in all human affairs.²³ But, coincident with this disruptive tendency, increased knowledge has had integrating effects, some of which are far from wholesome. Thus, increased historical knowledge has led to an aggressive nationalism that seeks to recreate a remote past. The Germany of the Middle Ages — the Holy Roman Empire with its theoretical claims to universal dominion in all things temporal — is a potent element in modern German aspirations. Similarly,

Serbia looks back to the time when she was the leading nation in the Balkans. The same is true of Bulgaria. Though the Polish nation has by no means as yet been re-established, some Poles are already thinking of the greater Poland of the Jagiello Princes! Likewise, "the Glory that was Greece and the Grandeur that was Rome" play an important part in the aspirations of those who look upon themselves as the direct descendants and heirs of these ancient states. Other instances might also be cited. Irredentism is by no means solely an Italian policy. In order to justify modern national ambitions, the real past has in many cases been transfigured and, in some instances even, a mythical golden age has been created. To such an extent has this been done that there is almost full warrant for Froude's cynical saying that history is "like a child's box of letters, with which we can spell any word we please."

But the spread of knowledge has likewise had integrating effects of a far more beneficent character. Increased education has led to a fuller knowledge of other groups. The intellectual interdependence of the western world has in varying degrees counteracted the particularistic tendencies inherent in the increasing differentiation into well-defined groups. The stranger is no longer fully a stranger and can be regarded with some measure of understanding and sympathy. But to some extent still, as in the case of religion, loyalty to one's national kin, frequently expresses itself less in devotion to the nation's

highest ideals, than in depreciation and dislike of other groups.²⁴

Thus, in general, nationalism and internationalism have developed side by side throughout the nineteenth century. There is no inherent antagonism between the two. As has been finely and truly said by Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson: "Internationalism does not attack the feeling 'We belong to ourselves.' It attacks only its perversion, 'We do not belong to you.'" ²⁵ In spite of the increasing group differentiation, mankind's fundamental unity has during the past hundred years received ever more extensive recognition and, at the same time also, the tendency has been to establish increasingly large political agglomerations, some of which are based upon the fullest consent of the self-conscious groups within them. This development has been made feasible by the abandonment of the old idea of a unicellular state and the development of the federal system. When unmolested, national self-consciousness is not apt to threaten the integrity of the state, and its political significance then consists merely in a tendency towards administrative decentralization and increased local self-government. It is not necessarily separatist. But when thwarted in its attempts at self-expression, nationalism becomes a disruptive force of first magnitude. Any attempt of a dominant race to impose its religion, language, and civilization upon a reluctant minor nationality within the state stimulates the tendency towards particularism and markedly accentu-

ates the growth of differences. Polish national sentiment had been powerfully stimulated by the persistent attempts of Germany and Russia to uproot the native language. The Southern Slav question and the renaissance of Bohemian nationality are due largely to the repressive policies of Austria and Hungary. Whether it be in the Ukraine, in Croatia, in Bosnia, in Transylvania, or in Alsace-Lorraine, wherever national feeling is a serious menace to the state's integrity, this is due predominantly to the pressure of a ruling majority. Even the memory of such a past, as in Ireland, is an influential factor. But wherever a broad policy is pursued, one not based on the principle of toleration — which implies superiority and inferiority — but upon the recognition of the inherent right of all groups to self-expression and, as a consequence, the constituent nations are allowed full freedom in the preservation of their own peculiar languages, religions, and customs, then the disintegrating tendency is minimized and may become even negligible. These underlying facts will ultimately make possible a world-state. At present, the nearest approach to such an ideal is the British Commonwealth, wherein the various nations constituting its four hundred and fifty millions live, not in complete concord, which can never be realized in a progressive world of divine discontent, but in sufficient harmony to render possible the meting out of a measure of necessarily imperfect justice to all under the rule of its far-flung law.

As a result of the growing interdependence of the

world and its increasing internationalism, the comity of nations had before the war outstripped that of states. Between individual and individual of different national groups there was markedly less hostility and, except in Eastern Europe, the antagonism between nation and nation as such had greatly declined. In every field of thought and activity, the western world was closely interrelated. There were even in existence some rudimentary organs of international government. But legally the world was divided into sharply defined units. In ordinary times of peace, the consciousness of the state is largely latent and the most real associations of the average individual are with religious, scientific, industrial, commercial, labour, and other professional groups, many of which cut across the state frontiers. But, as a consequence of the lack of interstate organization, whenever the state is in danger the citizen must ruthlessly sever all ties extending beyond its bounds. Under the existing international anarchy, the ultimate dedication must be to the state and not to mankind as a whole. The layman or official, whose final allegiance is to the unorganized society of states, is inevitably regarded as not only derelict in his duty but as a traitor. The so-called self-regarding nationalism, to which is generally attributed the conditions that made this war possible, is not primarily the product of the relations existing between nation and nation, but it is chiefly the inevitable result of the anarchy that must prevail in a world of sovereign states. Not that the feelings of nation to nation, as

opposed to those of state to state, were without antagonism. On the contrary, there was considerable antipathy, but this was rapidly decreasing especially in the most advanced western nations. But under the existing interstate anarchy, states are perforce in a position of distrust and suspicion and their governments cannot escape from acting upon competitive, as distinct from cooperative, principles. Those entrusted with foreign affairs can scarcely avoid disregarding the interests of mankind whenever they seem to be in conflict with those of the state.

Hence, before the war, although the most enlightened opinion throughout the western world, especially in English-speaking countries, favoured the creation of some effective super-state authority that would eliminate the possibility of a world war, the problem could not even be adequately approached because no state was willing to limit its sovereignty. The people were far more ready for a radical solution than were the governments. These were bound fast by the view that above all else it was necessary to maintain unimpaired the sovereignty of their respective states. The war has to some extent reversed this situation. The governments now recognize the necessity of some super-state authority, but national feeling has become so exacerbated that the prerequisite basis for the effective operation of such an all-inclusive organization has been undermined. The extensive nature of the war and its intensive conduct have brought non-combatant as well as combatant within its direct ravages;

while, at the same time, details of every phase of its course, which in former conflicts reached but small circles, have been made by the press the common property of all. In no previous war has each people been so fully and intimately acquainted with "the crimes and misdeeds of the enemy." German atrocities in Belgium and in Northern France, the bombardment of peaceful towns, the Zeppelin raids, the submarine campaign, the brutalities in Poland ²⁶—everything comprised in the policy of "frightfulness"—the Turkish massacres in Armenia, and the Austro-Hungarian outrages in Serbia,²⁷ have created a barrier whose temporary nature would not be light-heartedly affirmed if it were remembered that Cromwell's deeds in Ireland are still a factor in keeping the English and Irish peoples apart. The peoples of Central Europe have likewise some grievances and, no matter how insignificant relatively they actually be, in their eyes they bulk very large. Nor does it matter much that the Allied blockade is a time-honoured measure of war; so long as the Teutonic peoples think the so-called "starvation policy" not only unlawful but heinous, this fact will from their side strengthen and raise the barrier that their own conduct of the war had already established between the belligerent peoples.

As a result there has developed a marked fissure in the unity of western civilization. The cleavage was already present before 1914, but the outbreak and the course of the war have so broadened and deepened it that the abyss in view is formidable. It cannot be concealed by make-

shift contrivances or by elaborate bridges; and the mills of the gods grind too slowly to warrant the hope of its disappearance for a number of decades. Hence, the conditions are really less favourable for the establishment of an effective all-inclusive super-state authority than they were before the war. One may be created, but it will have no real vitality until the suspicions aroused by Germany's disregard of her plighted word towards Belgium are dispelled. Without mutual trust in one another's good faith, there can be no real interstate cooperation in fundamental matters. Suspicion was rife before, but for decades to come it will thoroughly permeate the atmosphere of all international conferences, congresses, and councils composed of the present adversaries. The development has, however, not been one of unqualified retrogression. While this cleavage in western unity has been laid bare and enlarged, the peoples divided by this abyss have been drawn into much closer relations with those ranged on their own side of it. Their alliances, as a consequence, will in the future have a much broader democratic basis.

Hitherto, these alliances have been predominantly those of governments, not of peoples; and their compelling motive has been fear, rather than any mutual attraction. This system of alliances was the result of the new conditions created by the rise of modern Germany after the successive defeats of Denmark, Austria, and France from 1864 to 1871. Bismarck, the master-builder of the German Empire, was not looking for new fields to

conquer but, in his satiety, sought to render secure the elaborate structure. He frankly admitted that the idea of hostile coalitions gave him a nightmare. Dreading such a union of Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary, he turned to the latter country and, in 1879, concluded a defensive alliance with it. On many grounds, Bismarck would have preferred an alliance with Russia and, as he tells us, such an arrangement "was popular with nearly all parties."²⁸ The alliance actually concluded was predominantly one of governments; its popular basis was at the outset most slender, though since then it has considerably broadened. Three years later, in 1882, Italy joined these two Powers and in this alliance were even more conspicuous the element of fear and the absence of a democratic factor. Originally, the alliance was entered upon, not out of good will towards the Central Powers, but mainly on account of resentment against France for acquiring a protectorate over Tunis which Italy coveted.²⁹ As time went on, this alliance, which ran counter to national instincts, was kept intact chiefly because it secured Italy from the hostility of Austria, her traditional enemy. The year after the formation of the Triple Alliance, Rumania joined this group on the same terms as had Italy.³⁰ Here again the same negative forces were at work.³¹ This is well illustrated by the remarks of the Rumanian statesman, Take Jonesco. Some years ago, as he related the tale, "when two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, one retired, the other in office, asked me at Paris how it was possible that we could be

Allies of Hungary, we who could never become a great country except at the expense of Hungary, I answered — ‘and the alliance of Italy with Austria, do you understand that?’ And when they said to me, ‘Certainly, it is an alliance of fear,’ I replied — ‘Why do you think that Italy alone is afraid?’ ”³²

The Triple Alliance, although originally wholly defensive in character, gravely disturbed the European Balance and inevitably aroused serious misgivings in Russia and France, who gradually drifted together until, in 1894, a series of prior agreements culminated in a similar defensive alliance. As the historian of this development has said, both France and Russia were suffering from “*l’hypertrophie de la puissance allemande*” and both realized the necessity of an equilibrium in Europe.³³ This alliance again was not based upon popular sympathies, but on fear.

While in this manner a fairly stable equilibrium was being established in Europe, England stood in general aloof from both combinations. Despite a tendency to gravitate towards the Central Powers due to the dread of Russian expansion in Asia and to annoyance at France’s uncertain colonial policy, these were really years of so-called “splendid isolation.”³⁴ This policy of aloofness could, however, no longer be maintained after Germany by word and deed had plainly manifested extensive colonial ambitions and was building a navy of such extent as to threaten the safety of the British Commonwealth. With Japan was concluded an alliance that per-

mitted the withdrawal of considerable naval forces from the Pacific. Then followed successive agreements with France and Russia that eliminated all outstanding disputes with them and paved the way for the co-operation of the three contracting Powers in international affairs. It would, however, require abnormally acute discernment to perceive in these arrangements any marked democratic elements. They were primarily agreements between governments to meet the impending German onslaught.

One of the most far-reaching results of the war promises to be a significant change in the nature of these alliances. We are to-day very remote from the eighteenth century when alliances were largely based upon dynastic considerations and when the partners in them changed with astonishing celerity and frequency. We are also rapidly leaving behind the age of merely governmental alliances based chiefly upon the negative factor of fear. As a result of the stress of a war demanding untold sacrifices and the most unselfish collaboration, what were at the outset predominantly governmental arrangements are rapidly becoming co-operative associations of peoples. A broad and firm popular basis for these alliances is being gradually developed. This is especially true as regards the democratic combination that aims to resist the aggression of Teutonic autocracy and to quell the rebellion of the Central Powers against the free and progressive spirit of western civilization. In the relations of each to every other member of this demo-

cratic group, the popular element will vary in proportion to the amount of reciprocal sympathy and understanding developed and must, now and in the future, depend upon the more or less close approximation of their respective national ideals. But, unless Germany is so decisively vanquished that all danger of renewed aggression is completely eliminated, the element of fear will still constitute an important factor of cohesion.

It is reasonably certain that the two existing sets of opposing alliances will, in some form or other, remain in existence. It is idle to expect them to be abandoned just when they are becoming living institutions. They are and will for some time continue to be, the most vital and real facts in interstate relations. They cannot with impunity be ignored by those who plan to organize the world and to create a supernational authority. That organization will necessarily have to rest largely upon them. If an all-inclusive league of states to enforce peace be established, its membership will for a considerable time probably consist of three classes, the neutrals during the war and the two groups of erstwhile belligerents. On the other hand, if the proposed "League of Honour" be restricted to the world's democracies, this concert of purpose and action would be predominantly the present alliance against the Teutonic Powers, though probably more definitely organized and presumably also endowed with a continuing programme for maintaining and extending the public right of the world. Whether it be the all-inclusive league or the democratic concert, the al-

liances will probably continue at least until the supernational organization has satisfactorily demonstrated its full effectiveness as a bulwark of freedom. In fact, these alliances and the less formal associations in this war against Prussianism may in some instances produce far more durable results. To the extent that they are associations of peoples based upon mutual sympathy and respect and dedicated to a common high purpose, they may eventually lead to a new form of political union, unknown to a political science whose chief concern is the state of indivisible and absolute sovereignty. Unless within the proposed supernational league there goes on a process of ever closer and closer association between the states whose people are nearest akin so that ultimately permanent political union result therefrom, there is but scant prospect that mankind will ever emerge from the darkness of international anarchy into the full sunlight of a world-wide system of order and justice.

III

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914

“Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe, our second never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with Cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe.

—THOMAS JEFFERSON to JAMES MONROE,
October 24, 1823.

CHAPTER III

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914

Introductory — American Political Philosophy and Ideals — Non-Interference in Europe — The Monroe Doctrine — Opinions of the Elder Statesmen — The Policy of Non-Intervention — The Assumption of Obligations in America and the Far East — Some Results of the Policy of Isolation.

THE modern system of sovereign states divides the world into sharply segregated politico-legal units. To the extent that this segregation is inconsistent with the growing social, cultural, and economic unity of western civilization, these entities are somewhat artificial. This system, however, determines the spirit and nature of interstate relations. As a result thereof, each one of these states is primarily, if not exclusively, interested in its own welfare and, in pursuing it, tends to disregard the rights and interests of its fellows and to ignore those of mankind as a whole. Under existing conditions, it is impossible for the statesman or for the layman to act upon the principle proclaimed by Mazzini: "You are *men* before you are *citizens* or *fathers*." ¹

At the same time, however, the fundamental unity of mankind, or at least of certain great portions thereof, which had never been wholly obscured since the days

of the Stoics, has prevented "the final and deliberate outward recognition of the view that States have no duties to one another and that the international polity is a fortuitous concourse of atoms."² But in case of conflict of interest between state and mankind and between state and state, the citizen must ineluctably give his ultimate dedication and supreme allegiance to his own country. It follows inevitably from this situation that states are forced into competitive relations³ and that those in charge of their foreign affairs cannot in all respects conform to the ethical code binding upon individuals.⁴ As long as the interests of the state are declared paramount, foreign policy must be dictated by more or less selfish considerations. All states are in varying degrees infected with this self-regarding nationalism, which is the fundamental cause of the present war and which will cause further catastrophes in the future unless the state can be effectively controlled by some adequate and practical form of world-organization. Apparently, such a consummation cannot be fully realized for a considerable time, because the sense of international obligation and responsibility — the willingness to forego or even to jeopard national advantage in mutual service for mankind as a whole — is more or less undeveloped in all states and, hence, virtually no state is willing to limit its freedom and independence to the extent necessary to establish an effective supernational authority.

At one extreme in the world of to-day is a state like

the German Empire which, goaded on by the aggressive tenets of a reactionary economic and political philosophy, impelled by an almost pagan worship of the God of War and at the same time imbued with the self-imposed mission to redeem a "decadent world,"⁵ rides rough-shod over the rights of others. At the other pole is England, whose policy is not only controlled by powerful moral inhibitions but, in addition, has been tempered by two generations of free trade and by centuries of intimate contact with most diverse peoples in all corners of the globe. As the head of a world-wide Commonwealth, whose persistence depends upon its performing a world-function, she has fully learned the value of the maxim, "Live and let live." Had this vast Empire been administered primarily for selfish national purposes, its existence would long since have been challenged by a united Europe. What was lacking in British policy was not adequate consideration for the rights and interests of other states, but the willingness fully and betimes to assume the responsibility of ensuring peace in Europe. In spite of the fact that England for years persistently strove to avert the threatening world war, she cannot escape some degree of negative responsibility for it, chiefly in that she refused to assume the unwelcome burden of adequate military preparedness and thus indirectly encouraged Germany in her plan to dominate Europe and the world. The responsibility is radically different in kind and degree from that of Germany and must be shared by other states, some belligerent and

some neutral, all of whom have over-emphasized their rights and have either minimized or ignored the complementary obligations to the still unorganized world-community of states. Almost, if not equally as disastrous to the civilization of the world as are the aims and acts of Germany, was the traditional attitude of the United States which, immersed in concern for its own peace and liberty, had until 1917 adhered to a policy of "no foreign entanglements" outside the western hemisphere that is tantamount to a repudiation of all responsibility for maintaining justice and right in interstate relations other than such as directly affected the American continents.

It follows from these premises that the United States cannot escape a certain degree of negative responsibility for the deplorable chaos into which civilization has fallen. American idealism and American practice in foreign policy presented a strange contrast. For although German political philosophy has been widely taught in the United States by scientists trained in German universities, its tenets have not become an integral part of general thought. Above all, its doctrines, when accepted, had not been pushed to their logical extremes. The German theory of the state is of ancient lineage and has profound roots in German thought and practice,⁶ and consequently it may be valid in so far as the German state is concerned. This is not questioned here. But when an American speaks of the state as an organism, he is using a metaphor.⁷ Nor do his anthropomorphic

tendencies lead him to endow the state with living personality.⁸ In the eyes of most Americans, this German concept of the state as a living organism with no moral responsibility but to itself, is a metaphysical abstraction corresponding in no degree to an actuality within their experience. And if, at times, the state is regarded by Americans as a *persona ficta*, the fictitious element is, in general, always kept in mind. Nor would Americans agree with the predominant German view that the state is based upon constraint and power, and that in determining the inner character of any state it is essential to find out whom the army obeys.⁹ As Americans view it, their state is not based upon power but upon general consent, and the body politic is a co-operative group for furthering the welfare and the ideals of the individuals composing it.¹⁰ Hence, American political thought, unlike that of Germany, does not make the organization an end in itself, to which the individual must be completely subordinated,¹¹ and whose aim must inevitably be the quest of power.¹² Liberty might, somewhat loosely, be named as the American state's supreme end. Nor is the German visualization of the world as an incoherent group of inherently antagonistic states, each a law unto itself, in accord with American political traditions and ideals. The value of the state is not over-emphasized nor are the rights and importance of mankind as a whole ignored. The prevailing concept is that of a morally responsible state conforming to the public opinion of the still unorganized

world-community. There has always been implicit in American thought the ideal of such an ultimate community based on the essential unity of humanity. America is deeply impregnated with the Kantian aim of universal peace, while modern Germany generally holds that the hope of banishing war from the world is not only senseless, but deeply immoral.¹³ Practically nothing effective, however, had been done by the United States to make this ideal an eventual possibility. It had been debarred from doing so by the deliberate policy of aloofness from European affairs.

The traditional American course of self-centred isolation was the joint product of factors within the body politic and of conditions in a Europe almost completely subject to autocracy at the time of this policy's formulation. American political life has been largely dominated by three concepts — independence, union, and the Monroe Doctrine. The independence gained after years of struggle is deemed a sacrosanct heritage that should not in the least be impaired. This ideal of independence is interwoven with the concept of sovereignty and both have been somewhat technically interpreted by the lawyers, whose influence in American political life overshadows that of all other groups. Most of these lawyers have sat at the feet of Blackstone and his definition of sovereignty as "the supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority" has played a considerable part in American history. The legalistic bent of American public men and the intense devotion of the people to every-

thing associated with independence have had their share in keeping the United States aloof from Europe. In addition, and as in the case of all English-speaking peoples, American political thought and action have been largely devoted to insistence upon the rights of individuals. What Mazzini called "the sterile Declaration of Rights" seemed to most Americans to embody the doctrines essential to a well-ordered society. The prevailing political creed was, and to some extent still is, predominantly the individualistic and negative one of rights, and there has been a marked, though rapidly decreasing, tendency to ignore the complementary obligations. When applied in interstate relations, this attitude resulted in a stress on the value of American rights together with a notable unwillingness to assume responsibilities for the welfare of the interstate community. The conjoint result of these factors is that, while the United States advocated the highest ideals of international comity, no other state was, at the same time, more reluctant to restrict its freedom of action by positive and active co-operation with others in attaining this goal.

Many of the fundamental features of American foreign policy—insistence upon the "impregnable independence and the equal sovereignty of the United States with any or all other nations of the world," the development of the doctrine and practice of absolute neutrality, the assertion of the principle of the freedom of the seas, the advocacy of international arbitration, and the

conclusion of extradition treaties — date from Washington's Administration, when an embattled Europe presented many difficult problems to the young Republic.¹⁴ But even more far-reaching than were these specific lines of action, was the general policy, adumbrated earlier, but clearly outlined by Washington in his famous Farewell Address of 1796. Herein he stated:

“The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. . . . Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have no, or a very remote, relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collusions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. . . . It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”

This advice of Washington has been taken literally, quite apart from the conditions that suggested its wisdom to him, and it is furthermore usually ignored that in the same address he not only advised an honourable adherence to the existing defensive alliance with France, but in addition stated that, “taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive position, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.”

Five years thereafter, in his notable first inaugural address, Jefferson advocated the same general attitude

in the following trenchant words: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."¹⁵ At the same time, in a famous letter to Thomas Paine, he elaborated these views, writing: "We shall avoid implicating ourselves with the Powers of Europe, even in support of principles which we mean to pursue. They have so many other interests different from ours that we must avoid being entangled in them."¹⁶

This principle of abstention from interference in European affairs formed one of the corner-stones of American foreign policy prior to 1914. The other was definitely laid only in 1823 when the Monroe Doctrine was formulated, but it was a logical consequence of the former action. As early as 1808, Jefferson wrote that the object "must be to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere";¹⁷ and, twelve years later, he emphasized "the advantages of a cordial fraternization among all the American nations, and the importance of their coalescing in an American system of policy totally independent of and unconnected with that of Europe."¹⁸ From Monroe's famous message dates the definitive adoption of these two correlative principles as inflexible rules of action. This outcome was, however, not reached without some struggle which served to emphasize that a clear-cut parting of the ways had been reached.

There were, at that time, three important movements in the world that deeply appealed to the American people. Greece was attempting to free herself from the Turkish

yoke and the South American colonies had all but succeeded in severing their political ties with Spain. In that country a revolution against the absolutist Bourbon monarchy was in full swing and France, acting under a mandate of the Continental Powers, was intervening by force to suppress the uprising. Furthermore, it was feared, and not without reason, that as soon as Spanish liberalism was crushed, the reactionary Concert of Europe would attempt to restore Spanish America to her former European allegiance. South America was far more closely connected by military¹⁹ and commercial ties with England than with the United States, and her future naturally aroused great interest there. In this conjuncture, the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, suggested to Richard Rush, the American representative at the Court of St. James, that Great Britain and the United States should co-operate in opposing an attempt on the part of the European Concert to re-subject South America to Spanish rule. When President Monroe received this offer, he forthwith sought the advice of his experienced predecessors in office, Jefferson and Madison.²⁰

Jefferson fully appreciated the momentous nature of the question and, in reply, wrote: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe, our second never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with Cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should there-

fore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is labouring to become the domicile of despotism our endeavour should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom."

These historic words are usually quoted apart from their context in order to justify a policy far other than that actually advocated by Jefferson. For the aged statesman further pointed out that one European state, most of all, could frustrate this outcome and that, by accepting Great Britain's proffer of co-operation, the United States would "detach her from the band of despots, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government and emancipate a continent at one stroke." Great Britain, he continued, "is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all, on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her then we should the most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause."²¹

Madison entirely concurred with Jefferson and went even further. He advised the acceptance of Canning's offer because "with that co-operation we have nothing to fear from the rest of Europe; and with it the best reliance on success to our just & laudable views." "Our co-operation," he added, "is due to ourselves & to the world: and whilst it must ensure success in the event of an appeal to force, it doubles the chance of success without that appeal." Furthermore, Madison queried:

“Will it not be honourable to our country & possibly not altogether in vain, to invite the British Gov^t to extend the avowed disapprobation of the project agst the Spanish Colonies, to the enterprize of France agst Spain herself; and even to join in some declaratory act in behalf of the Greeks?”²²

President Monroe, who independently was inclining towards the opinion that the present exigency justified a departure from the “sound maxim” of political isolation, was confirmed in this opinion by the advice of his predecessors.²³ His Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, however, vigorously dissented from this view, partly because he was under the influence of Clay’s vision of a Pan-American system,²⁴ partly because the proposed co-operation with Great Britain would have bound the United States not to acquire some coveted parts of the Spanish-American possessions,²⁵ and partly also because, as an ally of Great Britain, the United States would necessarily play a very secondary part. Finally, he realized that the same ends would be accomplished by separate action since Great Britain, whose sea power would be the determining factor, could not allow Europe to conquer South America.²⁶ Adams, likewise, opposed the contemplated action in favour of the Greek and Spanish insurgents.²⁷ His views prevailed. Two passages in the President’s message — one “speaking in terms of the most pointed reprobation of the late invasion of Spain by France,” the other recognizing the independence of Greece — were deleted. The British offer of co-opera-

tion, furthermore, was rejected. Adams' purpose, as stated by himself, was to remonstrate "against the interference of the European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe." Accordingly, Monroe's famous message of December 2, 1823, apart from some platonic good wishes to Greece, dissociated America from the European polity and disclaimed any American interference in European affairs. It further announced as an exclusively American policy that the United States was opposed to the extension of the European political system to America and that the New World was no longer open to colonization by the Old.²⁸

Thus for a mixture of weal and woe, whose exact proportions a critical future will determine better than can a self-satisfied present, the surviving Elder Statesmen were over-ruled and the United States became bound to a policy of self-regarding detachment from Europe. Daniel Webster's famous speech in favour of the Greek insurgents delivered in Congress shortly after Monroe's message, led to no action on the part of the government. In view of the overwhelming opposition to it, the resolution in connection with which it was made was not even pressed to a vote.²⁹ For two full generations this continued to be the norm of conduct. No matter how strongly public sentiment was aroused in the United States, as for instance for Kossuth and the Hungarian rebellion,³⁰ the government refused to take action. At the same time, while not interfering in Europe, the

United States to the extent that it was prudently able, opposed all European action in the American continents. In these long decades, the two principles became organically connected in the popular mind. As Secretary Olney said during the Venezuelan dispute of 1895-96: "American non-intervention in Europe implied European non-intervention in America."

In the conduct of its foreign relations, the United States proceeded strictly upon the legal theory that all states, as a direct consequence of their sovereignty, were absolutely equal, no matter to what extent they differed in size and resources. Hence, while no other state was allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of the United States, there was, in turn, to be no intervention on its part in the political concerns of other states. Non-intervention was the prevailing rule of conduct not alone towards Europe, but also towards those parts of America that were under the ægis of the Monroe Doctrine.³¹ The situation was anomalous and could not last. In 1895, during the Venezuela boundary negotiations, Secretary Olney informed the British Government that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."³² This elicited from the Marquess of Salisbury the natural reply that the United States was not "entitled to affirm . . . with reference to a number of states for whose conduct it assumes no responsibility, that its interests are necessarily concerned in whatever may befall those states simply because they are situated

in the western hemisphere." Shortly thereafter, the United States recognized the fundamental truth contained in these words, namely, that all rights necessarily imply corresponding obligations. The war with Spain for the purpose of abating the intolerable conditions existing in Cuba was a signal instance of this principle in action. Its theoretical justification was elaborated a few years later by Theodore Roosevelt in connection with the intervention in Santo Domingo. He then absolutely repudiated the doctrine of non-intervention in cases of chronic wrong-doing and of anarchy in the western hemisphere, and asserted that, with the benefits derived from the Monroe Doctrine, must be accepted certain responsibilities.³³ "Just as there has been a gradual growth of the ethical element in the relations of one individual to another," he declared, "so we are, even though slowly, more and more coming to recognize the duty of bearing one another's burdens, not only as among individuals but also as among nations."³⁴ This principle of intervention in cases of chronic disorder in the western hemisphere was subsequently applied in other instances, notably in Haiti and in Nicaragua. It has been half-heartedly invoked in the increasingly complex and disordered conditions obtaining in Mexico. The uncertain course of President Wilson towards that problem has only in part proceeded from the fact that its size implied the assumption of far more onerous responsibilities than in the case of Haiti. But, in addition, an unfortunate attempt was made to act simultaneously upon two irreconcilable principles.

The duty to assist Mexico in restoring order upon an equitable social system was recognized and thus led to a measure of intervention in her political affairs. But, at the same time, the legalistic trend of American political thought demanded, inconsistently, that no violence be done to the sovereignty of an independent state.

While the United States was thus somewhat hesitatingly and with faltering steps assuming the responsibility for some measure of justice and order in the western hemisphere, it was at the same time extending the scope of its interests in the Far East. On a very limited scale, these ante-dated the Spanish-American War but, as a result of its unforeseen course, the United States acquired extensive possessions not only in the Caribbean but also in the Pacific, and, as a consequence, assumed new and far-reaching obligations. It became a world-power in a sense quite different from what it had been in the years of introspective seclusion when it limited its external action to advancing the comity of nations by lofty precepts and to encouraging the growth of democratic liberalism by mere expressions of sympathy. This newer attitude was clearly expressed in 1898 in President McKinley's instructions to the American Peace Commissioners about the retention of the Philippines. He said:

“Without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations that we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and over-rules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that,

without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization."

This newer attitude towards world-affairs was revealed not only in the assumption of responsibility for the politically backward peoples in the Philippines, Hawaii and Samoa, but also in the policy adopted towards the Chinese question. The policy of the "open door" in China as explicitly formulated by Secretary Hay in 1899 and the subsequent participation in the concerted military action of the European Powers during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 were conspicuous manifestations of the emergence of the United States as a world-power. But here again there was marked hesitation. This was due to many factors, of which not the least was the underlying dread of weakening the Monroe Doctrine. For many feared that action on the part of the United States beyond the bounds of the western hemisphere might be held to justify European interference in American affairs.

There was some basis for these fears. To obviate such a possibility, the aloofness of America from Europe was again strongly emphasized. Thus the assumption of fresh responsibilities in America and in the Far East was accompanied by renewed formal assertions of the policy of non-intervention in European affairs. At the Hague Conference of 1899, the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes was signed by the American delegation subject to the following declara-

tion and it was subsequently ratified with this reservation attached. The declaration reads:

“Nothing contained in this Convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said Convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward American questions.”

This reservation, which significantly joined together the policy of non-intervention and that more specifically embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, was repeated at the Hague Conference of 1907. In the interval, the United States had enunciated this policy in another connection as well. The American representatives signed the Algeciras Treaty about Morocco without assuming for their country “obligation or responsibility for the enforcement thereof”; and the Senate, in ratifying the treaty, added the further proviso that attendance at the Algeciras Congress was “without purpose to depart from the traditional American foreign policy which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of political questions which are entirely European in their scope.”

This traditional policy of aloofness from European affairs is tantamount to a refusal to assume those obligations that every state owes to the unorganized world-community. This negative policy may have been expedient, but it unquestionably is devoid of moral value. Its wisdom cannot be measured by its material success, for

the great danger in all utilitarianism is the concomitant deterioration of character. No attempt can here be made to assay it according to this standard. But even in the days of America's weakness, when the nation was still young, it had some unfortunate consequences that a provincial outlook almost invariably ignores. The myopic absorption of the United States in its own development was an unquestionable factor in protracting Europe's struggle against the domination of Napoleon. Writing of that period, Admiral Mahan with characteristic insight pointed out: "The United States, contrary alike to the chief interests of mankind and to her own, sided upon the whole, though by no means unanimously, against Great Britain."³⁵ In his days of academic freedom, Woodrow Wilson likewise pointed out "the deep impolicy" of America's attitude and actions during that earlier world crisis. He then wrote:

"Napoleon was the enemy of the civilized world, had been America's own enemy in disguise, and had thrown off the disguise. England was fighting him almost alone, all Europe thrown into his scale and hers almost kicking the beam; and now America had joined the forces of Napoleon, in fact if not in intention, as he had subtilely planned. It was natural that the raw and rural nation should thus have seen its own interests in isolation and indulged its own passion of resentment with selfishness. England's policy had cut America to the quick and had become intolerable, and it did not lessen America's exasperation that that policy had been a measure of war against the Corsican, not against her. It was a tragical but natural accident that the war should be against England, not against France."³⁶

The only legitimate defence for such a policy of self-

centred aloofness from the questions that determine the broad course of history is impotence; but the United States steadfastly adhered to this attitude even after it had become one of the Great Powers and it thus forfeited the influence it could have exerted upon the affairs of mankind.

It is true that the United States attempted in various directions to exert its influence for the advancement of humanity, but except to a limited extent, and then well-nigh exclusively in Central and South America, it refused to assume any obligations for the application of its political ideals. One does not have to be an adherent of the German theory of force to realize that in interstate relations, as at present regulated, mere words, unless there is a willingness if necessary to back them up by deed, are futile. Force alone leads to Prussianism, to the doctrine that might makes right, with its dire consequences both to victor and victim. But mere words, no matter how cogent be the moral arguments, are on many occasions totally ineffective, especially when it is known that there is no intention whatsoever of wielding anything more warlike than the pen. The futility of such a course in the unorganized world of to-day was sadly realized by Secretary Hay when he was obliged to witness the breakdown of his Chinese policy by Russia's action in Manchuria. In 1903, he wrote to Henry White:

“The Chinese, as well as the Russians, seem to know that the strength of our position is entirely moral, and if the Russians are convinced that we will not fight for Manchuria — as

I suppose we will not—and the Chinese are convinced that they have nothing but good to expect from us and nothing but a beating from Russia, the open hand will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinks as the raised club. Still, we must do the best we can with the means at our disposition.”⁸⁷

In that the United States resolutely refused to become involved in any European matters and, furthermore, in that, because of its patent unwillingness to use more than moral suasion, it left to others the protection of its policies in the Far East, Americans cannot escape a degree of negative responsibility for the existing world-wide war. An examination of recent international history and of the fundamental aim of German world politics will make this nexus more apparent.

IV

THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

“With Austria, with France, with Russia, we have already squared accounts; the last settlement, that with England, seems likely to be the most protracted and most difficult.”

—TREITSCHKE.

“In the great conflicts of the future, the German people, whose loss of millions of Germans to Anglo-Saxondom in the nineteenth century has moved the world’s centre of gravity in a sense unfavourable to them, will need all inner powers of shoulders, fists, and heads, the people’s power, and the production-power, the fighting-power, the mind-power, and the master-power, in order to guard their rights among the peoples by land and sea.”

—ERNST VON HALLE (1902).

“In the future, however, the importance of Germany will depend on two points: firstly, how many millions speak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the German Empire?”

—FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI.

CHAPTER IV

THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Position of the English-Speaking Peoples — German Ambitions — The Duel with “Anglo-Saxondom” — The German Menace and its Effects — Proposals for an Anglo-American Alliance — British Foreign Policy — The European Defensive Coalition — Morocco — Persia — China — The Anglo-German Settlement of 1914 — The Bagdad Railroad — Central Africa — Summary.

THERE is a disconcerting vagueness about Germany's ambitious plans and there has been some indecision and discussion as to the steps required to reach the desired goal, but the underlying thought is unmistakable. Whether the immediate aim was expansion in the Near and Middle East¹ or over-seas in Africa, America and China, the ultimate end was identical. Somewhat over a generation ago, an American historian wrote as follows:

“The work which the English race began when it colonized North America is destined to go on until every land on the earth's surface that is not already the seat of an old civilization shall become English in its language, in its political habits and traditions. . . . The race thus spread over both hemispheres, and from the rising to the setting sun, will not fail to keep that sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy which it began to acquire when England stretched its arm across the Atlantic to the shores of Virginia and Massachusetts. . . . The world's business will be transacted by English-speaking people

to so great an extent, that whatever language any man may have learned in his infancy he will find it necessary sooner or later to learn to express his thoughts in English. . . . By the end of the twentieth century such nations as France and Germany can only claim such a relative position in the political world as Holland and Switzerland now occupy." 2

The fundamental truth of these descriptive and prophetic words, uttered by John Fiske in 1880, has been amply proven by subsequent events, despite the fact that in this interval Germany had annexed a vast colonial domain and had developed an extensive over-sea commerce. Since 1880, the United States has acquired the Philippines and other islands in the Pacific and has assumed a virtual protectorate over the backward countries bordering on the Caribbean Sea. Egypt, together with large sections of Central Africa, have come under the British ægis and South Africa has been united in an autonomous system whose *lingua franca* is destined to be in increasing measure English. British India has expanded over the outlying turbulent border regions and the Malay States have gradually come within the orbit of British order and justice. In 1912, somewhat over 37 per cent. of the world's foreign trade was credited to English-speaking countries and their dependencies, which was three times the share of Germany in this total.³ Unless arrested by military force, the progressive spread of the English language and of English political institutions was destined to proceed with the slow and irresistible momentum of a glacier, because it sprang from the needs of the situation itself. The strength of the movement

came from its response to human wants. It is a living process, growing with the changing demands of the times — one spontaneously generated by the activities and needs of countless individuals following their own immediate private ends. Only to a very minor extent is it the result of prescient planning, for governmental policies have been as a rule determined and shaped by the inexorable logic of pre-existing facts and circumstances.

The development of the British Empire and the growth of the United States, together with the spread of English political civilization throughout the length and breadth of the world, has been the most momentous political development of the past three centuries. Although in general very imperfectly understood in Germany, its significance was by no means minimized. In fact, it became an obsession with a people indoctrinated with the creed of Germanic superiority and impressed with the belief that they were, in the words of the Kaiser, "the salt of the earth." When the German statesmen, economists, and publicists tried to pierce the veil of the future and to picture the world toward the end of the present century, they saw three great political aggregates — the American, the British, and the Russian⁴ — outranging in cultural influence and in potential strength all other states of western civilization and dwarfing a Germany whose political growth under existing territorial arrangements could apparently not compete with theirs. Hence the insistent striving for a repartition of the world in conformity both with Germany's actual military strength

and with some hypothetical future need for more land for her growing population, as well as for new markets and fresh sources of supply for her expanding industries.

There was no question of any real need or of any actual handicap under existing conditions. Germany was exceptionally prosperous. Her foreign trade was rapidly expanding and her busy work-shops and thriving agriculture were more than absorbing her growing population. Concurrently, the birth-rate was falling rapidly, more rapidly even than was the death-rate. As a result, emigration in the true sense of the word had virtually ceased. In fact, entirely apart from the seven or eight hundred thousand foreign wandering labourers who came yearly to Germany, mainly from Poland, Austria, Italy, and the Netherlands, to assist in the harvest and in general industry, the number of foreigners permanently domiciled in Germany was constantly increasing. As their numbers considerably exceeded those of the emigrants, Germany had actually become a land of immigration, like the United States.⁵ This fundamental change did not, however, preclude the possibility of a return to conditions existing in the nineteenth century, when millions of Germans settled in English-speaking countries. According to the official German view, such emigration was a distinct calamity for it not only negatively and relatively weakened the German State by decreasing its potential economic and military strength, but it added to the forces of competing aggregates. Moreover, the children of these emigrants had, as a very general rule, no

cultural affiliations with Germany, but became integral parts of their English-speaking environment.

Weltpolitik and *Kulturpolitik* went hand in hand. The desire to play a commanding political part in the world and the wish to impress German civilization upon it, both made the existing partition of the world seem inequitable. In reaching this judgment, some vital factors were ignored. The spread of German civilization was hampered by the undeniable fact that, wherever German civilization was in close contact with another advanced type, it gradually lost ground. This was true not only of the German nuclei in English-speaking countries, where the circumstances were distinctly unfavourable, but it was also quite marked in German Poland, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, and elsewhere.⁶ Prince von Buelow attributes to political ineptitude this failure of Germany to make moral conquests. "How can it otherwise be explained," he asks, "that in the struggle between different nationalities the German has so often succumbed to the Czech and the Slovene, the Magyar and the Pole, the French and the Italian?—that in this sphere the German has usually come off second best in comparison with almost all his neighbours?"⁷ Similarly, Friedrich Naumann has demonstrated "that the modern Germans almost everywhere in the world are unfortunately bad Germanizers."⁸

Germany's egregious failure not only to germanize, but even to conciliate her Polish, French and Danish subjects, is primarily due to the fact that her policy was based upon the theory that wherever two nationalities

live side by side, one must be the hammer and the other the anvil. But blows serve only to intensify the anvil's national feelings. While the cause of this lack of success was not generally understood in Germany, the condition itself was fully appreciated and there was, before the war, a distinct realization of the fact that further conquests in Europe itself were futile and that the balance must be redressed by acquisitions over the seas. The course of military events during the war has forcibly diverted Germany's ambitions towards Eastern Europe. But the diversion in intent is presumably only temporary, and at most it is intended to establish German military predominance in Europe on so unassailable a basis that a policy of extra-European expansion may in the future be safely pursued. The experiences with her Polish and French subjects had convinced Germany that her future was largely on the water and that her enemy of enemies was the English-speaking world.

Before the war, Germany possessed a colonial domain approximately six times as large as her own area. While its resources are undeniably large,⁹ they had never been thoroughly tested, primarily because the German emigrant refused to settle there. The few who did seek their fortunes outside of Europe either had not the pioneer spirit or were better fitted by education to the complex civilization of already settled communities. Moreover, the bureaucratic methods and the military spirit of the German colonies repelled settlers, while the freedom of the English-speaking communities was exercising a powerful

counter-attraction. Germans especially have forgotten that it is individual initiative and the hard labour of the settler and trader that have developed the United States, Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, as well as Singapore and Hong Kong. The English colonial domain of the seventeenth century was largely what Spain and Portugal in their desire for facile wealth had not considered worth the taking, and every land is mainly what man makes of it. Disregarding or ignoring these considerations, Germany looked with envious eyes upon the flourishing English-speaking communities scattered over the globe. They said to themselves that Spain and Portugal had once divided the world between them, before France, Holland, and England had emerged as colonizing nations and that another repartition was by no means out of the question. "*Was einst geschah, kann wieder geschehen.*"

Thus it came about that of the three great political aggregates that Germany foresaw as dominant in the future world, the Russian was regarded as fundamentally unassailable, because its Slavonic peoples could not be assimilated or profitably governed and exploited. The great obstacle both to the further progress of German power and prestige, and to the spread of German civilization, appeared to be the English-speaking peoples with their ability to absorb German and other alien elements. Moreover, the non-military character of their political systems and the looseness of their general social organization seemed in the minds of those impressed with oppo-

site ideals to be infallible indications of inherent weakness and incontrovertible proof that this entire historical process, from the days of Shakespeare on, had been largely fortuitous. As Germany's future was deemed to depend upon a radical overthrow of these conditions and as their plans for expansion could be realized only at the expense of the British Commonwealth or in contravention of the Monroe Doctrine, the arch-enemy to Germanism, cultural as well as political, appeared to be the so-called "Anglo-Saxon block."

In his widely read and influential book, "Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt," Paul Rohrbach said:

"It is not necessary to claim for the German idea that it will exist like the Roman either as the mistress of the world or not at all, but it is right to say that it will exist only as the co-mistress of the culture of the world, or it will not exist at all. The Anglo-Saxons have spread over such vast expanses that they seem to be on the point of assuming the cultural control of the world, thanks to their large numbers, their resources, and their inborn strength."¹⁰

Similarly, Maximilian Harden wrote with alarm about what he called Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the New and Old World. According to him:

"Great Britain and North America tend to form a community of interests. On the two oceans, the Anglo-Saxons of the two continents group themselves together in unity of will. The hegemony of the white race will be theirs, if we do not make up the old quarrel. United with France, we should be invincible on land and sea."¹¹

This was written during the Agadir crisis. Two years

later, in 1913, another well-known publicist, Friedrich Naumann, called attention to the millions of Germans that had been absorbed by English-speaking communities, and proclaimed that this English factor was not only a national danger, but the national danger.¹² The press likewise lamented the slow but sure disappearance of the German elements in the English-speaking countries of America, Africa, and Australia.¹³ The great duel of the present and future was widely held to be an ineluctable combat à l'outrance between Germanism and Anglo-Saxondom.¹⁴ Germany, said an influential Pan-German writer in 1902, must take the lead in South America against American "jingoism" and must establish herself firmly in the Far East, "or the great duel between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon races will end in favour of the latter" and Germany will then politically sink to the level of Holland.¹⁵ To counteract this tendency in the cultural sphere, there was organized in 1881 the "Educational Alliance for the Preservation of German Culture in Foreign Lands," whose principles declare that "not a man can we spare if we expect to hold our own against the one hundred and twenty-five millions who already speak the English language and who have pre-empted the most desirable fields for expansion."¹⁶

Not only is the cultural solidarity of English-speaking peoples fully recognized, but also the fact that their separate developments have formed part of what is essentially one historical process. Briefly, the broad purpose of German imperialism was, and presumably still will

be unless its illusory basis is clearly demonstrated in this war, to eject the English-speaking peoples from the prominent positions that they have acquired in all continents. What English-speaking pioneers — discoverers, adventurers, traders, and settlers — have slowly and laboriously accomplished by individual enterprise, the German Empire with its consciousness of military strength and its contempt for non-military states planned to duplicate in a few decades.

The detached observer, whose interest is in the progress of civilization itself rather than in the comparative political importance of different states, would naturally not be disturbed by the prospective relative decline in Germany's political rank. Nor would he be dismayed at the fact that a constantly smaller percentage of humanity — though actually an ever increasing number of individuals — was habitually using the German language. All that is valuable in German civilization would still be the heritage of an interdependent world. According to his supernatural view, a real grievance would arise only if the English-speaking peoples were selfishly to debar German individuals from sharing in the advantages that they had acquired. This was conspicuously not so either in the British Commonwealth or in the United States. With the self-regarding nationalism of our prevailing international anarchy, it is, however, quite comprehensible and almost inevitable that Germany's leaders should look upon the situation with different eyes. Membership in large aggregates is a potent psychological force. As

Mr. Dickinson has said, "men who are insignificant as individuals acquire a sense of extended life by belonging to a powerful nation." They feel a pride in large numbers, in great areas, in swelling statistics of trade and finance, and "they do enjoy, in that gross way, the sense of power."¹⁷ There is, of course, a good deal that is ignoble in this gregarious pride and a good deal that is false in this sense of vicarious accomplishment, but membership in such large nations is in many respects a distinct advantage.¹⁸ With patriotism the largely self-regarding sentiment that it is, it was quite natural that Germany should desire to maintain her relative political and cultural rank in the world. Had she proceeded to do so by peaceful methods, by conciliating her subject populations, by attracting within her orbit the bordering peoples of kindred stock, and by populating her vast colonial domain, she would have escaped condemnation and probable disaster. Her methods, however, were the aggressive ones of the time-honoured Prussian philosophy of "blood and iron" and her aim was to construct a Greater Germany by undermining and grasping what others had laboriously built up. The German language with its accompanying civilization was to be forced upon unwilling peoples, and those Germans who had emigrated to English-speaking countries were to be induced to retain their cultural, and even political, affiliations with the Fatherland.

This distinctly hostile purpose towards the English-speaking peoples first manifested itself overtly and plainly

during the years when the difficulties between Briton and Boer in South Africa were reaching a climax and when Spain was forced by the United States to relinquish the last remnants of her old colonial empire in the East and the West. One direct result of this menace was the significant movement for greater cohesion that has made the British Empire a unit during the present war and which promises, after its conclusion, to lead to the creation of more or less adequate political machinery for the continuous expression of this solidarity. Another simultaneous result, just as truly although somewhat less obviously traceable to the German peril, was the marked increase in friendship between England and the United States and their cordial co-operation in some international questions, especially in the open door and territorial integrity policy as regards China.¹⁹ In England, where the sense of international realities was keener than in the United States and where, on the whole, there was a deeper feeling of kinship and of high regard than that prevailing in America,²⁰ there was some attempt to embody this growing friendship in a formal alliance. On the eve of the Spanish-American War, Earl Grey said to John Hay, the American Ambassador in London: "Why do not the United States borrow our navy to make a quick job of Cuba? They could return us the favour another time."²¹ On the same day, Joseph Chamberlain told Hay that he was extremely desirous of a close alliance with the United States, or, if that were prevented by American traditions, "of an assurance of

common action on important questions." "Shoulder to shoulder," so Hay reported Chamberlain's words to President McKinley, "we could command peace the world over."²² A few weeks later, in an address before the Birmingham Liberal-Unionist Association, Chamberlain specifically proposed an Anglo-American alliance.²³ With characteristic courage and clarity, he said:

"What is our next duty? It is to establish and to maintain bonds of permanent amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic. There is a powerful and generous nation. They speak our language. They are bred of our race. Their laws, their literature, their standpoint upon every question, are the same as ours. Their feeling, their interests in the cause of humanity and the peaceful developments of the world are identical with ours. I don't know what the future has in store for us; I don't know what arrangements may be possible with us; but this I do know and feel, that the closer, the more cordial, the fuller, and the more definite these arrangements are, with the consent of both peoples, the better it will be for both and for the world."

In the United States such proposals did not elicit any notable response. A few, very few, it is true, isolated Americans raised their voices in favour of such an alliance,²⁴ and the plan unquestionably appealed to John Hay when he presided over the State Department. Against its realization, however, stood not only the traditions of aloofness inherited from "The Fathers of the Republic," but also the prepossessions of many Americans against Britain as the historic foe, as well as the prejudices of some elements of America's heterogeneous population. Some of the difficulties were somewhat impatiently em-

phasized in John Hay's letter of June 23, 1900, to Henry White. Herein he wrote:

"What can be done in the present diseased state of the public mind? There is such a mad-dog hatred of England prevalent among newspapers and politicians that anything we should now do in China to take care of our imperilled interests, would be set down to 'subservience to Great Britain.' . . . All I have ever done with England is to have wrung great concessions out of her with no compensation. . . . Every Senator I see says, 'For God's sake, don't let it appear we have any understanding with England.' How can I make bricks without straw? That we should be compelled to refuse the assistance of the greatest power in the world, *in carrying out our own policy*, because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are fools—is enough to drive a man mad." ²⁵

The great mass of the American people were immersed in their own diverse affairs and had only the most superficial knowledge of international politics, while their leaders, with lack of courageous foresight, refused to question the traditional policy. It was realized by only an infinitesimally small fraction of the American people that what was primarily protecting South America from German ambitions was not so much the Monroe Doctrine as British sea power. Had the United States entered into such an alliance, it is more than probable that Germany would at the outset have realized the futility of a forcible attempt to change the course of history. As a cultural entity, "the Anglo-Saxon block" did not seem to be an insuperable obstacle, but a clearly defined alliance upon this solid foundation would presumably have given Germany pause. Had such an alliance been con-

summated at the turn of the century, the entire course of history would have been quite different and far more conformable to American ideals and interest; and its crowning climax, the present world-wide agony, would in all probability have been avoided. Americans can well ask themselves whether they can claim entire dissociation from the slaughter on Europe's blood-stained fields. The world is so closely interrelated that no great state can selfishly decline to assume the obligations resulting from membership in the world community without disastrous consequences not only to others but in the end to itself as well. It has been well said that a better international future depends upon whether or no Terence's oft-quoted saying, "*Humani nil a me alienum puto,*" is translated by every intelligent citizen as, "I will treat nothing of human import as a foreign question." Such a counsel of perfection was the very antithesis of American practice. Clinging to its self-regarding isolation, the United States left the defence of English-speaking civilization to the British Commonwealth.

Britain is the centre of a vast political aggregate, misleadingly designated as an Empire, but rapidly developing into a genuine Commonwealth of diverse nations and races.²⁶ It covers approximately one fifth of the world's area and includes somewhat more than one quarter of mankind. Its foreign commerce was in volume even more than proportionately extensive and its mercantile marine was equal to about one half of the world's entire tonnage. On account of these facts, the British Empire is

in more or less close contact with all peoples throughout the world, and every political change even in the most remote places must, to some extent at least, affect its fortunes. Yet the foreign policy of this vast Commonwealth was during the past fifteen years completely dominated by one single element — the German peril. That was the determining factor in recent international history and explains many apparently unconnected events in Africa, China, Persia, the Balkans, and Asiatic Turkey.

The dreaded menace was not economic, for in spite of some apprehensions aroused by Germany's commercial expansion, the British Government steadfastly adhered to the free trade policy and claimed full justification for this course in the remarkable growth of Britain's foreign trade.²⁷ Nor was Germany's desire for additional territory in Africa and for economic expansion in Asiatic Turkey deemed menacing. The peril consisted in the fact that Germany, at a time when her publicists were evincing the most extravagant ambitions, was intent upon adding to the most powerful army in the world a navy of such dimensions as to render precarious the safety of the British Commonwealth. In 1910, a well-known student of German life and institutions discussed the Anglo-German tension with Count Paul Metternich, the German Ambassador at London. Mr. Dawson opened the conversation with a remark to the effect that "trade jealousy was no longer a cause of serious friction, nor was colonial rivalry," when the Ambassador interrupted, saying: "I know what you are going to say — it is the navy, and you

are right.”²⁸ This menace diverted British foreign policy from its hitherto general support of liberty — such, for instance, as had been given to the cause of Greek freedom and to that of Italian liberation and unification — and concentrated it upon national security. In many respects this had unfortunate consequences, as in the Balkans, where England was predominantly disinterested and was prevented from exerting her full influence from fear of precipitating a general war.²⁹ Under the circumstances, it was inevitable that the main object of British policy should be security and that all efforts should be made to avert a European war into which the British Empire would inevitably be drawn. The plan adopted to prevent the impending German attack was to settle all outstanding disputes with other states and to create a diplomatic combination — an informal league to enforce peace — that would hold Germany back.

In 1902 was concluded the alliance with Japan that enabled England to concentrate her naval forces in the West. Two years later, the *Entente Cordiale* disposed of all outstanding questions with France; and, in 1907, a general settlement with Russia was made. The creation of this defensive combination, however, necessitated the reversal of certain policies that not only were in full accord with British liberalism, but had also seemed essential to national security. This was notably the case in Morocco and in Persia. In both of these countries the grave initial disorder had set in that always results from the close contact of backward peoples with the progres-

sive western world.³⁰ The situation was much the same as that prevailing in Mexico since 1913, only whereas in this case, as in the similar ones of Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua, it was generally recognized that the United States alone had the right to intervene, in the cases of Morocco and Persia, unsanctioned interference by one European Power would inevitably be resented by one or more of the others.

In Morocco, both England and France had quite important commercial interests of approximately equal extent. In addition, apart from historic political ties, England had a strategic concern in the future of Morocco. This was, however, far less vital than was France's connection arising from the long frontier between Algeria and Morocco with its record of chronic disorder. Spain likewise had a deep political concern in the fate of Morocco and also some commercial interests, of about the size of Germany's. That country's existing trade was quite insignificant, but its possible future expansion demanded the maintenance of the open-door and, at the same time, some Pan-Germans were clamouring for the acquisition of the southern part of Morocco.³¹ The traditional British policy had been to preserve the integrity of Morocco and to assist its government in the work of administrative regeneration.³² It may be that the idealism which in part dictated this policy was misplaced, and that, in preventing France from introducing into Morocco what is generally deemed to be civilization, England was retarding the course of progress. It is quite probable

that the hope of reform from within was entirely illusory, but even a cursory elucidation of this question would carry one far afield. What is germane in the present discussion is that England in 1904 completely reversed her policy and, in so far as she was concerned, virtually allowed France to establish a protectorate with the commercial open-door in Morocco. It is idle to speak of France's recognition of England's established and admitted position in Egypt as an adequate equivalent. These two elements of the agreement were entirely disproportionate in value.³³ The essential point is that, under the pressure of the German peril, England without commensurate return abandoned a cherished policy that was based both upon liberal principles and upon what prior thereto had been deemed the exigencies of national safety. This German factor was the decisive one and it likewise played a great part in determining British policy towards Persia.

For essentially the same reasons, conditions very similar to those in Morocco prevailed in Persia. Chronic disorder — political, economic, and financial — had resulted from intimate contact with the complicated economic machinery of the western world. The great bulk of Persia's foreign commerce was with her two mighty neighbours, Russia and the British Empire. Economically, and politically also, due to closer physical contact, Russia's interests predominated. In the background stood Germany, again with but a most insignificant trade, but interested in an unknown future that was

largely dependent upon the possible extension of the un-built Bagdad Railway to the Persian frontier. As in the case of Morocco, British policy towards Persia had idealistic as well as self-regarding elements. For a long time Russia had regarded Persia as "irretrievably doomed." As Lord Curzon wrote in 1892, "she regards the future partition of Persia as a prospect scarcely less certain of fulfilment than the achieved partition of Poland."³⁴ Russia's intention, apparently, was ultimately to annex the entire North, with its robust Turkish peasantry. A decade later, another competent student of this problem wrote that Russia "holds the Shah and the Central Government of Persia in the hollow of her hand by the two-fold power of the sword and the purse."³⁵ Here again the question arises whether or no, in supporting the integrity of Persia and in resisting the Russian advance so that Asia should not become "a field of contiguous European ambitions," England was not hampering the spread of civilization. In this connection, it should be remembered that the northwestern province of Persia, Azerbaijan, has no national connection with that country. Its population is well-nigh entirely Chaldæan and Tatar, and their cultural affiliations are wholly with peoples under either Turkish or Russian rule. Moreover, Russia's record of pacification and civilization in Central Asia is a remarkably favourable one. In fact, the contrast between the conditions of progress north of Persia and the disorder in that country was startling.³⁶

However this may be, England consistently opposed

Russia's undertaking the work of pacification in Persia, partly in order to preserve that country's integrity so as to permit of a national regeneration from within, but probably even more so to keep Russia and British India as far as possible apart. In 1907, the friction over this problem was removed by the agreement that settled the disputes outstanding between Russia and England. In so far as Persia was concerned, this agreement provided that the two interested Powers were to respect the integrity and independence of that country. What the negotiators had in mind was not the absolute independence of the sovereign state, but such independence as existed at that very time when Persia was virtually a quasi-protectorate, jointly of Russia and England. It was not the independence of a Germany or of a France, but something less than that of a Mexico and something more than that of a Santo Domingo that was meant. Furthermore, in order to obviate friction, Persia was divided into three spheres, of which the Russian was to the Northwest and the British to the Southeast, while between them was that denominated as neutral. Either country was at liberty to secure commercial and political concessions in this central sphere, but neither was allowed to do so in that reserved exclusively to the other country.

It has frequently been assumed that this agreement was tantamount to a partition of Persia. Such are its potentialities; but such was not the intent of the British Government, nor as yet has this been the outcome. In so far as England was concerned, the agreement was "in

reality of the nature of a renunciation." ³⁷ The so-called British sphere from which Russian concessions were excluded, consists mostly of desert; it has only one town of importance and is very sparsely inhabited.³⁸ Moreover, this arid region is virtually co-extensive with Persian Baluchistan, which is separated from British Baluchistan only by artificial political frontiers.

The agreement has worked far from well, especially from the standpoint of Persia.³⁹ It did not meet the crying needs of Persian anarchy and was at best only a makeshift. Moreover, it was concluded at a time when an attempt was being made to establish a modern constitutional régime in Persia. This had led to ever increasing disorganization. The administration was intermittently paralysed and brigandage was rampant. Under these circumstances, Russia intervened and occupied Azerbaijan in the Northwest. She could largely justify her action by the prevailing disorder which was injuring Russian subjects and their property.⁴⁰ But, in addition, it would appear that Russia tended to interpret the agreement of 1907 as leading to an actual partition of Persia.

While England objected to the Russian occupation of the northwestern province of Persia, her opposition was presumably far less vigorous than it would have been, had the general European situation not been so menacing. One of the periodical collapses of Persian administration occurred during Mr. W. Morgan Shuster's energetic attempt to reorganize the chaotic financial system. His brief career of tactless efficiency,⁴¹ in which he signifi-

cantly aroused the opposition of both Russia and Germany,⁴² exactly synchronized with the Agadir crisis in Europe. If during these tense months of 1911, when Europe was on the very brink of war, England and Russia had seriously quarrelled over what, compared to the gravity of the threatening world war, was but a most insignificant issue, there is but slight reason to believe that the greater peace would have been preserved. A break in the Entente combination would in all probability have been the signal for Germany actually to use the sword that had already been drawn from the scabbard.

In the Far East, also, the German peril decidedly affected British action and policy. Although the principle of the open-door and the policy of maintaining the integrity and independence of China were mainly formulated by Secretary Hay, their advocacy by the United States had been largely futile, simply because it was generally recognized that under no circumstances would armed support be offered. Hence England, whose aims were identical with those of America, had to seek co-operation elsewhere. In 1900 was concluded the Anglo-German Convention regarding the territorial integrity of China and the open door there. But when, immediately thereafter, Russia refused to withdraw from Manchuria the troops that had been used in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion, Germany declined to intervene on the plea that the convention applied only to China proper exclusive of Manchuria.⁴³ Having failed by these means to check Russian ambitions, England contracted in 1902 an alliance with

Japan, which fully recognized the independence of China and Korea.⁴⁴ As the ostensible upholder of the Anglo-American policy of Chinese integrity and equality of commercial opportunity for all foreigners, Japan secured the sympathy and support of the English-speaking world during the ensuing war with Russia. The Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 that concluded this war likewise recognized the Anglo-American policy. But, in the meanwhile, the German menace in Europe had become acute — the first Morocco crisis of 1905 had aroused grave forebodings in England — and to the British Foreign Office the future of Korea and of Manchuria, as well as British interests there, seemed naturally far less important than a general European war and the possible disruption of the Empire. This was, of course, quite patent both to Japan and to Russia, and they did not hesitate to take advantage of it. Unostentatiously, except in regard to Korea, but steadily, the open-door policy was repudiated and the integrity of China was undermined by the former enemies, Japan and Russia. The efforts of Secretary Knox under the Taft Administration to thwart this outcome were mere empty gestures since it was known that there was never the slightest intention to follow word by deed. They served merely to bring Russia and Japan closer together. In view of the German peril, England's hands were tied when Manchuria and Mongolia were being gradually detached from China and the open door was being slowly shut.⁴⁵

While the German menace and the dread of a general

war dominated England's policy and made it subservient to the aims of her Allies in the defensive combination, at the same time every effort was made to reach a complete settlement with Germany. Even an alliance had been suggested by Chamberlain during the Boer War and, thereafter, a number of attempts were made to lessen the naval rivalry. After the grave Morocco crisis of 1911, these efforts were even more energetically renewed. As the Belgian representative in London at that time wrote: "Ce qui est certain est que le but que l'on a en vue est pacifique. On voudrait à tout prix diminuer la tension existante entre les deux pays."⁴⁶ The crux of the difficulty was Germany's determination to build a powerful navy and England's equally firm resolution to retain her relative position among maritime powers. In view of German obduracy, no agreement for the limitation of naval armaments could be reached and the insensate rivalry continued with virtually no change in the comparative naval strength of the two competitors.⁴⁷ But at the same time, other negotiations were begun with the object of satisfying Germany's insistent demand for economic and territorial expansion. Thus Professor Hans Delbrueck wrote in 1912: "It cannot be doubted that since the fear of almost certain war during last summer, England is honestly ready to accord us a large and good place in the sun."⁴⁸ The negotiations were continued in this spirit and had been carried to a successful conclusion before the outbreak of the war. At that time, there was no issue between Germany and Great Britain except, as

has been pregnantly said, the issue of the geographical position of the British Isles and the existence of the British Empire. This is by far the most instructive chapter in the diplomatic history of the ante-bellum years, but its significance has been obscured by the fact that full details are not as yet available. Sufficient is, however, known to outline its main features.⁴⁹

This far-reaching settlement referred to two widely-separated regions, Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa, where German colonial ambitions conflicted with vital interests of the British Empire. In Turkey, the disagreement arose in the main from the fact that the construction of an extensive system of railroads under German control would place a great military power on the flank of both routes to India and Australasia, the shorter one by Suez and the longer one by the Cape. During the prolonged negotiations over the Bagdad Railway, England's chief aim had been to render it impossible for Germany to establish a formidable naval base on the Persian Gulf and to make these waters, which England had effectively and from a world viewpoint satisfactorily policed and controlled for over a century, a scene of tense international rivalry.⁵⁰ Hence, for years, the exclusively German control of the projected extension of the largely unbuilt Bagdad Railroad to the vicinity of the Persian Gulf had been opposed. On June 29, 1914, the day after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo, Sir Edward Grey gave the House of Commons the main outlines of the settlement of this com-

plex matter.⁵¹ He announced that various agreements with Turkey and with Germany had been or were being concluded and that their final signature and publication was delayed by one point only, namely, the completion of the necessary separate negotiations between Turkey and Germany.⁵² The essential features were that Germany was to continue the Bagdad Railway to Basra, a deep-water port on the Shatt-al-Arab, some sixty miles from the head of the Persian Gulf proper, and that the railroad was not to be extended beyond that point except by some future agreement. Equal rates were guaranteed and, in order to see that there was no discrimination, "so far as the conditions of commerce of all nations are concerned," two British directors were to be admitted to the German operating board. In return, Turkey recognized the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf, which was equivalent to the admission of Great Britain's long-established predominance there.⁵³ While apparently safeguarding the economic and strategic interests of the British Empire, this entire agreement gave Germany practically a free-hand in the economic exploitation of the potentially important region between the Tigris and Euphrates. If Germany's intentions were limited to making Mesopotamia and Irâk again the garden-spots that they had been in antiquity, she could have no complaint against the settlement. At all events, the chief champion of the *Bagdadbahn* greeted the adjustment with very marked satisfaction.⁵⁴

Concurrently also, an agreement in reference to Africa

was concluded. Here the ambitions of the two nations were apparently irreconcilable. The British plan, frustrated in 1894 by the opposition of France and Germany but still deeply cherished by not a few, was to link up Rhodesia and South Africa with the Soudan and Egypt by a railroad passing entirely through British territory. Germany's conflicting aim was to join her separated possessions on the eastern and western coasts into one compact mass dominating the centre of Africa from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The realization of either scheme not only implied the abandonment of the other, but was dependent upon some territorial re-arrangements in the Belgian Congo, while the German plan furthermore implied a complete change in the status of Portuguese Angola, north of German Southwest Africa.

The spirit in which England conducted these negotiations was clearly fore-shadowed in Sir Edward Grey's speech of November 27, 1911, after the Agadir crisis had been surmounted by a tenuous margin. He then said:

"If there are to be big territorial changes in Africa, brought about, of course, by the good will of and negotiation with other Powers, then we are not an ambitious competing party; and being not an ambitious competing party ourselves, if Germany has friendly arrangements to negotiate with other foreign countries with regard to Africa, we are not anxious to stand in her way any more than in theirs."

In 1912, when the negotiations about this African impasse were initiated, Hans Delbrueck stated that a re-arrangement of the African map such as would make

forever impossible Cecil Rhodes's scheme of a Cape to Cairo railroad "would be the strongest proof imaginable that England recognized us as having equal colonial rights with herself." It is not quite clear that the Liberal Government, in its efforts to avert war, went to this extreme length, but it is unquestionable that important concessions were made. To what extent British territorial concessions were involved and what success, if any, Germany had in negotiating with Portugal and Belgium about their respective African possessions, has not as yet been divulged by the interested chancelleries.⁵⁵ But Paul Rohrbach, one of Germany's most ardent advocates of extensive African expansion, who evidently had access to official information, declared that in Africa English policy had shown itself to a surprising degree accommodating.⁵⁶

From this brief summary of British policy during the past decade, it is apparent that some important British interests were impaired and some political principles were jettisoned in the hope of averting the world war that was England's nightmare. The chronicle is one of almost constant renunciation. The course was the reverse of aggressive; nor was it provocative, except to the negative extent that avowed pacific tendencies constitute a goad to those who regard juxtaposed states as necessarily and ever in the dynamic relation of hammer and anvil. The entire policy was unquestionably what Professor Keutgen of Hamburg dubbed it: "Eine Politik der Schwaeche." It certainly is a far cry back to 1849,

when Palmerston instructed the British representative at Vienna to express to the Austrian Prime Minister "openly and decidedly" England's indignant disgust at the rigours adopted in suppressing the rebellions in Italy and Hungary. Its very weakness, verging on pacificism, convinced Germany that England was a negligible factor and in this way it stimulated the German "will to war" and conduced to bring about the catastrophe whose fundamental purpose it was to avert. On the other hand, Sir Edward Grey's policy of a defensive coalition was based upon a fuller realization of the imminence and gravity of the German peril than obtained in most well informed quarters in England. Despite the bitterest criticism — whose foundation has since been completely destroyed by Germany's conduct during the fateful fortnight of 1914 — he persisted in his course and succeeded in keeping intact a diplomatic group of such strength as will, in all likelihood, thwart the German plan of world domination.

During the course of these vicissitudes of the past decade, not a few things were done which were repugnant to the American conscience and which affronted American idealism. Whether or no this conscience was always accurately informed and this idealism always free from mischievous sentimentalism is not at present a pertinent question. The essential point is that the American Government, pursuing its traditional course, was silent except when China was concerned; and that the vehement complaints of a few individual Americans totally ignored

the possibility of their country's having some duty in these matters. In the complacency of their negative rectitude, Americans did not contemplate the undeniable fact that those who might have prevented the deeds that seemed to be objectionable, in the Balkans, China, Persia, and elsewhere, were well-nigh helpless so long as the United States adhered to its policy of self-regarding isolation. In addition, definite American interests were prejudiced. The policy of the open door in China could not be maintained by England alone without breaking up the European defensive combination against Germany and the knowledge that the United States would under no circumstances use more than moral suasion rendered American advocacy of it wholly ineffective. A reconstruction of what the past might have been, had the United States been willing to assume obligations for the welfare of the world, is not a futile pastime, but is a valuable object lesson for the future.

V

AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR

“Questo misero modo
tengon l'anime triste di coloro,
che visser senza infamia e senza lodo.
mischiate sono a quel cattivo coro
degli angeli che non furon ribelli,
nè fur fedeli a Dio, ma per sè foro.”

—DANTE, INFERNO, CANTO iii.

“My friends, so sure am I that liberty and security in this land of ours depends upon the destruction and abandonment of the hated principle of national aggrandizement and immorality, and the enthronement of the principles of national responsibility and morality, that for all the countless generations to come after us in our dear land, I am grateful with all my heart to those men who are fighting in the trenches in France and Belgium and Russia and Italy and the Balkans to-day for the liberty and peace of my children's children.”

—ELIHU ROOT, January 25, 1917.

“Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples.”

—WOODROW WILSON, April 2, 1917.

CHAPTER V

AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR

The Issue — Its Relation to the United States — American Public Opinion — Neutrality and Pacificism — Preparedness and Pan-Americanism — The Administration's Policy — The League to Enforce Peace — President Wilson's Endorsement of this Programme — Its Possibilities and Limitations — America's Entrance into the War — An Inclusive League or one of Democracies — The Entente Group — An Alliance of the English-Speaking Peoples.

TO-DAY the world is in the throes of an agonizing war in which certainly the immediate, if not the ultimate, fate of western civilization is at stake. In the background is the imperilled future of all English-speaking peoples. In the middle field lies the fate of the Balkan countries as well as those of Turkey and of the projected *Mittel-europa*. Prominent in the very immediate foreground stands the issue of German domination over Europe. Upon the decision of this last issue inevitably depends the outcome of the two others, for all three are inseparably interrelated. In the days of Louis XIV and of Napoleon, the fundamental issue was whether or no Europe, primarily, was to be saved from the domination of one supreme military power. But the present struggle involves not only the freedom of Europe, but in addi-

tion that of the whole world as well, for the attempted hegemony of Europe was to serve as the basis for German mastery of the other continents. German ambitions avowedly looked to an extra-European goal. Furthermore, as a result of the subjection of this greater issue to the arbitrament of arms, all the vexatious and stubborn European problems, arising from artificial boundary lines based upon political, economic, and military considerations and resulting in suppressed and exploited nationalities, are in the crucible. However vitally important be some of these questions, they are completely overshadowed by the attempt of Germany to dominate Europe and to impose her will by military force, regardless of fundamental treaties and of established interstate custom and morality. Her success would mean in the future no freedom of action for any of the western continental powers. France, Italy, Spain, together with Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries, would be forced into the Prussian-German orbit and their policies would be completely dominated by Berlin as the capital of Central Europe. The freedom so vociferously and violently demanded by Germany for herself is tantamount to slavery for the rest of Europe.

This ascendancy once established, it would be easy for Germany, by means of the added economic resources, to create a navy of such strength as to be able successfully to challenge the British Commonwealth or the Monroe Doctrine if the English-speaking peoples

should not be re-united, and possibly even if they should join forces to resist their declared enemy. Hence the continued insistence of the Entente Allies that they will not make peace until the menace of German domination has been removed. When he was Britain's official spokesman, Mr. Asquith clearly defined the supreme end in view in the following carefully measured words:

"We intend to establish the principle that international problems must be handled by free peoples, and that this settlement shall no longer be hampered and swayed by the overmastering dictation of a Government controlled by a military caste. That is what I mean by the destruction of the military domination of Prussia: nothing more, but nothing less."

The aim of the Allies is to secure an unbound and a free Europe, to which Germany shall no longer have either the will or the power to dictate by intermittent threats of war. Both Germans and Englishmen are in essential agreement as to the only means of accomplishing this destruction of Prussian-German militarism. In the course of a most lucid analysis of this militaristic system, Professor Hans Delbrueck said that the decisive question in determining the inner character of a state always is: "Whom does the army obey?" In democratic countries like England or France, it is of course a minister responsible to the legislature, but such an arrangement, he shows, would be inconceivable in Germany. There the old personal connection between the primitive Teutonic chieftain and his following of faithful warriors perdures in the similar personal relation of army and War Lord. According to Delbrueck, this per-

sonal bond is the greatest force in the Prussian-German State; it is the rock-foundation of the German polity and could be destroyed only by the most terrible of military defeats —“durch die allerfurchtbarste der Niederlagen.”¹ Mr. Balfour clearly recognized this fact when he stated that one of the three essential conditions of a durable peace is that “the aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the German Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples.”² The same truth is likewise lucidly expressed by Bismarck’s biographer, Mr. J. W. Headlam. Peace will come, he writes, when “Germany has learnt the lesson of the war . . . that the voice of Europe cannot be defied with impunity.” In the following vigorous sentences this underlying idea is further amplified by him.

“Germany asks for security; she shall have it — precisely the same security that France and Russia and Italy and Holland enjoy; a security based partly on her own strength, but even more on the recognition of the laws and principles of Europe. Germany asks for guarantees, she shall have them — precisely the same guarantees with which every other State has to be content; the guarantee that the tyrannical overgrowth of any one State or confederation of States will arouse in the rest of Europe a coalition before which every nation, even the strongest, must bow. These laws of European life have been learnt in the course of centuries by all nations and accepted, and they have always been learnt in the same way, in the bitter school of experience and war. Germany is now learning the lesson, and the war will continue until the lesson has been completed; then it will stop. It will stop when it has been burnt into the heart of the whole nation so that it will never be forgotten. Men talk of the terms of peace. They matter little. With a Germany victorious no terms would secure the future of Europe; with a Germany defeated no artificial securities will

be wanted, for there will be a stronger security in the consciousness of defeat." ³

It is, however, open to the most serious question, whether the oft-drawn distinction between the German people and their government is really sound. The German people have for generations been so impregnated with the creed of Teutonic racial superiority, they are in large part so thoroughly permeated with the over-weening ambitions of an aggressive *Kulturpolitik* and *Weltpolitik* based upon the doctrines of ascendancy, and they have so widely accepted a materialistic code that rejects all moral considerations in interstate relations, that even the overthrow of an autocracy supported by the army and a subservient bureaucracy would by no means guarantee the liberties of the world and make it safe for the peace-loving democracies. The systematic educational drill of two generations cannot be nullified and discredited in a day. But the overthrow of militarism and the establishment of democracy would at least allow the entrance of the light.

In comparison with the menace of Prussian-German ascendancy over the world, the future of Constantinople, of Alsace-Lorraine, of Bohemia, of Jugo-Slavia, and of Poland are relatively of subsidiary importance. What matters in first line is that one state shall not have either the purpose or the means to impose its sway upon Europe. Thus the immediate issue at stake is the freedom of Europe and directly involved in it are the ultimate liberties of the world and the fate of all English-speaking

peoples. In addition, the future of democracy hinges upon the outcome. This was true from the very outset, but the war has become quite patently one of democracy against autocracy since the Russian Revolution and the entrance of the United States into the crusade for public right and liberty in alignment with the Entente. In a world so unorganized politically that its peace is at the mercy of one Power and its satellites, the crucial test of any form of social organization cannot be the more or less satisfactory character of its internal political life, but must perforce be its ability to defend itself and to survive in a struggle imposed by others. The world's democracy is being subjected to this crucial test. While, on the one hand, upon the utter discrediting of German militarism largely depends the growth of German liberalism, on the other hand, the maintenance of free institutions in Western Europe and even throughout the entire world is contingent upon an Allied victory. Such victory, however, does not at all imply the disintegration or crushing of Germany, which never were the avowed or implied aims of Britain's official spokesmen. Were democracy to fail in this grave crisis, were its efforts unavailing to secure for itself an unmolested future in Europe, then indeed would its fate there be sealed and its fortunes in America, Africa, and Australia would be dangerously imperilled. Upon the defeat of Germany depends the future of liberalism throughout the entire world. The welfare of the United States is only somewhat less directly contingent upon the frustration of Ger-

man ambitions than is that of the British Commonwealth.

It is naturally in the extreme difficult to gauge accurately the opinion of a country of such vast dimensions and of such striking economic and social differences as are those of the United States; and this difficulty is aggravated by the fact that its civilization is in large sections still fluid in character. Nor is it possible to define in static terms and in brief compass a body of dynamic thought and feeling that is constantly fluctuating from month to month.⁴ That there should be unanimity of thought in a democracy of free speech and unfettered opinions is of course out of the question, but the first thirty months of the war before American participation in it disclosed certain marked cleavages that denoted most imperfect integration. It was inevitable that the foreign-born population should in large measure have been polarized by its former connections with the belligerents. Although the immigrant may be wholly loyal to the United States, he cannot as a general rule be completely Americanized and must inevitably retain some affiliations with his native land. In the second generation, however, and even more so in the third, the process of Americanization has been nearly complete. The main failures of the melting-pot have occurred sporadically, where quickly acquired wealth or prominence united with education enabled the immigrants of such inclinations to maintain their imported culture in the home circle and thus to transmit it in a modified form to their children. On the whole, such instances are rare, and hy-

phenism is a less serious problem⁵ than is the marked abyss that exists between the comparatively few who, enfranchised from the thralldom of catchwords, think independently and the great general public that is in servitude to head-lines and to traditional formulæ. With the latter, in a democracy based upon theoretical equality all along the line and with universal suffrage as a potent factor, are inevitably aligned the bulk of the politicians. In addition to this striking divergence between the opinion of the intelligentsia and the views of the great mass of Americans, there was revealed a new sectionalism of considerable gravity. The Northern Atlantic sea-board, the South, the Middle West, and the Pacific Coast, each developed a distinct public opinion on the questions arising out of the European War. In general also, there was manifest a marked flaccidity of national temper that would have astounded the robust generation bred in the rigours of the Civil War which, until very recently, controlled the destinies of the United States.⁶

But the mere aggregate of the diverging views of different individuals, groups, classes, and sections does not constitute the opinion of the body politic. This effective opinion can usually be summarized in definite terms. On the outbreak of the European War, a wave of mingled horror and despair ran from the Atlantic to the Pacific and these feelings were subsequently intensified by the systematically barbarous and ruthless character of the war waged by Germany on land and sea. The fate meted out to Belgium made an indelible impression

and was a powerful factor in creating the strong anti-German sentiment that with many variations and vicissitudes consistently pervaded the United States during the thirty months of the war, prior to the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, 1917. The sympathy for the Allies was more a reflex of this feeling than a positive sentiment for a cause which, in general, was imperfectly understood by a people largely ignorant of affairs beyond the confines of America. Although the American people always had some vague perception that the most far-reaching issues were at stake, they had for a long time only the faintest realization of the extent to which their own future welfare was dependent upon the defeat of German ambitions. As a consequence, Americans did not quickly perceive that their own interests not only warranted but even demanded participation in the struggle against Germany. Naturally, with the still undeveloped sense of responsibility for the welfare of the rest of the world, the cause of public right and international morality in itself made no compelling appeal. Hence, quite apart from any tendencies towards pacifism, the United States was for over two years preponderantly averse from being drawn into the war. In fact, as the conflict developed, its ruthless intensity greatly strengthened the normally pacific temper of the people and made overwhelming the popular demand for a strict adherence to neutrality, unless Germany should render such a course absolutely impossible.

In the eyes of not a few Americans, there seemed to

be something dignified in this neutrality, as if the United States had been placed in the position of a judge appraising the actions of the warring, and hence, as they thought, necessarily erring nations. Others prided themselves on some moral quality that, they assumed, was inherent in an attitude of neutrality. A distinct echo of such sentiments is to be found in the remark made by Mr. N. B. Baker, the Secretary of War, during the spring of 1916, that the United States was "now in the dominant moral position in the world."⁷

To the Entente Allies, who were sacrificing their best blood and their accumulated treasure to safeguard the ideals to which the United States has always expressed fullest allegiance, such claims were totally incomprehensible and in the extreme irritating.⁸ They denoted completely divergent points of view and led to estrangement. In fact, a little sober reflection would have demonstrated that there was no warrant whatsoever for self-righteousness on the score of neutrality. Neutrality is essentially passive in nature and is merely a right or privilege sanctioned by interstate usage. In no sense, however, is it a moral duty. It may even be the very reverse. As Mazzini truly said, "neutrality in a war of principles is mere passive existence, forgetfulness of all that makes a people sacred, the negation of the common law of nations, political atheism." According to him, the injunction to remain passive spectators between good and evil was "the word of Cain."⁹ In the absence of the effective general leadership that American democracy has for

some time sorely needed, the issue was, however, not quite so clear-cut in the mind of the American people. Yet, it is patent that a great Power which, in a crisis that is determining the destiny of the world, and hence also its own future, deliberately remains passive and refrains from actively aiding what, even only in a general way, it considers to be the cause of justice and civilization is by this inaction placed upon the moral defensive. Its neutrality, instead of being as was generally assumed *a priori* meritorious, requires vindication if it is to escape condemnation. Whether this justification will commend itself to the judgment of the future is another matter. Naturally, the comparatively few Americans who saw the issue clearly fretted under the restraints of neutrality, but in addition the disharmony between creed and deed created the wide moral unrest that attends an uneasy conscience.¹⁰ Mere vehement, even though sincere, asseverations of ideals without the slightest willingness or intention to assume any risks or responsibilities is futile and demoralizing. It rots the moral fibre of the asserter, especially when what is lacking is merely the will, not the power, to give them effect.

The overwhelming desire of the American people to remain aloof from the war was, however, accompanied by a deeper insight into the dynamics of interstate relations. Hitherto a world war had seemed to the average American to be an utter impossibility, something with which he was not likely to come into closer contact than that vicariously afforded in reading of a barbaric

past. The ensuing rude awakening directed the attention of America to problems that had formerly seemed almost academically remote. It was then generally realized that a considerable increase in military and naval armaments was necessary. At the same time also, all plans for securing the future peace of the world received an attentive hearing. In fact, the progressive horrors of the war in Belgium, Serbia, Poland, and Armenia led to a notable growth of pacificism. Simultaneously also, American foreign policy was subjected to a critical examination. In some, the European agony produced such a revulsion that they sought salvation in a Pan-Americanism that seemed to them to promise renewed and reinforced isolation in the western hemisphere. They were ready to relinquish the Philippines, to abandon China to whatever fate the ambitions of others might allot to her and, under the spell of a somewhat fetichistic republicanism, they desired "to complete and round out the immunity from entangling foreign alliances proposed by Washington and Monroe, by asking our European friends to liberate all territory in any of the Americas now held by them."¹¹ Canada, of course, was excepted. Such men wished to carry to its logical conclusion Secretary Olney's dictum that any permanent political union between a European and an American state is "unnatural and inexpedient," and to make real the Pan-American unity that John Quincy Adams and Clay had planned and which Blaine had energetically fostered.

But the solidarity upon which this unity is premised

is largely fictitious in its spiritual, cultural, political, economic, and even in its geographical elements. The cultural and economic ties between Europe and America are far stronger than are those binding together the Americas.¹² English-speaking America and Latin America are not mere geographical terms, but express vital historical and social facts. To ignore this is to court disaster. Hence while many favoured Pan-Americanism, partly because it promised distinct commercial advantages and partly also because it is a step in the direction of interstate co-operation, others again saw in it the assumption of additional responsibilities without in any way adding to the security of the United States. Moreover, they deemed it dangerous to the extent that it tended to ignore the essential and real interdependence of Europe and America. This interdependence had been conspicuously emphasized by the war. As a consequence, ever growing numbers of Americans had rejected the gospel of renewed isolation, and had reached the conclusion that the policy of aloofness from Europe was obsolete and that the United States must in the future assume its share of the burden of upholding the public right of the world.

The policy of the Administration followed the course of public opinion closely. The neutrality maintained by President Wilson was not only an expression of the popular will, but was also a direct continuation of America's traditional policy of detachment from European affairs. For two and a half years the efforts of the Administration were largely devoted to unsuccessful attempts to

assert America's rights as a neutral against practices that the belligerents claimed were founded upon well-established principles of international law, though not in accord with all the niceties of previous custom, as well as against those rights and pretensions that were exercised merely in virtue of the recognized principle of reprisal and, at times, in defiance of all humanitarian principles.¹³ In addition, after more than a year for consideration, measures were adopted to increase materially both the army and navy. At the same time also, closer relations with the other twenty republics of the western hemisphere were assiduously cultivated. But as time went on, President Wilson perceived that Europe and America had become so interdependent that the destiny of one could not be separated from that of the other. He recognized that the American doctrine of rigid neutrality, to which he had consistently adhered as far as the circumstances would permit, was becoming untenable in a closely interrelated world and would grow increasingly impracticable in the future. Hence, he advocated with increasing insistence the future formation of a world-wide union of states such as was being actively promoted by an unofficial organization known as the League to Enforce Peace.¹⁴

The object of this purely private association was to advocate the creation of a league of nations, of which the United States was naturally to be one, whose members should bind themselves to four proposals. Of these, the first is that all justiciable questions arising between the

signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to an international judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment. The second provides that all other questions arising between the signatories and likewise not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation. By the third provision, the signatories agree that they will jointly use both their economic and military forces against any member of the league that commits acts of hostility against any one of the signatories before the question at issue shall have been submitted to the judicial tribunal or to the council of conciliation, according to the stipulations of the first two proposals. Finally, provision is made for holding periodic conferences of the signatory powers for the purpose of formulating and codifying international law; and, unless some member shall dissent within a stated time, the law so defined shall govern in the decisions of the international judicial tribunal. Apart from this last provision, all that is stipulated is the creation of an international council of conciliation and an international court, to either one of which, as the case may be, a member of the league must before having recourse to war submit his dispute with another member, on pain of having the economic and military forces of all the members used against him.

Only incidentally and indirectly is it the aim of this projected league to establish justice and right; its primary purpose is merely the maintenance of peace. Even in that respect it is only a minimum programme, for no

obligation to accept the judgments of the tribunal or the recommendations of the council is incurred. The submission of the case to these international agencies and the abstention from hostilities during its hearing, absolve any member from the league's economic and military penalties and leave him in the end free to carry out his purposes by means of arms. "We are willing to concede," said Mr. Taft, "that there may be governmental and international injustice which cannot be practically remedied except by force." The legitimate presumption, however, is that in nearly all instances these judgments and recommendations will be accepted. It is also reasonably assumed that delay, accompanied by a full knowledge of the facts, will, as a rule, prevent nations from being stampeded into Armageddon.

On its face the project would appear to be one of compulsory arbitration, with no expressed or even directly implied obligation to abide by the recommendation or decree. It is, however, considerably less than that. The members of the league do not specifically agree to submit their unsettled disputes to arbitration, but only not to go to war before doing so. The economic and military forces of the league are to be used against such members only as threaten or commit hostilities against a fellow member without submitting their case, but not against those who refuse to go before the tribunal or council to answer a complaint against them. This is a vital distinction. Thus one of the most active exponents of this movement has stated:

“Under the League a dispute may go on indefinitely without any attempt to bring the disputants into Court. . . . A people may be practising a gross injustice toward another people, may refuse the demand of the latter for a hearing, and the dispute may even flame up into war without the League having the right to interfere. For there is only one act which the League punishes, namely, the making of war against a fellow signatory without a previous hearing of the dispute or an honest attempt to secure one.”¹⁵

Before the effectiveness of this programme can be judged, one other point requires elucidation. Much, obviously, depends upon the membership of the proposed league. As yet no official decision has been reached, but the general opinion is clear. It is naturally realized that the essential prerequisite is to secure the adhesion of as many of the Great Powers as is possible, preferably of all. There is also one very considerable advantage in restricting the membership to these states. Such limitation would obviate the grave difficulties arising from the legal doctrine of the equality of all sovereign states, which wrecked “The Judicial Arbitration Court” planned by the Second Hague Conference. But such limitation would violate some fundamental liberal principles. Hence, the general intention is to admit all the Great Powers and also those minor states that have a long tradition of progress and order, as well as considerable resources in numbers and wealth. This canon would make eligible Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Spain, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries, but would exclude such states as Venezuela, Colombia, Serbia, Greece,

and Persia, not to mention such pigmies of the international family as San Marino and Lichtenstein.

The effectiveness of such a league can be estimated only by submitting its machinery to the concrete tests of a known past and of a hypothetical future. In the case of continuing injury inflicted by one member upon another, apparently very little could be accomplished. It would be distinctly in the interests of the party committing the injury to refuse a hearing and to remain quiescent. Unless the obligation to answer a complaint were explicit and unless refusal to do so would bring to the support of the complainant the economic and military forces of the league, the question would still remain, as it now is, a problem of power tempered in varying degrees by moral considerations. In such cases, justice would be on the side of the apparent aggressor who sought his remedy by arms. If Turkey had been a member of such a league during the nineteenth century, the continued maltreatment of her Christian subjects in the Balkans and in Armenia could not without her consent have come before the league's tribunals, no matter how insistent Russia and the other Powers had been. Likewise, if such a league had been in existence without Turkey having had membership in it, no relief could have been afforded by the league's agencies. In all probability, however, in this instance the league would have proceeded *ultra vires* and would have acted in much the same manner as did the Concert of Europe towards Balkan questions.

On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that such a league could have composed the dispute between the United States and Spain about the intolerable conditions in Cuba, provided both parties had been willing to submit the case to the council of conciliation. The outcome for all concerned would presumably then not have been just what it now is. But if Spain had refused a reference of the dispute, then the course of events would have been much the same as it was. On the other hand, if the United States, not Spain, had been the unwilling party and had insisted upon attacking the Spanish forces in Cuba, then the league's members would have been obligated to join their economic and military forces to those of Spain in repelling this attack.

Leaving this tentatively reconstructed past, it will be found instructive to test the league's programme by the course of events leading up to the existing war. As Serbia presumably would not have been a member of the hypothetical league, Austria-Hungary's attack upon her would not have concerned this organization until Russia had intervened with a complaint to the council of conciliation. If Austria-Hungary had agreed to allow the case to go before the council, this in itself would have provided no remedy unless the league had the power, as it is proposed it shall have, to enjoin the military proceedings against Serbia.¹⁶ Otherwise, in trying to prevent the military coercion of Serbia by attacking Austria-Hungary, Russia would have become subject to the league's full penalties. But judging by what actually did happen,

there is little reason to assume that Austria-Hungary would have agreed to a hearing and investigation. In that case, the course of events would probably have duplicated the actual one, except for one possible contingency. This arises from the relation of existing treaties of alliance to the proposed league. It is scarcely conceivable that these alliances will be abandoned until in the fulness of time the projected league shall have demonstrated its effective vitality. Admitting, solely however for the purposes of the argument, that the alliance with Germany had been abrogated as a condition of Austria-Hungary's admission to the league, in that most unlikely event, fear of Russia's teeming millions might have given Austria-Hungary pause. As now, it then still would have been largely a *Machtfrage*, a question of relative power. The league would in that event, of course, have had no right to interfere; for Russia, after having offered to submit her case and been denied a hearing, would have been at full liberty to attack Austria-Hungary. But, even if the treaty of alliance had been in full vigour, the existence of such a league might have considerably altered the course of events. For if Germany had proceeded exactly as she did, the whole forces of the league would probably have been called into action against her. On the other hand, this result might have been avoided by an adaptation of Germany's military strategy to this probability. One thing alone is certain, that the situation arising from the conflicting obligations to league and to alliances would have been a most intri-

cate and puzzling one, not for Germany alone, but for all the Powers.¹⁷ Presumably, though by no means assuredly, its outcome would have been an embattled world, had "the will to war" dominated Germany and Austria-Hungary.

If, however, we look behind the occasions of the present war to its causes, if we leave the incidents of a fortnight and concentrate our attention upon the international travail of an entire generation, then it would appear that the result might possibly have been an altogether different one. Everything would have depended upon the vitality of the league and the assurance that every member would have fully abided by his pledge to oppose aggression by force. Assuming such circumstances, if a united world in arms had unquestionably to be encountered, the aggressive aims of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and the world-wide ambitions of Germany would probably never have emerged from their academic phases into *Realpolitik*. The superstate organization would probably have hastened the development of an international mind.

Turning to the unpredictable future, it will be advisable to apply the machinery to possible contingencies that affect most closely the policies of the United States. These concern primarily the Monroe Doctrine and the open door in the Far East. Let it be assumed that for some more or less valid reason Germany were to proceed against Venezuela, Colombia, or any one of the backward Latin-American States that had not been

admitted to the league. Presumably the United States would protest. In that event, an appeal would be made to the council of conciliation and an injunction against Germany's proceedings would be demanded. It is true that this would involve submitting the Monroe Doctrine to arbitration; but the United States had already virtually agreed to this, though it is not generally realized, when the Bryan Treaties of 1913 and 1914, providing for the submission of all disputes to an international commission of enquiry, were concluded. If Germany, however, should refuse to submit the case, then no injunction could be issued and the United States, as under existing arrangements, would have to appeal to the arbitrament of arms. Even were Germany to consent to a submission of the case, the United States would still be at liberty to enforce its views, in the event of dissatisfaction with the recommendations of the international tribunal. Thus it is not apparent that the league programme would weaken the fundamental purpose of the Monroe Doctrine, which is to prevent European Powers from interfering with the free development of Latin America. On the other hand, if Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were to join the league, it is quite probable that Europe might be obligated to interfere in some purely American question. In itself, this probably would bode no evil. But while the essential purpose of the Monroe Doctrine would presumably not be impaired, it is difficult to see how it would to any extent be strengthened by the establishment of the league. The maintenance of

its fundamental purposes would in final analysis have to rest upon the same forces as it now does.

Similarly doubtful would appear to be the efficacy of the proposed machinery in securing the principle of equal commercial opportunities for all foreign nations in China and in maintaining that country's territorial integrity and political independence. Much would depend upon China's membership in the league. As a member, China could appeal to the league against aggressive conduct on the part of her neighbours. But if these refused to agree to a hearing, China might not be able to enlist the support of the league, as it would not be easy to establish the overt act of war in the slow process of penetration that has characterized the advance of Russia and Japan in Mongolia and Manchuria. On the surface, China might even be made to appear as the aggressor. On the other hand, if China were not admitted to membership, the league could not take cognizance of any complaints by a member against encroachments upon China, unless the offending states should consent to such action.

Following some previous public expressions manifesting general approval of the principles for which the League to Enforce Peace stands,¹⁸ President Wilson, on May 27, 1916, stated that the United States believed in the following fundamental propositions: first, that every people have a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live; second, that the small states have the same right to their sovereignty and territorial integrity as the great nations; and third, "that the world has a right to

be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations." Continuing, he expressed the firm conviction that the American people were willing to become partners "in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them sure against violation." The type of international organization that, in his opinion, the United States was willing to join, he defined as:

"An universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world,—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence."

In the course of the following weeks, President Wilson reiterated these principles¹⁹ and in the middle of June, 1916, they were formally included in the platform of the Democratic Party on which he ran for re-election. Thus these principles became an official part of the Democratic creed. In his formal speech accepting the re-nomination, on September 2, President Wilson emphasized this feature of the platform, stating:

"No nation can any longer remain neutral as against any wilful disturbance of the peace of the world. . . . The nations of the world must unite in joint guarantees that whatever is done to disturb the whole world's life must first be tested in the court of the whole world's opinion before it is attempted."

Although the principles of the League to Enforce

Peace were not embodied in the platform of the Republican Party, Mr. Hughes endorsed these doctrines unequivocally.²⁰ He omitted, however, to give them any prominence during his campaign. On the other hand, President Wilson on several occasions emphatically urged the necessity of the United States joining such a league of nations to prevent aggression and to maintain peace.²¹ Although popular attention had not turned towards this phase of his campaign, President Wilson was to a large extent justified in holding that his re-election gave him a mandate to carry this plan into effect. It was obviously important for the outside world to know this. Accordingly, it was proposed to inform the belligerents in order that they should take this new factor into account in determining what territorial re-arrangements were necessary to give them the desired future security. In his eirenicon of December 18, 1916, after referring to the fact that some of the opposing belligerents had already expressed their willingness "to consider the formation of a league of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world," President Wilson stated that the people and government of the United States "stand ready, and even eager, to co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends when the war is over with every influence and resource at their command."

Some time previously, in discussing this general plan, Viscount Grey had pointed out that "it is not merely a sign manual of Sovereigns or Presidents that is required to make a thing like that worth while; it must also have

behind it Parliaments and national sentiment.”²² The American people as a whole were as yet far from ready to abandon their traditional isolation and to join a league with such unlimited obligations. In addition, the plan could be put into effect only by a treaty which would have to be ratified by a vote of two thirds of the members present in the Senate. Furthermore, Congress alone has the right to declare war and the entrance of the United States into the proposed league would deprive Congress in a general way and in many unpredictable circumstances of the right to determine the belligerency of the United States.²³ Some of the grave obstacles in the path of this project were disclosed by the debate in the Senate on President Wilson’s Note of December 18. The league programme was aggressively assailed, partly on the ground that it undermined the Monroe Doctrine and partly because it committed the United States to unlimited obligations.

This debate and the discussion in the press directed considerable popular attention towards the league plan. Partly in order to explain more definitely his own views as to the proposed international organization and as to the circumstances under which he favoured membership of the United States in it, President Wilson, on January 22, 1917, personally addressed the Senate. He stated that, in every discussion of the future peace, it is taken for granted that its establishment must be followed by “some definite concert of power,” which will prevent the recurrence of any such catastrophic war. “It is incon-

ceivable," he added, "that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise." They cannot in honour withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged, namely, "to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world." This address led to renewed discussion in the Senate, during which it was again very apparent that grave opposition would have to be surmounted before the Senate would be ready to ratify a treaty embodying this project. In the midst of the debate came Germany's sudden announcement of her unrestricted submarine campaign. The ensuing severance of diplomatic relations with Germany naturally stopped all further discussion.

Germany's flagrant disregard of American rights and her fixed determination to delimit arbitrarily the high seas and to treat all vessels venturing within the barred zones of this commonage of all peoples as trespassers to be sunk at sight forced the United States to depart from the chosen course of neutrality. However unwelcome, in general, was this necessity, the other alternative was the impossible one of unmistakable national humiliation. At first, it was the intention merely to protect American rights and to maintain a neutral attitude towards the great aim for which the Entente Allies were contending. But this very issue was directly involved in the submarine controversy, because Germany's defiance of America's well-established and unquestioned rights proceeded in essence from the non-moral code that animates Germany's

entire foreign policy. It was a concrete manifestation of the spirit that had led to the invasion of Belgium. Protection of American rights meant the vindication of "public right" for which the Entente was fighting.²⁴ The two were inseparable.

This was further emphasized by Germany's inept attempt to embroil the United States with Mexico and Japan. The direct challenge to the Monroe Doctrine inherent in the offer to Mexico of the "lost" provinces of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, disclosed the insidious nature of the German menace. When Russia burst the shackles of autocracy, the situation became even more clarified. It was increasingly realized that the fate of democracy was involved in the war and that no stable or just international future was possible in a world where one state arrogated to itself the right to ignore solemn treaties, long-established interstate usage, and generally accepted principles of morality and humanity, whenever they interfered with its imperious will to power.

The negative policy of "armed neutrality" could not be maintained. It was not only ineffective in accomplishing its purposes, but it ignored the fact that it implied also a negotiated settlement. The German proposal to Carranza to "make war together and together make peace" disclosed the far from alluring prospect of having to arrange terms with a Germany unhampered by war with the Entente. But, in addition, "armed neutrality" falsified the fundamental facts of the situation. It degraded a great issue of international morality and right

into a relatively paltry question of neutral rights. Doubts early began to beset President Wilson and, in his inaugural address on March 5, he stated that the United States might be drawn by circumstances to "a more immediate association with the great struggle itself." A month later, all doubts had disappeared. In addressing Congress on April 2, President Wilson characterized the German submarine campaign as "a war against all nations" and he frankly admitted that armed neutrality was impracticable. He advised Congress to declare that the course of the German Government was nothing less than war against the United States and to take immediate steps "to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war." In addition to the mobilization of America's economic and military resources, this will involve, he pointed out, "the utmost practicable co-operation in counsel and action with the governments now at war with Germany."

President Wilson, however, did not allow the matter to rest here, but he again urged his plan for a league of nations and he definitely aligned the United States with the Entente Allies by fully accepting their interpretation of the deeper meaning of the war. In ringing words, he proclaimed his firm adherence to the programme of an organized society of states, renounced the constraints of neutrality and arraigned the Prussian-German code. He declared that the object of the United States in entering the war was:

"To vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life

of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances."

The entrance of the United States into the war for this positive ideal is in many respects a transcendent event of far-reaching potentialities. Apart from its effect upon the war itself, it marks the definite abandonment of the policy of isolation and the inception of new traditions of international responsibility. It means a clear recognition of the fact that the peoples of the world constitute a society and that each member thereof is responsible for order and justice therein. In addition, the full cooperation with the Entente Allies in their high purpose is equivalent to the practical establishment of a league to enforce peace. The paramount aim of the Allies is that of pacification. Their purpose is to quell the Germanic rebellion against the moral law, the established customs, and the liberal spirit of western civilization. In this connection, the fundamental question has inevitably arisen: "Shall this existing league perpetuate itself?" "Shall its membership be confined to those engaged in the work of pacification with the addition of some of the neutral states; or, shall the rebels against public right be admitted as soon as peace is concluded, regardless of whether

their spirit be chastened or still remain recalcitrant?"

In this connection, Mr. Wilson made some significant suggestions in his memorable address of April 2. He emphasized a fundamental fact that had not escaped the attention of American and English critics who had pointed out that the success of the projected league of nations depended upon reciprocal confidence among its members and upon a universal will to co-operation. One insincere member could work incalculable havoc with its delicate machinery and could use it to delude his fellows with a false sense of security. With such thoughts in his mind, President Wilson said:

"A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own."

Instead of an all-inclusive league of the world's stable states, President Wilson here proposed one confined to the self-governing democracies.²⁵ Either alternative has its advantages, as well as its concomitant disadvantages. In general, the more comprehensive the league, the more slowly will it acquire vitality and less positive must be its purposes. The programme of "the League to Enforce Peace" was especially devised for such an inclusive league and it is avowedly only a palliative to lessen the

risk of war. Its champions merely claim that it is the first step towards world organization. Other proposals go considerably further in advocating the compulsory submission of disputes and even the enforcement of the awards. Such apparently also was Mr. Wilson's purpose when, on December 18, 1916, he spoke of "a league of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world."

The advantages of an inclusive league, even with only the minimum programme, are patent, provided the equally obvious dangers are not ignored. Of these the gravest is that pacific peoples may too confidently place an undue reliance upon what is confessedly only a palliative and neglect those other safeguards that will be necessary if they are to remain fully secure against aggressive states. In general, the effect of the comprehensive plan would be to diminish the risk of war by fostering recourse to arbitration and thus injecting the factors of publicity, delay and reason into situations that are too often controlled by panic and passion. Moreover, even if war could by no means be eliminated by these agencies, force would not as now be predominantly used at the discretion of directly interested parties, but would in an increasing number of instances be applied under an international mandate. Instead of being exclusively national instruments, the several and distinct armies and navies would tend to become the policing force of a still imperfectly organized society of states.²⁶

Concomitantly also, the inevitable friction resulting

from the inherent conflict between the rights of belligerents and those of neutrals would tend towards elimination. These disputes have inevitably occurred in every great war in which sea power has been an important factor. But if such power were exercised under an international mandate, there would be no demand for its emasculation. In such authorized wars, in which the world would be divided between the policing states and those engaged in riot and rebellion, neutral rights would automatically cease to hamper the application of every ounce of pressure of which sea power is capable, provided the generally accepted dictates of humanity were not violated. Carried to its logical conclusion, the league programme implies that the aggressor would be confronted by a completely belligerent world. But the league's machinery is not devised to prevent all wars of aggression. In such unauthorized wars, neutral rights would still remain fully intact. Furthermore, in such instances, a canon would be established for determining aggression, upon which, in turn, could be based the at present legally questionable right to practise a benevolent neutrality towards the injured party.²⁷

Finally, such a league of nations will be indispensable as a link between the two groups of a disrupted western world. Some bridge must be kept open. No one is so pessimistic as to assume that western unity has disappeared for all time. But the cleavage in it is very real and it cannot be made to vanish merely by ignoring it, or by denying its existence. Failure to face facts is the

cardinal sin in statesmanship. Unless Germany purge herself of her materialistic and non-moral creed, either as a result of a democratic upheaval or as a consequence of economic and military collapse, the fundamental factor in interstate relations for the next generation or so cannot but be this abyss between the Allies and the Central Powers. It has been created by moral and political forces of great potency. Its depths cannot be lessened merely by the earnest desire of those who regret its existence. Under these conditions, when mutual confidence is lacking, sincere co-operation between the two groups of states will for a considerable time be out of the question. In this more or less long interval, the proposed league would at least act as a serviceable bridge until ultimately the disrupted unity be restored. From the very fact that they will live in the same world, the two sets of belligerents must meet to regulate matters that are common to all. However great be the efforts made to lessen it, their interdependence will still remain an important factor.

The immediate programme of the inclusive league would be essentially the negative one of diminishing the chance of war. If carried into effect, it would remain for a long time an artificial organization with little inherent vitality. As opposed to such an unlimited union with indefinite and negative objects, President Wilson's "League of Honour" presents the possibility of a limited union with definite and positive aims. In order to render either organization effective to any satisfactory extent, it would seemingly be necessary to create a code of public

right embodied in a series of fundamental treaties to which all members were parties. These treaties should guarantee in explicit terms: first, the independence, integrity, and neutrality of all minor states occupying economic and strategic points of vantage, such as Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Serbia; secondly, the independence and integrity of China and of other backward independent countries, with the wide-open door there and, possibly also, in the undeveloped dependencies of Europe and America; thirdly, the Monroe Doctrine, in so far as it is based upon the foregoing principles and not upon either the imperialistic aims or the exclusive economic ambitions of some elements in the United States.

Finally, it should be realized that, whether it be an inclusive league or the limited concert of democracies, the project will in either case remain largely an unreality if the rigid categories of the current political science are not modified. If the world adheres to the accepted theory of sovereignty which demands a supreme and undivided allegiance to the absolute state, the league will be a victim of infantile paralysis. As Sir Frederick Pollock has wisely said, an effective league "involves a considerable delegation of authority by sovereign States; but those who desire the end of effectual concerted action must be prepared to grant the means."²⁸ In order to avoid any infringement of sovereignty, "the League to Enforce Peace" has specifically made its programme one of optional arbitration and of non-enforcement of the judgments. To go further is to secure increased effective-

ness at the expense of sovereignty. The dilemma is self-evident. Senator Cummins, assuming that Mr. Wilson favoured enforcement of the league's decision, attacked the project, declaring that it meant the surrender of sovereignty by the United States to "a new world sovereignty" and "the formation of a new and supreme government which is to command our resources in both blood and treasure." To his not abnormally nationalistic mind, it was a "humiliating reflection that the United States will be reduced to a mere principality, pursuing the path of obscurity to an ignominious future, doing the bidding of a higher power."²⁹

It is easy to criticize such sentiments, but it would be folly to ignore them as they are held far and wide, not only in the United States but throughout the world. They are part and parcel of the current political thought upon which is based the modern state-system. Hence the grave difficulties in the way of the creation of an effective superstate authority and the extreme improbability that, whatever be the type of league formed, it will rapidly become an independently robust organization.³⁰ The vital factor in interstate relations will be the cooperative spirit engendered among the members of the two groups by the war. The democratic basis which is establishing itself in support of the existing alliances has given them a fresh vitality. This is especially true of the group with which the United States has thrown in its fortunes. Except in the most improbable event of military or naval disaster undermining its vitality, this

group will continue in existence after the war in some form or another. If an inclusive league of nations be formed, the members of this group will inevitably tend to act in concert within it. If, on the other hand, the league be restricted to the world's democracies, its membership and that of this group will largely coincide. In either case, this group will be a vital fact. It may be bound together in one general agreement or its solidarity may express itself in a mere *entente*. In all likelihood, the members will be united in a network of separate alliances, whose general effect will be to make them a unit in defence and to create separate combinations for the attainment of specific ends.

Within this group, the relations of each to every other member will vary considerably in accordance with many factors. Of these the most important will be the more or less close approximation of national ideals. But, in addition, geographical facts will play a leading part. Contiguity cannot be ignored. Similarly, these relations will be greatly influenced by the closeness of the economic bonds and by the degree of parallelism in policy as regards common purposes and interests. Hence the relations of France and Italy are bound to be very intimate. Cultural similarity, juxtaposition, and economic interests, all favour such an outcome. Thus the Italian Deputy, Giuseppe Bevione, significantly said:

“We, the old Latin races, in whom the historical sense is deeply ingrained, have already acquired the feeling that this alliance which has been consecrated on the field of battle must

continue after the war, if we wish to preserve the fruits of victory. Woe to those who find they stand alone after the struggle! France and Italy, by uniting their forces, can constitute a powerful, uniform and united *bloc* of 80 millions of Latins. . . . If the Latin *bloc* is formed, it will be a factor of the first importance in the Europe of to-morrow—a factor whose counsels will be respected and whose strength will be feared.”³¹

It will probably be impossible and it would presumably be highly injudicious for the United States to retire after the war from this group to its former hermit-like isolation. America's clearly defined purpose in the war is to establish public right and to make the world safe for its democracies. A more or less artificial league of nations will confessedly not be sufficient to accomplish this. Nor, unless an extensive code of right be formulated, will it in itself give any added strength to the Monroe Doctrine and adequately safeguard the integrity of China and the open door to her undeveloped markets and resources. Direct co-operation with others is necessary and the more explicitly and publicly the basis of this co-operation is defined, the more effective will it be. The outbreak of the war proved the inefficacy of the policy of understandings with ill-defined obligations. If Germany had faced the positive fact that her attack upon France would bring the British Empire into the war, she would probably not have drawn the sword. Nor is co-operation merely in certain specific questions adequate. For instance, it is quite plain, even to the most casual observer, that Japan is at present attempting to gain an

exclusive and predominant economic and political position in China. The ultimate success of this scarcely disguised attempt will depend primarily upon whether or no England after the war will be in a position that, in opposing Japan, she can afford to run the risk of that country joining the Central Empires. In the formation of this decision, the attitude of the United States in this special instance will necessarily count for little; the main consideration will ineluctably be the general balance of power and purpose throughout the world, because on it will depend the safety of the British Commonwealth. The greater need must over-ride the lesser. America's co-operation in some isolated case alone with no firm assurance of immediate active support if again the greater issue be raised, would be no compensation for the possible defection of Japan to the Teutonic Powers. Whether or no China's fate is to be determined by factors entirely extraneous to the problem itself and independent of the ethical elements involved in it, rests chiefly with the United States. Until the Prussian-German peril is completely eliminated beyond possibility of resuscitation, many fundamental questions will be decided in the main by their bearing upon it to the neglect of their intrinsic merits. So long as this fear of military domination haunts the world, it will control foreign policy and will render full co-operation of its intended victims highly essential.

The *post-bellum* relations of the United States to its associates in the present war are a momentous problem.

A general defensive alliance with the group as a whole would apparently be highly inadvisable as the United States wisely does not want to be drawn deeply into the welter of European politics. Nor would such an arrangement effectively safeguard the two chief American policies, the Monroe Doctrine and Chinese integrity. For essentially the same reasons, a general alliance with France is out of the question, in spite of the depth of American sympathy for a harassed sister-republic. The future security of France and also that of Italy and Belgium could be served as well by an alliance of the United States with the British Commonwealth.

Physically, economically, and spiritually the United States is in closest contact with the English-speaking peoples of this world-wide Commonwealth of Nations. The unfortified boundary between Canada and the United States was an envied marvel to a Europe armed cap-à-pie. The economic ties connecting these kindred peoples are ever becoming more extensive and more binding. Their common civilization represents a distinctive branch of the western type. The success of a league of nations depends predominantly upon their intimate and genuine co-operation within it. Its vitality would be drawn chiefly from this source. An alliance of the United States with the British Commonwealth on clearly defined terms of unquestionable explicitness, made in the open light of the day, so that those planning aggression could realize clearly the formidable obstacle in their path, would effectively, though not absolutely, secure the general peace

of the future world. In addition, such an alliance would well-nigh guarantee the development of the world along progressively democratic lines. It would give nearly absolute security to the English-speaking peoples, and relative safety to all Europe. More than anything else, it would prevent the persistence of the German menace. In it largely lies the hope of curtailing the term of reaction towards economic and political nationalism that is to be the war's inevitable aftermath and in it lies also the prospect of an ultimate better all-inclusive international future when the fissure in western civilization shall have finally grown together.

VI

THE UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES

“The international relationship constituted by the alliances and antagonisms known as the Balance of Power, in which the factors are governments and armaments, is a social relationship of a lower order than the Bond of Peoples between the United Kingdom and the United States, in which there is a living force.”

— NATIONALISM AND WAR IN THE NEAR EAST, p. 6.

“But there were some half-dozen of us who hammered away—I dare say we bored our audience at these ideas: that the growth of the Colonies into self-governing communities was no reason why they should drop away from the Mother Country or from one another; that the complete separation of the two greatest sections of the English-speaking race was a dire disaster, not only in the manner in which it came about, but for coming about at all; that there was no political object comparable in importance with that of preventing a repetition of such a disaster, the severance of another link in the great Imperial chain. The greatest local independence, we then argued, was not incompatible with closer and more effective union for common purposes.”

— LORD MILNER, March 29, 1897.

“The German Emperor has become a great Empire-builder, but it is not his Empire that he is building.”

— MR. BONAR LAW, February 7, 1917.

CHAPTER VI

THE UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES

Modern British Imperialism — The British Commonwealth — Imperial Reconstruction — The Dominions and Foreign Policy — The Imperial War Cabinet — The United States an English-Speaking Country — The Language Factor — The British Stock — Anglo-American Relations in the Past and Future.

WHILE war is certainly not the father of all things, as the Greek philosopher sweepingly claimed, it unquestionably clears away many a mental cobweb and hastens the course of many a slowly progressing movement. Daily more and more Americans are realizing the perils of future isolation and a growing minority are urging the necessity of intimate Anglo-American co-operation.¹ But the war has definitely rendered impossible such an alliance as Joseph Chamberlain proposed in 1898. An Anglo-American alliance is now out of the question, simply because in the future British foreign policy will be controlled and directed by organs representative of the Empire as a whole, not of Britain alone. An alliance with the British Commonwealth, in which not only Great Britain, Canada, and South Africa with their systems of free government, but also the most advanced democracies of the world, Australia and New Zealand, are to have a

direct voice in determining foreign policy, is patently something quite different from one contracted only with the people of the British Isles. For uniting these self-governing Dominions and the United States is not only that fundamental identity of civilization which is characteristic of the Mother Country as well, but also other points of likeness arising from their similar evolutions under frontier conditions. All these growing democracies have this great feature in common that they are the off-shoots of a little sea-girt isle that only so recently as Shakespeare's day contained fewer people than does the present city of New York.

While the United States has severed all political ties with the parent country, the other outlying democracies have not only kept alive this bond, but in recent years, and more especially since the South African War, they have been drawing it tauter. This spontaneous and voluntary movement towards closer union is the predominant characteristic of modern British imperialism. Its nature has been considerably obscured by an inadequate terminology and by misleading associations inherited from a past animated by a different spirit. "Man is a creature," said Robert Louis Stevenson, "who lives not upon bread alone, but principally by catchwords." From historical analogies, imperialism is a term that automatically suggests the extension of rule by military force over unwilling peoples. Similarly, colony conveys a distinct concept of inferiority of status and also the idea of ownership by the parent community. These misleading

implications have not only somewhat alienated sympathy from what is essentially a movement towards greater cohesion among kindred peoples, but they have retarded progress towards the real goal by keeping alive vestiges of the old system. Hence the mischievous nomenclature and obsolete labels are being rapidly discarded. Since 1907, the self-governing democracies are no longer officially known as Colonies, but as Dominions.² Likewise, in order to escape from the tyranny of words, a widespread effort is being made to substitute for Empire the more truly descriptive term, Commonwealth. As Mr. Steel-Maitland, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, has said, "the first savours of command, the second of service: the one of servitude, the other of freedom."³

These words represent the finest spirit of modern British imperialism and it is this type that is very rapidly gaining ground. One of its chief exponents, Lord Milner, has defined its temper in the following words:

"Imperialism as a political doctrine has often been represented as something tawdry and superficial. In reality it has all the depth and comprehensiveness of a religious faith. Its significance is moral even more than material. It is a mistake to think of it as principally concerned with extension of territory, with 'painting the map red.' There is quite enough painted red already. It is not a question of a couple of hundred thousand square miles more or less. It is a question of preserving the unity of a great race, of enabling it, by maintaining that unity, to develop freely on its own lines, and to continue to fulfil its distinctive mission in the world."⁴

In 1908, five years before these sentences were writ-

ten, Lord Milner addressed a Canadian audience as follows:

“I am so intensely conscious of all that the Empire stands for in the world, of all that it means in the great march of human progress, I am so anxious to give full and yet unexaggerated expression to my sense of the high privilege of British citizenship. But there is nothing so odious as cant, and this is a subject on which it is particularly easy to seem to be canting. Not that I am afraid of falling into a strain of boastfulness. The last thing which the thought of the Empire inspires in me is a desire to boast—to wave a flag, or to shout ‘Rule Britannia.’ When I think of it, I am much more inclined to go into a corner by myself and pray.”⁵

The purpose and spirit of such imperialism is closely akin to that of Abraham Lincoln.⁶ In fact, this movement has drawn much of its inspiration from American statesmen. From Washington’s steadfast and noble character, from Hamilton’s firm grasp of fundamental principles,⁷ and from Lincoln’s passion for freedom and union have been gained many valuable lessons. These modern imperialists look upon the British Empire as a vast Commonwealth of Nations. The bond which unites all its citizens and “constitutes them collectively as a state is, to use the words of Lincoln, in the nature of *dedication*. . . . Its foundation is not self-interest, but rather some sense of obligation, however conceived, which is strong enough to over-master self-interest.”⁸ With Mazzini, they totally reject the sterile doctrine of rights and demand a positive creed. According to their views, “it is obligation, not privilege, duties, and not rights, which lie at the root of citizenship, and which, in conse-

quence, are the foundations upon which every healthy and progressive state must build its communal life." But this obligation is not to an abstraction, the state, but to the whole body of one's fellow citizens, organized as a community under a common law. In their eyes, the state is based upon the irrevocable dedication of the members to one another for the practical conduct of social life.⁹

With obvious qualifications and reservations, for full realization still lags, this is a far truer picture of the actual British Empire than that visualized by many Englishmen, by most Americans, and by nearly all Germans. If one thinks of a little island in the North Sea as the owner of one fifth of the habitable globe, some doubts as to the equity of the distribution must arise. But if such a gross and palpable distortion of actuality is dispelled and one regards Great Britain merely as the head, but not as the owner, merely as one member of a worldwide Commonwealth of Nations, then the aspect is radically different. The latter view is a close approximation to reality. In no sense of the word can it be said that England owns Canada, Australia, or South Africa; nor is such a possessive term truly descriptive of the relations to India, Egypt, and the rest of the Dependent Empire. The concept of ownership is applicable only in the case of Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, and those other outposts whose chief function is to secure the safety of communications in the far-flung Commonwealth so aptly called "that new Venice whose streets are the oceans."¹⁰

This fundamental change in the spirit animating British imperialism did not come over-night. When, during the early Victorian period, was established in Canada the system of responsible government upon which rests the present autonomy of the Dominions, all but a carefully remembered corporal's guard of England's public men regarded this step as the logical precursor to the Empire's dismemberment. The rest were agreed upon this inevitable outcome, though they envisaged it with varying attitudes ranging from trepidation through indifference to positive relief. Practically no one contemplated the use of force to prevent it. Even a generation later, when imperial federation became a much discussed question as a result of Seeley's writings and of Parkin's activities, few judged that the Empire's integrity would be able to stand the shock of a foreign war. It is not surprising that Lord Morley's imagination could not then conceive of Australia participating in some future war "for the defence of Belgian neutrality,"¹¹ but the father of the modern imperial movement, Joseph Chamberlain, was also at the time somewhat similarly pessimistic.¹² It is a far cry from those days to the grim present, when Dominion troops are conspicuously active on the plains of France and have proven their mettle in the deserts of Egypt and amidst the hills of Gallipoli Peninsula. What produced this change of temper with its complete transmutation of imperial values?

In reality, despite the confident predictions of public leaders, there was in the mass of men in Britain and in

the Dominions no desire for absolute separation, but each community wished to work out its own destiny unhampered by outside interference. Thirty years ago, the interests common to the various groups were abnormally inconspicuous, primarily because the international situation was such that Great Britain's supremacy at sea seemed unassailable. As a consequence, each of the Dominions had apparently before it the prospect of an undisturbed development of its own individual life, and the dangers from which the British Navy protected them seemed scarcely to be real ones. But this calm rapidly gave place to a period of keen international rivalry. The rise of Japan, to a limited extent also American expansion in the Pacific, but above all the emergence of Germany as a world power with alarmingly vague ambitions brought the Dominions face to face with the underlying facts of international relations. A rude shock was administered by the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger in 1896 and by subsequent German intrigues in South Africa, which greatly aggravated the difficulties of British statesmen in securing relief from conditions that Lord Bryce had accurately described as intolerable.¹³ This was further emphasized during the Boer War, not only by the bitter animosity of the German people, but also by the covert hostility of their government.¹⁴ At the same time also, considerable feeling was aroused by Germany's attempt to penalize Canada for granting preferential treatment to commodities imported from the United Kingdom.¹⁵ These and other incidents awakened the Domin-

ions from their dream of security, but they were brought into even closer contact with the dynamics of international politics by the gradual withdrawal of the British fleet from the Seven Seas and its concentration in the North Sea. As the international tension became more and more acute, the desire for a closer union became stronger, and a growing number of men, unconsciously and consciously, transferred their ultimate dedication from the local community to the world-wide state of which it constituted merely a member. *L'amour du clocher* was expanding into an imperial patriotism, which many found to be entirely consistent with colonial nationalism.

In the changed international situation, imperial defence became a vital problem; and, in facing it, the whole imperial system was subjected to close scrutiny. According to the strictly legal view, which was based upon Roman precedents and analogies, the British Colonies were provinces of Great Britain and were subject to the sovereignty of Parliament. This legal theory was not wholly in accord with the actual political facts even as they were in the days of the "Old Colonial System" before the schism of the American Revolution, and it had become quite untenable towards the middle of the nineteenth century when the Dominions became almost completely self-governing entities under the system of responsible government. The theory of parliamentary sovereignty was, however, still retained, but in recent years this legal fiction is being more and more abandoned.

Chamberlain called the Dominions "states which have voluntarily accepted one crown and one flag, and which in all else are absolutely independent of one another." According to Mr. Asquith, the United Kingdom and the Dominions are 'each master in its own household, a principle which is the life blood of the Empire — *articulus stantis aut cadentis Imperii.*'¹⁶ The Crown is now regarded as the connecting link binding together Great Britain, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa; and, in so far as these Dominions are concerned, the Empire has assumed the outward character of a league of autonomous nations. The Dominions are no longer regarded as daughter states, but rather as sister nations; and loyalty is expressed not to the original Mother Country, but to the Empire as a whole.

In a loosely organized Commonwealth of this character, one of the most difficult problems is to apportion the burdens that are common to all — especially that of imperial defence — in such a manner that their weight shall fall equitably on each member without at the same time doing violence to political principles that underlie free government. Hitherto, as in the colonial period of the United States, the burden of imperial defence had rested almost exclusively upon the taxpayers of Britain. The attempt to solve this problem by parliamentary taxation brought on the American Revolution, and that experience rendered easy the avoidance of the pitfalls then encountered. In those days, as Professor Maitland most suggestively said:

“The State that Englishmen knew was a singularly unicellular State, and at a critical time they were not too well equipped with tried and traditional thoughts which would meet the case of Ireland or of some communities, commonwealths, corporations in America which seemed to have wills—and hardly fictitious wills—of their own, and which became States and United States.”¹⁷

There was at that time no statesman in England or in America to whom the possible solution occurred. All thought in terms of the alternatives: independence and imperial disruption, or subjection to Parliament and union. Since then the world has had considerable experience in federated and federal governments of most diverse types.

When brought face to face by the German menace with this problem of imperial defence, the Dominions recognized not only that the distribution of the load was inequitable, but also that it was totally out of harmony with the newer concept of imperial relations, which predicated “equality of status, though not of stature” between them and Britain. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were willing to assume some share of the burden of imperial defence, but the question became more than ever complicated when adequate means were sought to give effect to this desire. While they chafed at the undignified immaturity inherent in their position as protected communities, they could not, in attempting to emerge from it, fail to realize that their deeply cherished and much vaunted autonomy was incomplete in that they had no control over foreign policy and no voice in the decisive

issue of peace or war. Some considerable influence they might have, but in final analysis their destiny was not in their hands, but was largely determined for them by others. Whether, as in Australia, local navies were to be created, or, as was proposed in Canada, funds were to be granted for strengthening the British Navy, mattered not; in both cases the Dominions would have no direct voice in deciding why, when, and how these armaments that they supplied or supported were to be used. Stripped to its essentials, it was the same difficulty that had brought about the American Revolution, the impossibility of a complete reconciliation of *libertas* with *imperium* under the existing political machinery. It was the old question of "taxation without representation" in a different guise. This gave Canada pause.

The situation was an exceedingly difficult one, because a full and satisfactory solution would necessitate radical changes. The new institutions that had been devised to meet the demand for greater imperial co-operation were not adapted to the purpose. The Imperial Conferences at which the Dominion Ministers were to meet their British colleagues in London every four years, and the occasional presence of colonial statesmen at the meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, however admirable for the purpose of consultation and mutual enlightenment, did not meet the situation. Under the system of responsible government, the executive of the United Kingdom cannot follow the commands of several entirely distinct legislatures and electorates. This Cabinet, which

controlled the foreign policy of the British Commonwealth, had to act in conformity with the views of the legislature to which it was responsible, and the Parliament at Westminster could in turn embody only the will of the people that elected it. The constitutional problem is to devise means by which "a British citizen in the Dominions can acquire the same control of foreign policy as one domiciled in the British Isles."

The existing war has greatly aggravated the urgency of this problem. It has furnished concrete proof of the momentous increase of imperial sentiment and of the solidity of the Commonwealth's spiritual foundations. From all corners of the globe came fervent expressions of loyalty and concrete demonstrations of their sincerity. The Dominions have manifested the vitality of the new conception of imperial partnership by active participation in the titanic struggle on a scale and in a manner without any parallel or even analogy in the Empire's long history. This participation was entirely spontaneous,¹⁸ and the motive that prompted it was predominantly, though not exclusively, patriotic devotion to the Empire, not loyalty to the Mother Country. The very extent of this participation and the enormous sacrifices that it involved have forcibly emphasized the anomaly in that these free peoples are engaged to an unlimited extent in a war that was the outcome of an international situation over which they had no direct control. No attempt has been made to burke this vital fact. Early in 1916, Mr. Andrew

Fisher, the High Commissioner of Australia, bluntly said:

“If I had stayed in Scotland, I should have been able to heckle my member on questions of Imperial policy, and to vote for or against him on that ground. I went to Australia. I have been Prime Minister. But all the time I have had no say whatever about Imperial policy—no say whatever. Now that can't go on. There must be some change.”

Similarly, Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada, has stated that “it is impossible to believe that the existing status (of the Dominions), so far as concerns the control of foreign policy and extra-imperial relations, can remain as it is to-day.” As to this there is general agreement. It is universally admitted that the Dominions must have a voice in determining the peace terms and in shaping the future foreign policy of the Empire. But as yet no proposal has secured the general support of the different peoples concerned.¹⁹ The difficulty of welding “the stubborn and refractory material” of the Empire into indissoluble union is admittedly great. This patent fact is reflected in Lord Rosebery's eloquent words:

“I cannot doubt that when the arduous efforts of the peace congress are over—an awful task, far surpassing a dozen conferences of Vienna—there will appear higher peaks behind mountain summits, there will appear the almost more gigantic task of reorganizing the British Empire.”

In the meanwhile, pending this final comprehensive adjustment of institutions to spirit and fact, certain steps have been taken that are one further proof of the gulf

that separates the England of 1917 from that of 1914. In 1915 and 1916, Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada, and Mr. Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia, attended meetings of the British Cabinet in London. This was an entirely unprecedented step, and was followed, late in 1916, by an invitation to the Premiers of the Dominions and to an official representative of India to attend an Imperial War Council in London. In this connection, Mr. Lloyd George said :

“I regard the Council as marking the beginning of a new epoch in the history of the Empire. The war has changed us. Heaven knows, it has taught us more than we yet understand. It has opened a new age for us, and we want to go into that new age together with our fellows overseas just as we have come through the darkness together, and shed our blood and treasure together. . . . The Empire War Council will deal with all general questions affecting the war. The Prime Ministers or their representatives will be temporary members of the War Cabinet, and we propose to arrange that all matters of first-rate importance should be considered in a series of special meetings. Nothing affecting the Dominions, the conduct of the war, or the negotiations of peace will be excluded from its purview. There will, of course, be domestic questions which each part of the Empire must settle for itself — questions such as recruiting in the United Kingdom, or home legislation. Such domestic matters will be our only reservation. But we propose that everything else should be, so to speak, on the table.”²⁰

On this occasion, Mr. Lloyd George prudently refused to discuss the problems of constitutional reconstruction after the war, although he pointed out in the following words that things could never be the same as they were before :

“Five democracies, all parts of an Empire, cannot shed their

blood and treasure with a heroism and disregard of cost which have been beyond all praise, without leaving memories of comradeship and of a great accomplishment which will never die. Of this I am certain, the peoples of the Empire will have found a unity in the war such as never existed before it — a unity not only in history, but of purpose. . . . We stand at this moment on the verge of the greatest liberation which the world has seen since the French Revolution. And do you tell me that the peoples who have stood together and staked literally everything in order to bring that liberation about are not going to find some way of perpetuating that unity afterwards on an equal basis?"

The convocation of this Imperial Cabinet was a momentous step. For the first time India and the Dominions were called to the councils of the Imperial Government "not merely in an advisory but in an executive capacity."²¹ The Imperial Conferences that had been convened at irregular intervals from 1887 on were purely consultative bodies, but these representatives of the Dominions and India, together with the British War Cabinet, constituted a new executive for the Commonwealth as a whole.²² When this Imperial Cabinet met in London on March 20, 1917, the constitutional position was quite unique. It is succinctly described in the following words of Sir Robert Borden:

"For the first time in the Empire's history there are sitting in London two Cabinets, both properly constituted and both exercising well-defined powers. Over each of them the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom presides. One of them is designated as the 'War Cabinet,' which chiefly devotes itself to such questions touching the prosecution of the war as primarily concern the United Kingdom. The other is designated as the 'Imperial War Cabinet,' which has a wider purpose, jurisdiction, and personnel."²³

The function of the Imperial Cabinet was to determine the policy to be pursued in waging the war and in settling the problems arising out of it. Its formation was a radically new development in the constitutional machinery of the Empire. This experiment worked so successfully that the British Government formally proposed to adopt it as a permanent constitutional expedient and to make the Imperial Cabinet at least an annual institution to be held whether the conditions be those of peace or of war. This proposed Cabinet, which will be responsible as an entity to the whole citizenry of the Commonwealth, is to be composed of the Prime Minister of Britain, such of his colleagues as deal especially with imperial concerns (foreign affairs, defence, and dependencies), the Premiers of each of the Dominions, and a specially accredited representative of British India. The official consideration of this suggested solution of an exceedingly stubborn problem has, however, been deferred until after the conclusion of the war, when an Imperial Conference is to be convened for the specific purpose of devising institutions in which the solidarity of the Commonwealth can find expression.²⁴

As in the case of the formation of an effective super-national authority, probably the most formidable obstacle to such a reorganization of the British Empire as will bring its institutions into accord with its spirit, consists in the rigid concepts of an obsolescent political science. The unitary state with central legislative and executive organs of the existing type unfortunately suggests the

potential coercion of minorities that are concrete entities with a definite geographical location and not merely more or less coherent groups dispersed throughout the body politic. While there is no necessary opposition between Dominion patriotism and the larger patriotism to the Commonwealth of Nations, while the two may co-exist in full vigour, the theory of a supreme sovereignty demanding an undivided allegiance creates a disharmony between two concurrent loyalties and establishes an unreal antithesis between colonial nationalism and imperialism. The problem is to create the political framework for a multicellular commonwealth of co-operating nations, uniting them for their common purposes but allowing full scope to the development of their distinctive ideals. In this connection, Lieutenant-General Smuts has very suggestively said:

“Let me give you one word of warning. In thinking of this matter, do not try to think of existing political institutions which have been evolved in the course of European developments. The British Empire is a much larger and more diverse problem than anything we have seen hitherto, and the sort of constitution we read about in books, the sort of political alphabet which has been elaborated in years gone by, does not apply and would not solve the problems of the future. We should not follow precedents, but make them.”²⁵

Although this problem is one of absorbing interest, it is not necessary in the present discussion to attempt a forecast of either the nature or the details of its solution. In this connection, the only important point is that hereafter British foreign policy will be directed and controlled by organs representative of all the English-speaking peo-

ples in the Empire and that future alliances will be contracted by such imperial agencies and not by the Foreign Secretary and Parliament of the United Kingdom alone. The new situation was explained by Sir Robert Borden after his return to Canada in the following words:

“It is not proposed that the Government of the United Kingdom shall, in foreign affairs, act first and consult us afterwards. The principle has been definitely and finally laid down that in these matters the Dominions shall be consulted before the Empire is committed to any policy which might involve the issues of peace or war.”

There is no more important question than the relations of the American people to those of the British Commonwealth. It is far more important to-day than it was a generation ago when “the ideal of English-speaking reunion” was the centre of Cecil Rhodes’s political aspirations.²⁶ Their future relations will be determined by a variety of causes, cultural, psychological, economic, and political. But the most potent influence of all is the fact that English is their common tongue. As a result of this alone, whether the relations of the two great branches of the English-speaking people are to be those of sympathetic co-operation or those of antagonistic competition, the ties cannot fail to be intimate ones. When asked what was the greatest political fact of modern times, Bismarck is reported to have responded, that it was “the inherited and permanent fact that North America speaks English.”²⁷ Whether the saying be authentic or not, the remark is certainly worthy of its reputed author’s keen insight into political fundamentals.

The United States is not only a body politic whose structure and cultural life spring from British origins that have determined the entire course of its evolution, but in addition it has always been and still is an English-speaking country with all the far-reaching consequences that this vital fact implies. It has been said by an English historian who was so thoroughly imbued with German political thought as to be conspicuously un-English in outlook, that the purpose of the British Empire in the past had been "to give all men within its bounds an English mind."²⁸ Such, however, has not been the Empire's purpose, nor has such been its general effect, except on the self-governing English-speaking peoples in the United States, Canada, Australasia, and Africa. The spirit of British imperialism is predominantly supernational. In this connection, the following sentences of Lord Milner may well be quoted. In 1913, he wrote:

"Do not let me be thought to advocate the 'anglicization' of the non-British races of the Empire, or to wish to force them into a British mould. Imperialism is something wider than 'Anglo-Saxondom' or even than 'Pan-Britannicism.' The power of incorporating alien races, without trying to disintegrate them, or to rob them of their individuality, is characteristic of the British imperial system. It is not by what it takes away, but by what it gives, not by depriving them of their own character, language, and traditions, but by ensuring them the retention of all these, and at the same time opening new vistas of culture and advancement, that it seeks to win them to itself."²⁹

The American system is just the reverse. It is not cosmopolitan or supernational, but intensely national. Its success depends upon giving the child an American

mind. Despite systematic attempts to emphasize the national characteristics of this mind, it is in all essentials identical with that of the other English-speaking peoples in Britain, Canada, Australasia, and South Africa. The "melting-pot" fuses the child into an approximately uniform type, which is clearly discernible despite infinite individual variations. Any radical divergence from the normal is regarded askance, and hence the immigrant's son is prone to "out-Herod Herod" in his Americanism. He resents the slightest intimation that he is not as thorough and as good an American as is his neighbour. He keeps his father's native country in the obscure background, because he realizes that such external ties are a bar to success in that they establish the existence of differences between him and his fellow citizens. Despite the heterogeneous origins of America's population, American civilization is not an amalgam of the civilizations of various European countries. Extreme nationalists are prone to insist that the United States had no especial cultural affiliations with any one European people. Philosophical idealists, who would fain have American civilization be a composite of the best of all nations, tend to take the same view. It is both contrary to the facts and to the course of social evolution.

Ever since Darwin demonstrated the potential adaptability of the primitive Fuegian to civilized conditions, it has been recognized that race is far more a cultural than a physical fact. If the consciousness of outward physi-

cal differences could be altogether eliminated, as can to a great extent be done in the case of the Caucasian, race might even be termed a predominantly cultural fact. There is no scientific evidence that those psychological and mental traits that are deemed the peculiar attributes of Englishmen, Frenchmen, Italians, or Germans are inherited in a physical sense.³⁰ If a number of German new-born were transferred into a purely English environment, they would, provided neither they nor any one else knew anything at the time about their origin, develop in all likelihood into as typical Englishmen as a similar number of native-born who had been subjected to the same social and educational influences. To a great extent, this is what has happened in the United States. That the fusion has not been perfect is due to the impossibility of entirely eliminating in the course of the second generation, and even later, both the inner consciousness and the outer knowledge of external origin.³¹ The immigrant brought his own standards from Europe, but his children acquired the typical American viewpoint from their environment. The main agency has been the free-school system, which tends to produce uniformity of type and homogeneity of outlook. The barriers that cut these children off from the civilization of their parents' country are, on the one side, social compulsion, because divergence from the typical is a handicap; and, on the other side, differences of language that prevent the English-speaking child from understanding his father's original countrymen. The part played by language can scarcely be over-estimated, for

“an individual is a mental slave to the tongue he speaks.” It determines the limits of his intellectual life which can be transcended only by the man of extraordinary gifts or of exceptional opportunities. The social mind and the contents of his language exercise absolute sway over the average man. He is slave to “that incalculable potency broadly called literature, spoken or written—the oratory, romance, poetry, philosophy, history, and science—which is his daily mental food all the years of his conscious life.”³²

Hence, in spite of the fact that the population of the United States is composed of many European strains, there is an essential unity in so far as the Caucasian native-born elements are concerned. This unity of language has given to these Caucasians born in the United States a common mind, and this mind does not differ in essentials from that of the other English-speaking peoples. As has been said by Professor Hart, “the standards, aspirations and moral and political ideals of the original English settlers not only dominate their own descendants, but permeate the body of immigrants of other races.”³³ The son of the immigrant into the United States finds himself at home in Canada, Australia or Britain, while he feels himself a detached stranger within his own ancestral gates in Continental Europe.

The efficiency of the “melting-pot” is, however, far from perfect, and in recent decades its capacity has been sorely overtaxed. In addition, there is a largely unconscious, but very real, determination on the part of those

of British ancestry not to allow the control of affairs to pass out of their hands. This is reinforced by no small measure of racial and religious prejudice on the part of the dominant majority and by an instinctive, though not avowed and generally recognized, distrust of those of different origin. It is of decided significance that the Americanism of neither candidate in the presidential campaign of 1916 was impugned, although Mr. Wilson's grandfather came from North Ireland as recently as 1807, while Mr. Hughes missed a Welsh nativity by only a few years. In the case of none but those of British ancestry would such close proximity to European ancestors have escaped unchallenged, especially during a world-wide war. In 1895, President Wilson said: "The common British stock did first make the country, and has always set the pace."³⁴ That there is such a leading and dominant majority of Anglo-Saxon descent even the most cursory examination of the facts will demonstrate.

Some twenty years ago, Senator Lodge made a study of the distribution of ability in the United States, using as his material a well-known cyclopædia of American biography, whose concluding volume had appeared in 1889.³⁵ This work aimed to list all Americans who had attained eminence as statesmen, soldiers, clergymen, authors, lawyers, scientists, or in any other capacity, and contained 14,243 biographies. Of these 12,519 bore British names,³⁶ 659 German and 589 Huguenot. These results were confessedly defective in that only the descent on the paternal side was traced and there is some reason

to believe that ability is more often transmitted through the mother. Moreover, eminence is not synonymous with ability; other factors are just as influential, and in many instances they are even more so. More recent investigations have confirmed these general results.³⁷ The patronymics of the President and his Cabinet, of the Supreme Court, and of the Senate are overwhelmingly British in origin. To a less extent this is also true of Congress. In 1915, it was found that out of the 383 higher officials of the State Governments, no less than 326 had British names. At that time also, 29 out of the 32 generals on the active list of the American Army, and 23 out of the 27 admirals on the active list of the American Navy bore family names of the same origin. Similarly, it has been found that the parents of American men of science are predominantly British-American, "with an admixture of nearly 8 per cent. of Germans and about 5 per cent. from other nationalities."³⁸

In discussing the results of his tabulations, Senator Lodge stated his belief that "in proportion to their numbers the Huguenots have produced more and the Germans fewer men of ability than other races in the United States." The explanation offered is convincing. The Germans settled originally in compact groups in only three of the thirteen colonies. Retaining their language and customs for approximately a century, they kept themselves more or less separated from the balance of the community. As was complained in colonial days, "being ignorant of our language and laws, and settling

in a body together," they constituted "a distinct people from his Majesty's subjects." As an inevitable result, they handicapped themselves in competing for those prizes of life which depend to a great extent upon the support and confidence of the public as a whole.

These researches prove two things beyond peradventure: first, the overwhelming predominance of the British stock in the upbuilding of the United States and its present ascendancy in directing the affairs of the nation; secondly, that those immigrants and their children have best succeeded who have become most speedily and most completely Americanized, and that only under such an eventuality can they expect a free field for the development of their potential abilities. Not only is the United States governed by men who are predominantly of British stock, but in addition its native-born Caucasian population is fully impregnated with the ideals and standards that are the common intellectual heritage of all English-speaking peoples. These find expression in like political principles and institutions. The rule of law and the equality of all before it, an untrammelled and compelling public opinion, self-government as against autocracy and bureaucracy, the absence of a military spirit and caste, and the stress laid upon individual rights as against the undue claims of the state, are some of the characteristic features uniting in one common civilization all the English-speaking peoples. Over a century ago, before science had revealed the effect of language upon thought, Wordsworth seems intuitively to have divined this relation when he wrote:

“We must be free or die, who speak the tongue
That Shakespeare spake; the faith and morals hold
Which Milton held.”

A common literature in the past and to a great extent also in the present creates common ideals. Of these the most fundamental is that of liberty — the qualified liberty of self-realization in the ordered freedom of a self-governing community.³⁹

“An intimate like-mindedness,” such as connects all branches of the wide-spread English-speaking people is, as Professor Dunning has well said, “the indispensable factor in permanent international amity.”⁴⁰ But it does not necessarily cause such amity. Until the past two decades, the relations between the United States and England constituted a strange series of misunderstandings that kept the kindred peoples apart. The War of Independence, which in many of the colonies assumed the character of a civil war, left a legacy of bitterness such as only conflicts of that nature can generate. Before it could disappear, this feeling was implanted in the next generation by the War of 1812. As fate willed it, the declaration of war was signed by President Madison two days after the British Government had announced that the Orders in Council constituting the grievance would be immediately withdrawn. Within a few days, this repeal was actually issued. But as there was no telegraphic communication, the news of this action could not arrive in time to avert the conflict.⁴¹ Its conclusion ushered in a century of peaceful relations, but left outstanding many

unsettled matters resulting from the fact that the British Empire is an important American Power with great territorial and economic interests both on the continent and in the Caribbean. These differences were all settled peacefully, and on the whole equitably, leaving little, or no aftermath of ill-feeling. The prospect of sincerely harmonious relations was, however, again deferred by the Civil War. The path of a neutral during an internecine war, in which both belligerents are firmly convinced of the righteousness of their respective causes, is beset with grave perils. England did not escape the inevitable consequences of her Government's fundamentally impartial conduct.⁴² Both North and South resented this official neutrality. Moreover, the generally unfriendly attitude of the governing classes to the North, which was especially marked before the abolition of slavery became an avowed issue, obscured the deep sympathy of a constantly growing majority of the English people. The resentment arising from these factors profoundly influenced Anglo-American relations and is still an element that has vitality.

A marked change in the feelings between England and the United States set in after the settlement of the Venezuelan dispute in 1896, which had brought home to the consciousness of both peoples the tragedy involved in a war between them. The gradually increasing friendship had apparently secured an unassailable foundation when the Great War broke out. During the first thirty odd months of the conflict, Great Britain and the Do-

minions became distinctly estranged from the United States. The fundamental cause of this estrangement was the neutral course of the Government. If in deed, though not in word, the policy of President Wilson was one of benevolent neutrality towards the Entente Powers, as some contend it was, this good-will was not overt and its surreptitiousness deprived it of all moral value and of all political advantage. Among sorely tried peoples, keenly conscious of fighting for a cause with which the United States was closely identified, this apparently rigid neutrality of the Government outweighed the openly expressed sympathy of the great majority of the American people. With the parts reversed, it was much the same situation as during the Civil War when Lowell thus addressed John Bull:

“ We know we ’ve got a cause, John,
 That ’s honest, just, an’ true;
 We thought ’twould win applause, John,
 Ef nowhere else, from you.”

Before the entrance of the United States into the war on the broad issue for which the Allies were contending, there was the gravest danger of a renewed schism between the English-speaking peoples. This would have been disastrous to them, for their fortunes are really inseparable. In 1916, before this menacing probability had been removed, an American publicist truly and forcibly said:

“ Which will win? I do not know. Which is best? I will not say. But one thing I do know and will say. Yea, I will

proclaim it from the housetops. *The British civilization is ours.* In it we live and move and have our being. Outside it we have no future. Let no man deceive us. Let us listen to no specious sophistries about our composite people and our distinctive civilization. We speak one language, we cherish one literature, we recognize one political principle of temperate central rule and local freedom, and these are the language, the literature and ideal of Britain. . . . Our civilization, like our language, is the gift of a single people, and the difference between here and there is hardly greater in civilization than in speech. . . . And this civilization will survive or perish as a unit. If it triumphs in the present struggle, we share in its triumph. . . . If it fails, we shall as certainly see these instincts and these institutions discredited and ultimately discarded." ⁴³

These fundamental facts are more than sufficient warrant for the fullest solidarity with the Entente Allies during the present war, and for an intimate democratic alliance with the other English-speaking peoples after its close.⁴⁴ It is not a question of mere sentiment based upon the inherent unity of these peoples. Like-mindedness, even when accompanied by consciousness thereof, does not in itself lead to the voluntary association of kindred groups, though it furnishes the essential basis for genuine co-operation.⁴⁵ Outside pressure is usually required to counteract the inertia of peoples bred in traditions of isolation. The German menace is emphatically supplying the pressure that makes such close and intimate co-operation imperative.⁴⁶ Upon the outcome of the war will depend the survival and future peaceful development of English-speaking civilization. The result may, however, not be decisive; and, under all circumstances,

constant vigilance demands preparedness against a recurrence of the peril, even if it take a somewhat different guise.

VII

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

“As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the Act of Navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all commercial regulations of England.”

— ADAM SMITH, *The Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, chapter ii.

“In the light of experience gained during the War, we consider that special steps must be taken to stimulate the production of foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured articles within the Empire wherever the expansion of production is possible and economically desirable for the safety and welfare of the Empire as a whole.”

— RESOLUTION OF THE BRITISH COMMITTEE ON
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY, Feb-
ruary, 1917.

CHAPTER VII

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

Economic Determinism — Economics and War — The Monopoly Factor — Tariff Systems of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain — Colonial Policies of the United States, France, and Great Britain — The Central European Project — The Paris Economic Conference — British Economic Policies — Economic Interdependence of the British Commonwealth and the United States.

THE human mind has an inveterate tendency to seek a simple explanation for complex phenomena and to select from a multitude of contributing and convergent causes one that is hailed as dominant. "Man's instinct is to define, to establish some sort of order and sequence amid the seeming chaos of the universe. That which will not submit itself to reason threatens reason."¹ The choice of such a supreme factor is not infrequently dependent upon subjective considerations — upon a man's interests and purposes in life, as well as upon his moral and intellectual qualities. This point of view once firmly established, there is in turn a marked tendency to disregard facts and to twist them into preconceived formulæ. As a result, the visualization of the world is far from being in accord with reality. The mental lens

produced by the craving for a monistic explanation of phenomena gives a distorted picture.

In their efforts to explain the complex facts of economic life, the classical economists created "the economic man," an imaginary being solely influenced by regard for his own material interests. This abstraction was based upon a false psychology. It failed to take into account not only the altruistic and co-operative instincts, but also those self-regarding impulses — the craving for power, prestige, and prominence — that frequently overshadow the desire for mere wealth and well-being. Moreover, this theory assumed not only that man was predominantly moved by his material interests, but also that he was generally able to recognize what these were. The force of ingrained habit and custom, the widespread ignorance, and the frequent subordination of reason to emotion were largely overlooked. This counterfeit presentment underestimated man's moral nature and overestimated his rationality.

As a result of such destructive criticism, "the economic man" was relegated to the dust-bin of discarded hypotheses, only to be resuscitated later in a different guise. During recent decades there has been a marked tendency among one school of thinkers to explain all historical phenomena by purely economic causes. It is a facile method of writing history, since it obviates the necessity of studying all the facts intensively, and demands merely the selection of those that fit in with the preconceived theory. Its results, furthermore, have the charm in-

herent in a simple explanation of complex phenomena. But the fallacy of this purely economic interpretation is the same as that of "the economic man." It is based upon the same narrow psychology and results in a picture of the world that bears only a slight resemblance to actuality. That the economic explanation is, as a rule, deemed insufficient and incomplete by professional historians, whose paramount function is to study all the facts of the past and to see them whole, is decidedly significant. The chief adherents of economic determinism are economists and socialists, to whom the past is, for the most part, merely a mine for illustrative material. The latter, strangely enough, while explaining all past development by a theory that conceives man to be a mere self-regarding automaton, yet demand a reorganization of society that postulates a far less selfish average man than history has as yet evolved.

While the influence of the economic factors can readily be exaggerated, their importance can also easily be minimized. Economic forces work in two ways, directly and indirectly, both as causes and as motives. The conscious motive for a policy may be entirely non-economic in character, while economic causes have had considerable influence in the adoption of the policy. The crude facts of life, the need for nourishment, covering, and shelter, are always somewhere in the background. They are the fundamental facts in primitive society but, as civilization progresses and as nature is mastered, they become less prominent though actually no less vital.

“ To get the whole world out of bed
And washed, and dressed, and warmed, and fed,
To work, and back to bed again,
Believe me, Saul, costs worlds of pain.”

Man is, however, not satisfied with mere subsistence. His wants have a capacity of infinite expansion and the process of historical evolution is largely one of satisfying this demand. Only some of these wants are material; others are non-economic. The inner cry for self-realization demands satisfaction for the moral, emotional, intellectual, and æsthetic faculties, as well as for the baser and nobler cravings of ambition. As civilization advances, economic forces work in the main silently in the background, while man's interpretation of his wants, both economic and other, accelerate and retard that work and sometimes even deform it. The two processes usually go on side by side, seemingly disconnected, but in varying degrees always interacting. The great factor in modern western civilization was the Industrial Revolution that made coal, steam, and machinery man's servant. This momentous change was effected in England, silently and gradually, during the forty years from 1775 to 1815, of which thirty were years of war. This far-reaching economic revolution did not bring about the Anglo-French and the Napoleonic Wars, nor in turn were these wars either a direct or a contributing cause of the new industrial system. Among the factors that pushed Revolutionary France into a war of conquest against Europe were probably some of an economic nature. But they

were distinctly subordinate. Similarly, England's predominant motive in opposing the French attempt to rule a conquered Europe was the desire for security, which had negative economic elements in it. To characterize it as essentially economic would be equivalent to such an extension of the connotation of the term as to make it meaningless. It would then be synonymous with all of life. But the economic revolution, distinct though it was from this bitter international struggle, had a bearing upon it; and the war, in turn, influenced the progress of the revolution. The new economic system added to England's resources; and the fact that Continental Europe was for twenty odd years the scene of constant fighting delayed the introduction of the system there, gave England an invaluable advantage and made possible her so-called commercial supremacy. The economic causes of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were remote, but their indirect economic consequences were most important, while the economic resources of the combatants exercised an important influence on the ultimate outcome.

Similar are the factors in the existing world-wide war. The connection between economic rivalry and war among primitive peoples is patent. Excessive population and the need of more land for hunting, grazing, and agriculture led to constant warfare, whose economic advantages were enhanced by the enslavement of the conquered peoples and by the confiscation of their lands and private property.² This nexus becomes less conspicuous as we approach civilized conditions. Other factors, the lure

of glory and prestige, the quest of dominion and power, the gregarious pride of nationalism, and the dynastic interests and ambitions of autocracies play their part in producing war. In addition, there is also active, to a varying extent, the commercial rivalry of groups segregated into sharply defined entities under the modern state system. The wars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were largely due to conscious economic motives.³ This was especially true of those conflicts resulting from the attempts of Portugal and Spain to exclude by force all traders of other nationalities from the East and from America. After much fighting, the Dutch, English, and French succeeded in breaking these monopolies. Similarly, the Anglo-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century resulted largely from the efforts of Holland to exclude Englishmen from commercial intercourse with the East Indies and with West Africa, as well as from friction resulting from England's Navigation Acts which curtailed the wide-spread activities of the Dutch mercantile marine. Cromwell suggested a radical solution of the difficulty when he proposed a political union of the two nations which would have permitted Englishmen and Dutchmen to share in the commercial preserves of each other.⁴ The willingness to enter such a union is the infallible test for determining which group is benefiting by monopolies and privileges other than those conferred by nature.

The economic motive was not quite so predominant in the Anglo-French commercial and colonial wars of the

eighteenth century, but it was important. Here again the element of monopoly entered, since under the old colonial system the trade of the colony was largely confined to the metropolis. Such monopolies were a direct cause of war, because force could break them. War cannot, however, act so effectively in the case of the more normal rivalry between the various groups forming the modern state-system, whose political separation was in most instances further emphasized by the erection of customs barriers. States so protected are frequently in active economic strife with their fellows, but their tariff wars have rarely caused actual armed conflicts, chiefly because force could accomplish little.

At the present day, conditions have considerably altered. With the equalization of values throughout the world, the inordinate profits that were formerly gained in trade with outlying regions have disappeared. Hence, the economic inducement to monopolize such trade has been greatly diminished. At the same time also, the growing interdependence of the world and the increasing internationalization of commerce and finance have weakened the former view that the state, and not the individual, is engaged in foreign commerce. There still remain, however, important vestiges of the older persistent attempts to monopolize exclusive sources of supply and markets in the East and West which characterized the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the maritime states of Europe sought to create self-sufficient commercial empires.⁵ National monopolization of co-

lonial trade is still widely current. Even to-day, the policy of statesmen is influenced by these older ideas and public opinion is largely affected by them.⁶ It is not difficult to demonstrate that with the shrinkage of the world and its increasing economic interdependence, these ideas are largely, if not wholly, outworn.⁷ The dramatic terms of neo-mercantilism — invasion, capture and loss of markets, commercial supremacy — do not, as a rule, convey an accurate picture of the present economic process. They tend to give the impression that the foreign trade of the world is a fixed quantity for which the commercial nations are fighting as dogs for a bone. But, while it is true that the trade of the world has an infinite capacity for expansion, and that one nation's commercial prosperity does not mean its competitor's decline, this truth must be generally realized before it can fully affect political action.

Modern mercantilism is far less crude than was its prototype and its aims are less predominantly economic and are more thoroughly permeated with political objects. Its purpose is not so much to increase wealth as to safeguard the nation's economic development. It bases its calculations more upon conditions during war than upon those of peace. Provided goods in transit are free from duties, as they generally are in such instances, it can be of slight economic importance to Germany to control the mouth of the Rhine or to Russia to acquire the Dardanelles. Only in time of war is such direct access to open water important and then its value is entirely de-

pendent upon control of the sea. In fact, if the enemy control the sea, it is obviously of quite some utility to have a neutral interposed between the hinterland and the dominant sea power. But lack of control over important commercial outlets, while inevitable under existing conditions, creates a feeling of insecurity. Similarly, under modern conditions, the industrial states are becoming more and more dependent upon foreign markets and upon foreign sources of supply. This again results in a desire to secure physical control over such markets and sources of supply so as to be sure of retaining them.

This feeling of insecurity is inevitable in an economically interdependent world that is politically completely unorganized. It was raised to a morbid pitch in some quarters in Germany because there the theory of sovereignty is carried more fully to its logical conclusion and limitations upon complete freedom of action to which all other states must comply are looked upon as intolerable grievances. The modern state system was not devised for industrial states dependent for their very existence upon factors outside their borders and beyond their control.

While Germany was not suffering from any economic pressure, this state of mind among many of her leaders, especially among the captains of industry and the pundits of economic lore, greatly reinforced the aggressive tendencies that rested upon non-economic motives. In view of the plain facts, it would be incorrect to say that economic conditions impelled Germany to war. Before

they are translated into policy and action, economic facts must become psychological forces. It was the way some Germans interpreted the situation and the future possibilities inherent in it that added to the aggressive spirit of a nation imbued with the idea of an almost sacred mission to rehabilitate a "decadent world."

It is impossible to escape from the conclusion that, while the growing economic interdependence of the world is a bond of union between the citizens of different states, it may be and often is at the same time a source of discord between the states themselves. There is an increasing disharmony between this interdependence and the freedom of action and independence that the theory of sovereignty attributes to the modern state. This disharmony produces unrest and leads to international friction. The more the theory of sovereignty is pushed to its logical conclusion, the more irksome appears to be dependence on factors beyond the state's frontiers and the more keen is the desire to secure actual control over these necessary complements to the national economic life. It is largely to lessen such dependence that tariff barriers have been erected. Their aim in part is to bring the economic system of each state into harmony with the legal and political self-sufficiency that sovereignty postulates. As long as the modern state system remains intact and tariffs further divide people from people, economic interdependence cannot exert its full strength in the direction of international amity. An element of economic discord of varying intensity remains. This dis-

cord may be counteracted by other factors, as it has been in the case of the relations between England and the United States, whose growing friendship has synchronized with a period when the United States adopted exceedingly high tariffs that greatly injured some important British industries. Nor did the growing American competition in neutral markets avail to overcome the friendly tendencies. International amities are based largely upon other than economic factors. While, on the one hand, commercial rivalry may not lead to ill-feeling, on the other, a markedly unequal degree of interdependence between two states — that is, a clearly one-sided dependence of one upon the other — has this tendency. From the earliest colonial days to the close of the last century there existed towards England on the part of Americans a general feeling similar to that of the debtor West towards the industrial and capitalistic East of the United States. When financial independence from British capital was all but secured toward the end of the last century, this feeling largely disappeared.

The whole subject of international friendships and antipathies is one of such infinite complexity, involving so many converging and contrasting factors, that it is impossible to formulate any brief generalization about their causes. If, however, the economic factor be segregated, it cannot but be recognized that tariff barriers are in themselves not productive of international good-will. As in the case of military and naval armaments, protective tariffs in one state lead to the same fiscal policy

in others. Carried to its logical conclusion, the system of protection cannot fail to lead to international antagonisms. It is essentially an indirect denial of the unity of mankind. Of all the Great Powers, England was the only one that steadfastly adhered to free trade and, regardless of whether her policy was from the purely economic standpoint wise or injudicious, it had an inestimable moral value in fashioning among her leaders something that at least approached an international mind.

Closely connected with the protective system, is the ideal of economic self-sufficiency. From the standpoint of the state this ideal is defensible, but from a broader standpoint it is a denial of economic interdependence and runs counter to the integration of the world. Moreover, it is not based upon conditions of peace, but contemplates a state of war. It is apparently defensive in its nature, but it has aggressive implications. By reason of its immunity from some of the perils of war, the diplomacy of the self-contained state tends to become aggressive. During the century stretching from the fall of Napoleon to the present war, England was only once involved in war with a European Power. The Crimean War, however, was not only an evitable one, but it was due to a policy that is now generally regarded to have been a mistaken one. This pacific attitude was due in large part to the fact that England is the centre of a widely scattered and hence very vulnerable Empire and that her existence is dependent upon an extensive foreign trade of which two parts in three are with countries under foreign flags.

Abuse of power would inevitably have led to the formation of a European coalition against England, as did actually happen once. Its result at that time was the independence of the United States. Napoleon could never understand why Great Britain had derived so little benefit from the long struggle culminating at Waterloo. "In the position of affairs nothing could have been refused to you," he said, and "your ministers, too, should have stipulated for a commercial monopoly in the seas of India and China." "You ought not to have allowed the French or any other nation to put their nose beyond the Cape."⁸ Had the great militarist's policy been followed, the British Navy's record from 1815 to 1914 would not have been so uneventful a one, nor might the British Empire have developed into what it is to-day.⁹

The spirit of international relations in the future will depend largely upon the fiscal policies of the various states. Cobden was unquestionably correct when he argued that free trade made for international good-will and peace. Unfortunately, there is no indication that one of the war's results will be an immediate step forward towards less restricted trade. In fact, the opposite bids fair to be its result and this will become the more inevitable as the financial burdens incurred by the belligerents become greater. What the future has in store can in a measure be estimated by the course of opinion in the leading industrial nations.

There are, in general, three distinct types of fiscal policy exemplified by the different practices of the three

chief industrial states — the United States, Germany, and Great Britain. The American policy is distinctly defensive in nature, its main purpose being to protect the high standard of life prevailing among the labouring and producing classes of the United States by reserving to them, as far as is possible and advisable, the American market. With this object in view, high tariff walls were built to protect not alone the manufacturer but the producer of raw materials and foodstuffs as well. When, however, the exportation of manufactured articles began to increase rapidly, as happened towards the end of the last century, and this foreign trade became an important element in the national economy, it was realized that the imposition of heavy import duties on raw materials and foodstuffs was detrimental. Hence, the Underwood Tariff of 1913, in general either removed or greatly reduced these duties, but it retained the system of high protective duties on imported manufactured articles. Although this law has been hailed as marking the advent of a new commercial freedom, this is true in only a very relative sense. The barrier against manufactures was distinctly lowered, but not to such an extent as to imperil the monopoly of the American market that the domestic manufacturer was enjoying. In the ten months ending July 31, 1914 — the *ante-bellum* period of normal operation — free goods consisting predominantly of raw materials and foodstuffs amounted to 61.5 per cent. of the total imports. The remainder, consisting largely of manufactured goods, paid average duties of 37.1 per cent.¹⁰

These rates are very far from low.¹¹ Nor is there manifest any tendency further to decrease them. On the contrary, there is very wide-spread the opinion that without further protection, the American manufacturer's hold on the domestic market will be weakened owing to the increased efficiency and improved organization of *post-bellum* Europe. Those industries that have been established as a result of the stoppage of the European supply insistently demand future security — such provision was made in the summer of 1916 for the dye-stuff industry — and the older established trades are likewise clamorous. Thus, there is slight prospect of a relaxation of the commercial restrictions. Free trade, as it was understood in *ante-bellum* England, is altogether beyond the political horizon. It is the ultimate goal of some reformers, but only a small and negligible fraction of the electorate would vote for its immediate introduction. The economic results of so sudden and drastic a readjustment would be appallingly disastrous.

While the fiscal policy of the United States has been predominantly defensive in character, a wide-spread campaign is being made to enlist the government's support in maintaining and extending the country's foreign trade. As has been said by one of the leaders of this movement, "governmental policy has been developed for every other activity that has made this country great," such as westward expansion, internal development, railway construction, and the growth of industry.¹² Up to the present time, however, American foreign trade has been but

little aided by the government. This distinguishes the policy of the United States from that of Germany. While the one is purely defensive, the other is in addition also offensive.

In its purely defensive character the German protective system is very much like that of the United States. It is more systematic and scientific, but its aim is fundamentally the same — that of protecting the home market from foreign importations. While in the United States the duties on foodstuffs were imposed largely for political purposes and had little economic effect,¹³ in Germany, however, agricultural protection was a most important element in the system. It was deemed essential to national security to preserve in full vigour the agricultural life.¹⁴ But, in addition, the German Government co-operated actively with the individual in fostering the export trade. This was largely conducted by interlocking combinations of producers and manufacturers, in some of which the government was even financially interested and whose operations as a whole it supervised. Every facility and assistance, such as exceptionally low railroad rates, was given to the exporter. Goods were systematically sold for considerably less in the foreign than in the domestic market.¹⁵ In addition, the diplomatic resources of the government were used to secure advantageous commercial arrangements for Germany. The favoured nation proviso in the outstanding commercial treaties did not stand in the way of such discrimination, for it was easily circumvented by the skilful wording

of tariff schedules.¹⁶ In addition, Germany's military power and the scarcely-veiled threat implied in it was used to obtain commercial advantages. It was under duress, during the Russo-Japanese War, that Russia finally agreed to the unfavourable commercial treaty of 1904.¹⁷ The German system was essentially a national one.¹⁸ The German exporters did not trade so much as individuals but as members of a state and their activities were carefully supervised by the government. The German Government was waging a systematic economic war of an offensive nature against all-comers, but especially against Great Britain.

The prosperity of the two large German shipping companies, the Hamburg-American and the North German Lloyd, was largely dependent upon the European emigration to America. With the virtual cessation of emigration from Germany during the past twenty years, Italy and Eastern Europe have been the sources whence the American melting-pot was supplied. The German Government used all means to secure this passenger traffic from Eastern Europe for the Hamburg and Bremen lines. Every difficulty was placed in the way of the Russian and Polish emigrant who desired to traverse Germany unless he had purchased a transportation ticket for these lines. Those with tickets for the British and French lines were harassed and obliged to return home.¹⁹ In contrast with this practice, the British Government did not impose port dues when the German liners made their financially indispensable stop off Southampton, even

though the English companies in the American passenger traffic had to pay such fees. These contrasting practices well illustrate the fundamental difference between German policy and that of Great Britain. While the former was intensely and aggressively national, the latter was that of governmental non-interference which the theory of free trade postulates. As Mr. Bertrand Russell has said, "most Germans think of trade in nationalist terms, but in England this habit is not very common."²⁰

Despite some quite minor and not wholly incidental protective features,²¹ the British customs tariff was pre-eminently designed to raise revenue. It was not a protective but a fiscal measure. Under it, the British market was open on equal terms to all producers and manufacturers the world over. Not only was the system that prevailed before the war an almost absolute expression of free trade doctrines, but *laissez faire* principles in other respects had in a measure converted it into the positive antithesis of a protective system. The railroad rates encouraged the importer at the expense of the domestic producer and acted as virtual bounties on imports.²²

At the turn of the century there was a marked revolt against this general policy, but the wide-spread prosperity during the decade preceding the outbreak of the war enabled the traditional free trade doctrines to withstand this assault. It is self-evident that a state which admits freely everything that others can produce more cheaply, while everything in which it has an advantage must overcome customs barriers, is not in an advantageous position.

Moreover, a policy of free imports leaves a state largely defenceless against commercial discrimination. The Japanese tariff of 1911 advanced the duties on British goods considerable more than those on imports from other countries. The reason for such discrimination against an ally is to be found in Count Komura's blunt words: "Great Britain has what is called a free-trade policy; there is no reason for a convention with that country."²³ At the present stage of the discussion it is, however, not so necessary to evaluate the relative economic benefits and disadvantages to a state of a policy of free trade in a world of highly protected competitors, as to realize that such freedom is a powerful force making for international good-will.

It is impossible fully to understand the economic system of the *ante-bellum* world without a knowledge of the policies adopted in regulating the trade of colonies and dependencies. There is considerable variety in practice, but the fundamental characteristics will be made evident by an analysis of the systems of the United States, France, and Great Britain. In general, the policy of the United States is to include all territorial accessions within the national customs domain. Hawaii and Porto Rico are enclosed within the American tariff barriers and, since 1909, the same system has been applied with some limitations to the Philippines. With Cuba, a different arrangement was effected. The reciprocity treaty of 1903 provides for mutual preferential treatment of imports. Thus, the most important articles imported from the

United States into Cuba pay there 30 per cent. less than the regular customs duties. Largely as a result of this, the United States has virtually monopolized the trade of Hawaii and Porto Rico and to a less extent also that of the Philippines and of Cuba.²⁴ The total external commerce of these islands in 1913 amounted to the very considerable sum of 569 million dollars,²⁵ of which 392 millions or 70 per cent. was with the United States. The free admission of the products of these islands, especially of sugar, has been equivalent to a direct bounty and has been of enormous benefit to them.²⁶ On the other hand, largely as a result of this general arrangement, nearly two thirds of their imports came from the United States. In 1894, merchandise to the value of only \$362,878 was imported into the Philippines from the United States, but twenty years later this insignificant amount had expanded to nearly 27 million dollars.²⁷

Although France has a colonial domain far vaster in extent and far more populous than is that of the United States,²⁸ the aggregate amounts of their respective colonial trades, provided that with Cuba be included in the American total, are virtually the same.²⁹ The French system of regulating colonial trade is likewise similar to that of the United States, but it is far more complicated and varied.³⁰ In some of the dependencies, notably in Morocco, the open door to all comers on equal terms has been guaranteed by international agreement. The same freedom of trade prevails also in French India. But in some of the most important colonies, such as Algeria,

Indo-China, and Madagascar, the policy of tariff assimilation had been pursued and the colony has been included within the customs sphere of the metropolis. In other instances, such as the French West Indies, this policy of assimilation has been modified to meet special conditions. Again, in some instances, fiscal policy has been even more adapted to local needs, but with this is generally combined preferential treatment of French goods, as well as similar advantages to the colonial products in France. The general result of this policy is to confine the colonial trade largely to the French market. In Algeria, especially, other factors, such as proximity and the relatively large European population, have the same tendency. It is also undeniable that Algeria has benefited greatly from the absence of customs barriers between her and France. The total over-sea trade of this, the most important of French colonies, amounted in 1912 to 1153 million francs, of which 969 million or 84 per cent. was with France.³¹ Similar conditions obtained in Tunis, but to a decidedly less marked extent.³² The remaining French colonies, whose aggregate foreign trade is somewhat less than that of Algeria and Tunis together, do not, however, trade so exclusively with the metropolis. Only 43 per cent. of their aggregate exports and imports had such respective destination and origin in 1911.³³

As England is not only the centre of a world-wide Empire embracing one quarter of all mankind, but is also predominantly an industrial state, her commerce with the other parts of this Commonwealth is not only abso-

lutely far larger than is that of France with her dependencies, but it is furthermore a more important factor in her national economy. In 1913, the total foreign trade of the United Kingdom amounted to 1,403.5 million pounds sterling, of which 431.7, equivalent to 30.7 per cent., was with countries under the British flag or under British protection. Of the exports, 34.5 per cent. had such destination, and 28 per cent. of the imports had such derivation.³⁴

These colonial products received no preferential treatment in the home market but were treated on a parity with those of foreign origin. Nor did England impose upon those parts of the Commonwealth controlled from London a fiscal policy that favoured her products. In them the door was left fully open to the goods of all comers on terms of absolute equality. The self-governing Dominions of the Commonwealth had, however, of their own accord granted preferential duties to imports from the United Kingdom. This system was first inaugurated by Canada in 1897, and had subsequently been adopted by South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia.³⁵ The general purpose of this policy was to draw closer the bonds of imperial union and also to compensate the United Kingdom for the inordinate share in the burden of imperial defence borne by it. It is usually admitted that this arrangement does not violate the principle of the open door, since the Dominions and the United Kingdom are essentially parts of one political aggregate. The foreigner, it is contended, has no more justification to

complain on this score than he has against the free admission of Prussian goods into Bavaria or of Pennsylvania's manufactures into California. The soundness of this argument will, however, become more manifest as new institutions are created to express the inherent unity of the Commonwealth.

The total external commerce of the dependent and self-governing parts of the British Commonwealth, exclusive of the United Kingdom, amounted in 1913 to 1,116.4 million pounds, of which 475.7, or 43 per cent., was with the United Kingdom.³⁶ The imports and exports were about equal and the same proportion prevailed in both cases. It should also be noted that this percentage is very considerably less than those prevailing in the colonial domains and protectorates of the United States and of France.

This trade of the British over-sea countries with the United Kingdom naturally divides itself into three parts, that of the Dominions, that of British India, and that of the remaining widely scattered dependencies.³⁷ The Dominions contributed somewhat over one half of the total, to be exact 56 per cent. Of their aggregate external trade, 48 per cent. was with the United Kingdom.³⁸ This percentage, which is higher than the general average, is due to many factors, such as the large exports of gold from South Africa, but an influential element is unquestionably the system of preferential duties.

While the exports from the Dominions to the United Kingdom exceeded the imports thence, the reverse is the

case with British India. Here also special factors, despite the full open door, contribute to directing a large proportion of this country's trade to the United Kingdom. Long and intimate commercial intercourse has contributed to an adaptation of British production to Indian needs and, furthermore, England has certain marked advantages in the manufacture of cotton goods, which constituted in 1913 one quarter of the Indian imports.³⁹ In that year, the trade of British India with the United Kingdom amounted to 143.7 million pounds and was equivalent to 30 per cent. of the aggregate commerce of the over-sea British areas with the European metropolis. It constituted 42 per cent. of British India's total external commerce, but it was very unevenly divided as to imports and exports. The former were two and a half times as large as the latter.⁴⁰

The external trade of the remaining colonies and protectorates amounted to 229.2 million pounds, of which 67.1, or 29 per cent., was with the United Kingdom. The proportions in individual cases varied largely, some being far above and some considerably below the average. Proximity to a large market, such as that of the British West Indies to the United States, is an important factor among many others of infinite diversity.⁴¹

Of the total external commerce of the Dependent Empire, in which free trade rules, somewhat less than 38 per cent. is with the United Kingdom. It is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy to what extent the political connection is an element in this situation.

The percentage is quite in line with the conditions prevailing in an independent country like China, 41 per cent. of whose foreign trade in 1913 was with the British Empire.⁴² Certain general considerations are, however, incontestable. While it is true that the flag tends to follow trade, the converse is equally a fact. Business is not solely an equation of supply and demand or a mere question of comparative cheapness and dearness. As in all human transactions, there enter here the elements of inertia and habit, and the psychological factors of confidence and distrust, of attraction and aversion. Unquestionably, these forces work in favour of the trade of the colonizing or protecting power even under a régime of fullest free trade and they somewhat handicap the foreigner.⁴³ They are naturally more active in the matter of governmental contracts and in the granting of concessions, even when the public authorities have the best of intentions.⁴⁴ It is easy to overestimate the national economic advantage derived from these facts when the policy is one of free trade and the door has been honestly kept open to all, as it has been done, in the main, by England. Under such circumstances, it is by no means clear that the economic advantage gained counterbalances the assumption of the added responsibilities and the concomitant expenses of administration and protection.⁴⁵

The intricate and inclusive network of international commerce was rudely torn to shreds on the outbreak of the Great War. The former extensive trade between

the two groups of belligerents was immediately cut off, and more gradually the commercial intercourse of neutrals with the Central Powers was also in increasing measure restricted. The resulting dislocation necessitated an extensive readjustment to war conditions, which has, in the main, perforce been in the direction of increasing the economic self-sufficiency of each belligerent state and in general also that of the two allied groups with which they have thrown in their fortunes. At the same time, likewise, the future was envisaged. Plans had to be made betimes for a world again at peace. The war abrogated a vast series of commercial treaties with their favoured nation clauses and threw this refractory matter into the overflowing crucible of unsettled problems. At the same time also, the heavy financial burdens incurred necessitated a reconsideration of the existing and future fiscal policies.

The adjustment of these closely related questions is intimately dependent upon the spirit of future political interstate relations. Their nature will determine whether the reorganized economic systems are to be based upon a state of peace as the normal condition of international society or shall be shaped to meet the more or less probable contingency of renewed war. All thought on this subject has been profoundly affected by the intensification of national feeling resulting from the internecine conflict. An exacerbated nationalism is almost bound to find expression in economic policy. The general trend of opinion in belligerent and also in neutral countries is

towards further increasing in the future the economic self-sufficiency of the state with the object of thus rendering it the better able to withstand the shocks and surprises of war. Everywhere plans are being formulated to decrease the economic interdependence of the *ante-bellum* world. The wide-spread movement in the United States during 1916 for the creation of a merchant marine proportionate to the country's foreign trade was part and parcel of the programme of economic and naval preparedness. In the belligerent countries, naturally, the movement towards self-sufficiency was at that time even more accentuated, but there is in addition, a more or less clearly defined tendency to consider the allied groups as constituting in themselves somewhat incoherent economic units. When Mr. William Massey, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, said: "We should aim at a self-contained Empire, just consideration being given to our Allies,"⁴⁶ he echoed the opinions of many in all belligerent countries.

The first and clearest expression of this policy naturally came from Germany, because the sea power of the Allies had largely cut off her foreign trade and had made self-sufficiency a dire necessity. The course of military events — pre-eminently the Battle of the Marne and the subsequent failures to reach the Channel ports — together with the apparently unassailable supremacy of Britain on the water, had forcibly demonstrated to Germany that in this war the great goal of over-sea expansion was not attainable. Hence, attention was diverted

from the more radiant West to the inherently less attractive East and the plan was devised to create a large Central European economic and political unit, consisting of the Teutonic Allies and the lands that they had conquered.

In its purely economic features, the projected Mid-Europe is largely a mere revival of a scheme that ever since the middle of the nineteenth century has intermittently dazzled the imagination of a number of Central European statesmen and publicists.⁴⁷ There is, however, this vast difference, that now its political purposes completely dwarf the economic ones. The abortive German peace overtures of December 12, 1916, were designed to secure a settlement which would leave Germany dominant over the regions between Verdun and Riga and from Antwerp to Bagdad. As has been tersely said, the peace that Germany desired was one that would "enable her to fulfil in the next war the aims she had failed to fulfil in this." There is not the slightest indication that the major German plan, which most directly threatened the future of all English-speaking peoples, has been abandoned. It has merely been deferred until the times be more propitious. Prince von Buelow's significant words, that "England was the only country with which Germany's account in world policy showed a balance on the wrong side,"⁴⁸ still hold true, except that the United States should now be joined to England.

In the background of the *Mittleuropa* project, as in that of the more ambitious scheme of world empire to

which the narrower plan is to serve as a stepping-stone, is the haunting fear that the Germany of the future will be dwarfed by the British Commonwealth, the United States, and Russia. The great apostle of Central Europe, Friedrich Naumann,⁴⁹ sees these three aggregates as the sole members of "the first class of economic world-group Powers," and for him the vital question at the moment is the formation of a similar unit in Central Europe that by its wealth and resources shall automatically enter this class.⁵⁰ With this object in view, it is proposed to create a loosely federated combination of the Teutonic Allies with parts, if not with all, of the conquered lands to the West, East and South and to enclose this populous area within tariff barriers. But within these barriers free trade is not to prevail between the members of the confederation. The system is to be equivalent to one of mutual preference as against all outsiders.

The economic goal in view is pre-eminently self-sufficiency. The aim is to liberate Central Europe so far as it is possible from dependence on imports by sea and to develop the varied resources of this large land area. Not only is the production of foodstuffs to be increased, but the Balkans and Turkey are to furnish supplies of cotton, copper, and wool.⁵¹ From the Elbe to the Persian Gulf there is to be "a closed economic system by the side of those of the other world-Empires," proclaims a well-known Socialist member of the Reichstag. Moreover, this self-contained agglomeration is to exert eco-

conomic pressure on all its peripheries and thus gradually to draw the smaller neighbouring states within its political orbit. The manufactured products of its political rivals are to be rigorously excluded or penalized, while those of Central Europe are by the forcible imposition of commercial treaties to secure exceptionally favourable treatment throughout the entire European Continent.⁵²

There are serious internal and external obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of this project. Part of it apparently has already been frustrated by military events, and its future is largely contingent upon the terms of peace. Moreover, as a political structure, Central Europe would rest on frail fundamentals, which the repressed national feelings of the subject Slav peoples would be constantly undermining. Economically also, it has encountered considerable opposition among Turks, Magyars, and Austrians, who aim to develop their own industries and do not complacently look forward to a state of economic dependence on the German over-lord. As a result of all these factors, the idea of a close customs union is giving way to the less rigid and less obtrusive programme of general economic *rapprochement*, whose ultimate political aim is essentially the same.

As a direct result of these preparations of the Central Powers for "a contest on the economic plane" after the cessation of armed hostilities, representatives of the Allied Governments met in Conference at Paris during June of 1916.⁵³ This assembly devoted itself to considering the means of increasing the economic solidarity

of the Allies and recommended specific measures for this purpose. Some of these were purely for the duration of the war; others were transitory expedients to facilitate the *post-bellum* reconstruction; and finally, some were devised to secure permanent collaboration. It was proposed that during the transitional period of rehabilitation, the Allied countries should have a prior claim, before all others, on all their own natural resources and on all available means of reconstruction. With this object in view, the benefit of "most favoured nation treatment" was not to be granted for a number of years to any of their enemies. Furthermore, in order to defend their economic life against aggression, the commerce of the enemy Powers and goods originating in these countries were to be subjected for an indeterminate period either to prohibitions or to differential treatment.

As permanent measures, the Conference recommended that the Allies should take immediate steps to render themselves independent of the enemy countries as regards materials and manufactures "essential to the normal development of their economic activities." In order to facilitate the interchange of their own products, the Allies were to improve and cheapen all means of communication with one another and also to assimilate, so far as might be possible, their laws governing patents, indications of origin and trade-marks.

The general aim of these elastic recommendations was to expedite the work of reconstruction, to strengthen both the solidarity of the Entente Powers and their eco-

conomic independence and also to erect barriers against a recurrence of the German state-aided system of economic penetration. The defensive character of the proposals was especially emphasized. They were not, however, purely economic in purpose. In part, their aim was to prevent the Central Powers from recuperating more rapidly than the Allies and at their expense, and from then being able to resume the military contest under possibly more favourable auspices. The scope of this entire programme, as well as the details of the measures to be adopted, will finally be determined by the nature of the military settlement and by the degree of security which the Allies feel that they have attained.⁵⁴

It would be in the extreme difficult, if not quite impossible, to devise a comprehensive arrangement that would satisfy the divergent interests of each of the Entente Powers and fashion them into a fairly self-contained economic unit. For instance, the agricultural products of Russia and those of Italy will still need the Central European markets.⁵⁵ Such a comprehensive plan was, however, never in view.⁵⁶ But it is entirely feasible, though by no means simple, to develop a system of reciprocal preferential treatment among these allied countries. And, finally, it is to a varying extent a fairly simple matter for each one of these states to lessen its own dependence upon Germany for basic products and to prevent the aggressive invasion of its home market through "dumping," export premiums and other devices

of the German Government and the interlocking industrial combinations known as cartels.

As a consequence of the resolutions of the Paris Conference, the British Government appointed a Committee to consider: what industries are essential to the future safety of the nation and what steps should be taken to maintain and establish them; what steps should be taken to recover home and foreign trades lost during the war and to secure new markets; to what extent and by what means the resources of the Empire should be developed and could "be prevented from falling under foreign control." The chairman of this non-partisan Committee, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, was an ardent free trader and among its members were others of that school as well as pronounced tariff reformers, such as Mr. W. A. S. Hewins. On February 2, 1917, in view of the approaching Imperial Conference,⁵⁷ this Committee submitted a preliminary report on commercial policy between the various self-governing peoples of the Commonwealth, stating that they had reached their conclusions chiefly because "we think it necessary that for the sake of the unity of the Empire a serious attempt should now be made to meet the declared wishes of the Dominions and Colonies" for the development of closer economic relations with the United Kingdom by means of preferential treatment of their products. The Committee further stated that they intended to submit an additional report on the tariff policy of the United Kingdom and on the

question of how far the wishes of the Dominions could be met "by the granting of subsidies in lieu of tariff preferences."⁵⁸ The report itself recommended that special steps be taken "to stimulate the production of foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured articles within the Empire," that adherence to the principle of preference be officially declared, and that early consideration be given to "the desirability of establishing a wider range of Customs Duties which would be remitted or reduced on the products and manufactures of the Empire, and which would form the basis of commercial treaties with Allied and Neutral Powers."⁵⁹ The fact that this report received the unanimous support of the Committee shows how far England had travelled from the *laissez faire* doctrines that for over two generations had dominated her fiscal policy.⁶⁰

Just as Germany's colonial and naval imperialism had stimulated the movement towards greater imperial unity, so German military and economic aggression was leading to a somewhat belated recognition of the disadvantages of a system of unrestricted imports in a world of tariff barriers. When the Imperial War Conference met in London some six weeks later, the preferential principle came up for consideration. After an exhaustive and favourable discussion in the Imperial Cabinet, the Conference unanimously agreed that each part of the Empire, "having due regard to the interests of our Allies," shall give specially favourable treatment and facili-

ties to the produce and manufactures of other parts of the Empire.⁶¹

When forwarding their report, the Balfour Committee stated that in developing the system of mutual tariff preferences, "the special position of India, as well as of Egypt and the Sudan, will require consideration." In the meanwhile, the Government of India was investigating the entire question of that country's future tariff policy.⁶² For the past fifteen years the Indian Nationalists had with increasing insistence been demanding a protective system that would foster the development of India's industrial life.⁶³ In this connection, the most bitter attacks were concentrated upon the excise duty of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. imposed upon cotton goods manufactured in India to offset the customs of the same amount collected on such goods when imported. This question had before the war assumed a prominence entirely disproportionate to its intrinsic economic importance, unless it be remembered that, in Indian eyes, the excise stood pre-eminently for the denial to India of an autonomous protective system. The cotton excise was the chief fact cited to substantiate the oft-repeated allegation of the Nationalists that Indian interests were being deliberately sacrificed to those of Britain, and it gave a certain plausibility to what was on the whole a groundless contention. Its imposition in 1896 was most ill-advised and its retention in the face of native opposition was unwise in the extreme. While other manufactures in India were allowed

at least a modicum of protection — moderate import duties, but no countervailing excises, were levied on virtually all other wares — the British Government adhered to the free trade principle in the case of cotton goods largely because they were convinced of its inherent soundness and thought that protective duties would merely benefit the clamant few at the expense of the inarticulate multitude of consumers. The situation would, however, alter considerably were England herself to abandon free trade. Thus, in 1912, Lord Crewe had said that a protectionist Government in England would have no right to prevent India from following such a policy.⁶⁴

Accordingly, in the spring of 1917, the Indian Government, with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, proposed to increase the customs on imported cotton goods from 3½ per cent. to 7½ per cent. without imposing a countervailing excise duty on the products of the Indian looms. This decision, which was equivalent to inaugurating a moderate protective tariff on cotton goods, aroused a storm of protest from the Lancashire manufacturers. It also produced misgivings in disinterested quarters, where the fear was expressed that its effect would be merely that the struggling ryot would have to pay tribute to the wealthy Indian millowners.⁶⁵ Despite this opposition, the increase in duties was sanctioned by the British Parliament, on the understanding that the subject was open to reconsideration after the war. This action is of considerable significance, not only in that it involves the recognition of the fact that

Indian fiscal policy must be determined by the weight of Indian public opinion, but also because it may point the way to a great extension of the protective system in India and, possibly also, to the application of the preferential system to her trade from and to other parts of the British Commonwealth.

Lord Balfour's Committee had also been instructed to consider "to what extent and by what means the resources of the Empire should and can be developed." This work had in reality been already undertaken by others. As a result of the Imperial Conference of 1911, a Royal Commission had been appointed which, in March of 1917, published its final report on the economic resources of the Empire.⁶⁶ This influential body, composed of representatives of the United Kingdom and of the Dominions, unanimously urged that it was vital that "the Empire should, as far as possible, be placed in a position which would enable it to resist any pressure which a foreign Power or group of Powers could exercise in time of peace or war in virtue of a control of raw materials and commodities essential to its well-being." They divided such commodities into three classes: 1, those of which the world's requirements were mainly or wholly produced within the Empire; 2, those of which the Empire's requirements were approximately equalled by its production; 3, those mainly produced and controlled outside the Empire. The essential commodities of the first class, such as nickel, asbestos, and jute furnished, as they pointed out, "a valuable means of eco-

conomic defence and commercial negotiation." As regards some of those of the second category, such as wheat and wool, they suggested the promotion of their exchange within the Empire. But in respect to others of this class, such as zinc, tungsten, and monazite, they indicated "special action in order to secure the control and utilization of Imperial supplies for the Empire's use." As regards commodities of the third class, such as cotton, petroleum, nitrates, and potash, they proposed investigations of the possibilities of developing new sources of supply and of finding substitutes within the Empire. For this purpose, as well as for others, they suggested the creation of an Imperial Development Board, containing representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, the Crown Colonies, and the Protectorates. In conclusion, this Royal Commission — the first one comprising representatives of all the self-governing communities of the Empire — expressed the hope and belief that their conclusions and recommendations would not "be found to conflict with the systems to be evolved by the Allied Nations after the war."

In the meanwhile, an important unofficial committee composed of men of wide experience, such as Earl Grey, Lord Selborne, Sir Horace Plunkett, and Sir Starr Jameson, had been investigating this subject from a different angle. Their point of approach was the vast increase of the National Debt caused by the war and its future burden upon the taxpayers. In order to alleviate this burden, they proposed the development of the im-

mense latent resources of the Empire "for State purposes, under State auspices." With this object in view, they advocated the conservation for the benefit of the Empire of such natural resources as can be controlled by the Imperial, Dominion, or Indian Governments, the development of selected resources "under such conditions as will give to the State an adequate share of the proceeds," and the appointment of "a Board for the Conservation and Development of the Resources of the Empire."

This organization proposes plans whereby the State on its own account should develop some of the unworked resources of the Empire, so as to pay both the interest and ultimately also the principal of the huge War Debt. For instance, it has been suggested in this connection that 200 million acres of arable land in Western Canada be reserved for this purpose. Again another proposal is that the State should assume control of some of the tropical and sub-tropical products of Africa. This radical departure from the British individualistic tradition has received considerable support which is qualified, however, by the strict injunction that the fundamental principle of British imperialism, "government in the interests of the governed," must not in any way be infringed by the projected imperial brand of state socialism.⁶⁷

The experiences of the war have also markedly emphasized the danger of relying so predominantly on imported foodstuffs as does England, and have led to a wide-spread demand for the rehabilitation of English agriculture. As a war measure, in order to encourage

the home production, minimum prices for grain, coupled with a minimum wage for the agricultural labourer, have already been guaranteed by the Government. In addition, the Committee which was appointed by the Government to consider the methods of increasing the agricultural output "in the interest of national security" have, with one dissenting voice, recommended the permanent adoption of this policy.

The greater portion of this official and unofficial programme naturally came up for discussion by the Imperial War Conference, when it met in London in the spring of 1917. In addition to endorsing the principle of imperial preference, this body — composed of representatives of the United Kingdom, of the Dominions (except Australia), and of India — unanimously agreed upon the following economic policies: the establishment of an Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau at London; the development of the Empire's military and naval supplies; the encouragement of the development of imperial resources so that the Empire should be independent of other countries as regards food supplies, raw materials and essential industries.⁶⁸

These various projects and plans — *Mitteleuropa*, the Paris Economic Conference, the British proposals — were virtually all in an inchoate state,⁶⁹ when the United States entered the war. Whether or no they crystallize in actual policy will be largely influenced by this new factor. For the fate of all these proposals will to a varying extent be determined by the military outcome of

the war and by the degree of interstate security that will be attained when peace is re-established. The participation of the United States has decidedly lessened the possibility of a German victory or even of a stale-mate peace, and thus has made highly improbable the internecine economic war after the war which a few unofficial extremists had advocated. But if, in addition, the United States should break with the past traditions of isolation and should continue to co-operate effectively with its present allies to ensure justice and peace in the future, the programme of the Entente will probably be even further modified in the direction of less restricted trade relations. Yet, even under the most favourable circumstances of a decisive Allied victory and an unlimited guarantee of the settlement by the United States, the economic future will not be that of the past. In general, it may be assumed that measures will be taken to prevent Germany from nullifying the most favoured nation principle by the specialization of duties and from undermining her neighbours' industries by "dumping" and other obnoxious means. In so far as England is concerned, it would appear that the days of unrestricted imports are gone and that, as in the days before Cobden, a national trade policy will be evolved.⁷⁰ Even in the bitterest days of the struggle there was a very considerable free trade party in England and at no time was it proposed to erect tariff barriers of the height of those surrounding the United States. Many of these free traders, however, without disavowing their firm belief

in the economic efficacy of *laissez faire* doctrines, have reached the conclusion that security is more important than opulence. With tariff reformers they are in favour of stimulating British agriculture either by bounties or by protective duties and they approve of the protection of certain so-called "key industries," such as the manufacture of aniline dyes, magnetos and optical glass. Moreover, the very need for revenue to pay interest on the debt and the war pensions will make almost inevitable recourse to an extended customs system and attached to this will necessarily be some protective elements. And again, apart from the prejudice against German goods, which will be an important factor for a considerable time, positive measures will in all probability be taken to curtail their free and unrestricted access to the British markets so as to counteract the German system of state-aided penetration. Finally, it should be remembered that the increased nationalism produced by the war will seek expression in economic policy; and that territories which have been defended and acquired at the expense of immeasurable sacrifices inevitably seem more part and parcel of the body politic than those whose administration has been assumed somewhat in the rôle of trustee for the world. Closely associated with such feelings is the natural sentiment that those who have defended civilization should have a prior claim, both before those who attacked and those who remained neutral during the crisis, on all the means of rebuilding their shattered economic structures.

On the other hand, it is quite clear that if the British Commonwealth and the United States were to join in a co-operative alliance, there would be very much less likelihood of an application of the preferential principle to the dependent or non-self-governing parts of the Empire and also that the general arguments in favour of a protective policy would lose much of their force. With its high protective system and a colonial policy that largely excludes foreign goods from its dependencies, the United States is not in a position to object to the application of these principles by others. Nor, for the same reasons, is France. Such questions are, however, pregnant with interstate friction. The element of national monopoly with respect to the trade of dependent communities should so far as it is possible be removed and the principle of the wide-open door should be genuinely applied to them, as well as to the still independent, but undeveloped and backward, countries of the world. A general international agreement to this effect backed by an English-speaking alliance pledged to this self-denying principle would do much to further the peace of the world.

In normal times, the great bulk of the foreign trade of the United States is with the countries now at war. In 1913, more than three quarters of its exports went to the belligerent countries, while only somewhat less than this proportion of its imports came from them. By far the greater part of this trade was with the present Allies of the United States. To them went 63 per cent. of the total exports and from them came 54 per cent. of the

imports. On the other hand, the exports to the Central Powers constituted only 14.5 per cent. and the imports thence only 17.7 per cent. of the respective totals.⁷¹ The aggregate trade with America's Allies was almost four times as large as that with the Teutonic group. Military events have probably doomed the formation of a *Mittel-europa* extending from Antwerp to the Persian Gulf, but even the more limited project of a close economic union of the Central Empires is beset by grave difficulties, since the various nationalities of Austria-Hungary are looking forward to their own industrial development and do not relish their assigned part of being mere purveyors of raw materials and foodstuffs to the German work-shop. The aim of this plan was to increase the economic self-sufficiency of these countries and to free them from dependence on America and the whole outside world for unmanufactured supplies and grain. Whether or no even this limited project be perforce abandoned, in either case the United States cannot look forward to an expansion of its trade relations with this group. It is true that the former commerce with Germany was large. In 1913-14, the exports to Germany amounted to 342 million dollars and the imports thence to 190 millions.⁷² But these exports were composed largely of such supplies as copper and cotton, that are indispensable to Germany. On the other hand, the imports consisted of fertilizers, chemicals, and dye-stuffs, as well as a varied assortment of manufactured goods.⁷³ There is no visible indication that either Germany or the United States is prepared to

lower the barriers against foreign manufactures in order to facilitate an interchange of such goods. In fact, their respective industries are not in the main complementary, but are markedly competitive, as both have specialized in large scale production of cheap goods by machinery rather than in the highly finished goods of skilled workmanship.

This trade of the United States with Germany was all but completely cut off by the war while, at the same time, the normally far more extensive commercial relations with the Entente Allies expanded at an unprecedented pace. By far the largest part of this original and increased trade was with the British Commonwealth. Ever since the establishment of the English Colonies that in time developed into the United States, the trade routes between England and America were crowded with ships carrying merchandise to and fro. In 1913, nearly one half of the exports of the United States went to countries under the British flag and somewhat less than one third of the imports came from them.⁷⁴ The war has even further increased this commercial interdependence and it has also drawn closer the pre-existing strong financial ties. As a result of abnormally large exports at inordinately high prices, the United States had during the first two and a half years of the war accumulated an unprecedentedly vast credit balance in foreign trade and was able both to buy back the greater part of its securities owned abroad and also to loan very considerable amounts to the Entente Allies. Before the United States had en-

tered the war, these loans amounted to over two billion dollars, of which about one half was Great Britain's share. Since that event, these financial relations have become even closer and are binding the English-speaking peoples together by the closest economic ties. Not only has the war taken the United States out of the class of debtor nations, but in doing so it has completely removed the inevitable element of discord between creditor and debtor that from the earliest colonial times was a disturbing factor in Anglo-American relations. The war has definitely established a parity of status, which will, among other things, enable the citizens of the United States and those of the British Commonwealth to co-operate on terms of equality in developing the backward countries of the world and in rehabilitating the economic structure of the war-harassed nations.

Everything is tending to draw the English-speaking peoples into more intimate economic relations. If their present co-operation during the war should lead to future close association for their mutual security and for maintaining freedom, justice, and right throughout the world, these relations should be predominantly harmonious. For in that event, the arguments in favour of a policy of complete economic self-sufficiency for the British Commonwealth will be discredited. Presumably, a tariff for revenue, with duties on a much lower scale than those of the United States, will at all events have to be imposed in the United Kingdom. To a limited extent, this may hamper the increasing sale of American manufactures in

England, but before such a tariff could legitimately be deemed a grievance, the United States would have radically to lower its own tariff walls. Similarly, it is probable that steps will be taken to revive British agriculture and also to give preferential treatment in England to the raw products of the Dominions. As a result, there may be less demand in England for American foodstuffs, but this is quite unimportant, as it is very probable that the United States will soon have no agricultural surplus to export. Finally, it is quite assured that all of Germany's enemies will take means to prevent the unfair competition by which their markets have been penetrated. To the extent that this is successful, there will be a vacuum in these countries which will be supplied by their manufacturers and by those of the United States. The same effect will be produced by the sentiments and passions aroused in the war. Germany's extremely unscrupulous and ruthless conduct has attached a stigma to her citizens which for a considerable time will handicap them in disposing of their wares in foreign countries. The personal factor is important in most business transactions. As long as this inevitable semi-boycott obtains, it will act as a protective measure in favour of all the Allied nations, both in their own markets and also in those of sympathetic neutrals.

VIII

COMMUNITY OF POLICY

“Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure.”

— ABRAHAM LINCOLN, November 19, 1863.

“The British Empire is not founded on might or force, but on moral principles — on principles of freedom, equality and equity. It is these principles which we stand for to-day as an Empire in this mighty struggle.”

— JAN SMUTS, April 2, 1917.

“We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy.”

— WOODROW WILSON, April 2, 1917.

CHAPTER VIII

COMMUNITY OF POLICY

The Need of Co-operation — Sea Power and Its Control — The Future of China — Latin America — German Ambitions — Militarism — The Necessity of Security — A Positive Policy — Conclusion.

THE war has given the death-blow to America's cherished policy of isolation and has conclusively demonstrated that the traditional course of non-intervention is impossible in a markedly interdependent world. Like Cobden, the typical American was opposed to armed intervention and believed in the efficacy of a pacific example to quell the warlike ambitions of other states. In Mazzini's eyes, such an aloof course was but "cowardly desertion of duty," for to him the final justification of national existence was the active part taken in international politics. Hence his exhortations to the United States to enter into the stream of world affairs some sixty years before the logic of events had finally brought about this consummation.¹

The force of this logic in the future will be largely dependent upon the extent to which the German menace has been eliminated, but under all circumstances it presumably will be sufficiently cogent to render most in-

judicious a return to the obsolete creed. Intimate cooperation with the other English-speaking peoples will undoubtedly be found to be more and more essential. The closeness of the resulting relation must ultimately rest upon the immutable fact that these peoples are culturally closely akin and have essentially the same political ideals and institutions. In both branches of this politically separated, but clearly defined, entity, an unfettered public opinion, basing its judgments upon the dictates of personal morality, as a rule obliges the government in its conduct of foreign affairs to conform to standards that are far from being so generally recognized elsewhere.

This cultural solidarity is strongly reinforced by an ever increasing economic interdependence, which not only necessitates the closest association during the war, but also promises to make imperative such collaboration after the re-establishment of peace. The absolute diminution of the world's shipping as a result of submarine and mine, the shortage in foodstuffs throughout the world, the depletion of Europe's accumulated supplies of raw materials, the huge national debts, have produced a most serious dislocation and will result in disaster unless the process of economic rehabilitation is carefully supervised by international agencies. The chief burden of directing and controlling this reconstruction will fall upon the United States and upon the British Commonwealth because of their predominant financial power, their ownership of the major portion of the world's mercantile marine, their vast output of manufactured goods and

their exceptional resources in basic raw materials. Controlling, as they largely do, the world's sources of supply of gold, copper, tin, cotton, rubber, and wool, the English-speaking peoples must in concert devise measures for their distribution in the most advantageous, efficacious, and equitable manner.

The complex problems of economic reconstruction will demand the closest co-operation between the English-speaking peoples. But apart from all cultural and economic ties, these peoples are joined by physical contiguity and propinquity. Like the United States, the British Commonwealth is an American Power with vast interests in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. Hence intimate relations are inevitable and these relations are more likely to be of a co-operative than of an antagonistic nature, not only because there is no inherent conflict of interests, but also because their common civilization has permeated their foreign policies with the same general ideals and purposes. It may be confidently asserted that, of all the Great Powers, these two are the ones least infected with dreams of military glory or with ambitions of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of others. In the exceptionally advantageous position that they occupy on all the continents, it would indeed be very surprising were it otherwise. But it is an undeniable fact that with them peace has been the genuine goal of policy. As a result, the general foreign policy of the British Empire and that of the United States follow parallel lines. The fundamental aim of both states was, and perforce

must always be, security; for, unless safety is practically assured, the more positive purpose of maintaining the liberty of others will yield to the imperative immediate need. But security, in these days of rapid communications and of ever growing economic interdependence, means far more than mere immunity from invasion. It implies, in addition, the protection of a state's interests within the confines of other countries.

For the United States, security both in the narrower and in the broader sense, is obviously contingent, in the main, upon sea power.² The dependence is not so great as in the case of the British Commonwealth, but it is increasing year by year as foreign commerce is playing a larger part in the national economy. Sea power is, however, an economic fact that cannot be improvised. The British Empire's command of the seas rests, in ultimate analysis, not upon a navy that any state sufficiently rich might duplicate, but upon the fact that its merchant marine before the war amounted to approximately one half of the world's total tonnage.³ The efficiency of a navy is dependent upon a commensurate auxiliary mercantile fleet and its trained seamen. Were all warships to be discarded and complete naval disarmament to be the future dispensation, British sea power would be even more predominant than it now is. It is certain that the German submarine campaign will oblige the United States greatly to increase its mercantile marine, but it is highly improbable that this expansion will be sufficient either for the needs of American commerce or for a navy that will

provide the requisite security if the United States does not continue in close association with the British Commonwealth. Before America's participation in the war, Admiral Fiske contended:

“In order to have an effective naval defence (since we are precluded by our policy from having European allies and no South American country could give us any effective naval help) we must have on each ocean a fleet as strong as that of any nation on that ocean against whose wishes we may have to enforce a policy — or against whose policy we may have to oppose resistance.”⁴

Such a naval programme is feasible, but it would be burdensome in the extreme. It would be highly inadvisable, for the same security and the same ends can be attained by joining forces with the British Commonwealth. When, nearly one hundred years ago, Canning suggested to Richard Rush, the American Minister at London, the policy that led to the formulation and enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, he said that he did not believe that concert of action would be necessary, because the knowledge that Great Britain and the United States were of the same opinion would by its moral effect prevent European interference in South America. This belief was founded, Canning said, “upon the large share of the maritime power of the world which Great Britain and the United States shared between them, and the consequent influence which the knowledge that they held a common opinion upon a question on which such large maritime interests, present and future, hung, could not fail to produce upon the rest of the world.”⁵

Before reaching a definite decision on this far-reaching suggestion, President Monroe turned for advice to his experienced predecessors in office. In reply, Thomas Jefferson stated:

“Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all, on earth; and with her on our side, we need not fear the whole world. . . . But I am clearly of Mr. Canning’s opinion that it will prevent, instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such a war.”⁶

James Madison fully concurred with Jefferson, writing to Monroe that, while such co-operation “must ensure success in the event of an appeal to force, it doubles the chance of success without that appeal.” At the same time, he wrote to Jefferson that “with the British power & navy combined with our own, we have nothing to fear from the rest of the nations.”⁷

The situation is essentially the same in 1917 as it was in 1823. The submarine has not fundamentally changed the nature of sea power. It has merely re-introduced, in an aggravated form, a factor that was removed only in 1856 when privateering was abolished.⁸ Thanks largely to steam and electricity, the command of the surface of the sea is more complete than ever before.⁹ While the submarine has been extremely destructive of shipping and its cumulative effect may even result in a serious disarrangement in the carriage of necessary supplies, this demolition of merchant vessels cannot directly accomplish a positive military purpose. The submarine

and mine are essentially defensive weapons. They may weaken the enemy commanding the sea and they may even disrupt his offensive, but they still leave his shores immune from invasion. So long as the British Commonwealth and the United States can, with their joint resources, control the surface of the sea, they will be secure from the havoc inflicted upon Belgium, Northern France and Serbia. Neither one can unquestionably attain this full security alone. Nor is there any definite assurance that the control of the sea by the English-speaking peoples will in the future be uncontested. This depends largely upon the military outcome of the war and the future relations of the British Commonwealth and the United States.

If Germany were perchance to emerge from the war as mistress of the European Continent, she could readily use the added economic resources to build a navy of portentous size for a renewal of the bid for world dominion; and such a policy would be all the more probable, if it were not plainly manifest that the maritime resources of all the English-speaking peoples would be jointly used to thwart her. But while joint action during the war and close co-operation after its close will probably be able to protect these culturally kindred peoples, sea power in itself cannot prevent Germany from dominating Europe, though the economic pressure it can exert may mitigate the rigours of such hegemony. The freedom of France and Italy from enforced subservience to German policy — in fact the liberties of Europe, not to mention those of

the world — are dependent upon such future intimate relations between the British and American peoples.

In this general connection also, it would be the height of folly to overlook the fact that the United States has gained the deep hostility of Germany by entering the war. Even prior to that event, the Central Powers were incensed at the purchase by the Allies of vast supplies in America. There is this to be said for their attitude that, already before 1914, they had held that a non-combatant state could not become an extensive source of warlike stores without violating its neutrality.¹⁰ Furthermore, these Powers had constantly protested against the failure of the United States to compel the Allies to permit American raw materials and foodstuffs to reach Germany. Their case, it should be noted, was strengthened by the fact that the United States had, to some extent at least, accepted their view of the international law applicable in these instances. In their opinion, America had been grossly unneutral and her final participation in the War was but the culmination of a gratuitously partisan attitude. This has led to a wide-spread feeling of implacable resentment.

When we leave behind us the question of safety from invasion and direct our attention to interests beyond the state's frontier, it will inevitably be found that the successful and peaceful maintenance of American policies towards Latin America and towards China is largely dependent upon British support and the sea power that goes with it. Since the aims of both states are in funda-

mental accord, there is no reason why this support should not be forthcoming. The policy of the open door in China is essentially Anglo-American in origin. This policy has both idealistic and utilitarian phases. The aim is not merely to preserve and widen a market for British and American wares, but to keep intact the territorial integrity and political independence of that backward country with its swarming millions feebly groping toward the progress of western civilization. Manchuria and Mongolia, in large part, have in all probability been already irrevocably detached from China, but the fate of the rest of this huge country hangs in the balance and apparently the only peaceful means of tipping the beam in accordance with America's ideals and interests is a clearly-defined alliance of the English-speaking peoples. Such an explicit engagement would probably give pause to those under the spell of imperialistic ambitions.¹¹

Similarly, there is no opposition in policy toward Latin America. In so far as the Monroe Doctrine is concerned, the general interests and political ideals of both countries coincide. The strength of the doctrine was from the very outset largely derived from British sea power.¹² The chief aim of this policy is to safeguard Latin America from foreign domination so that the twenty republics included therein may develop their characteristic institutions unhampered by European dictation. Great Britain has no political aims or territorial ambitions here, but she has a direct interest in stable conditions because of her extensive economic and com-

mercial relations with these countries. Before the war, imports from the United Kingdom into Latin America about equalled those from the United States, in spite of the preferential treatment accorded to American goods by both Cuba and Brazil.¹³ These imports were at that time about fifty per cent. larger than those of Germany.¹⁴

Great Britain naturally places great stress upon this extensive trade which has been developed by centuries of effort on the part of individuals, who demand as of right only the privilege of equal opportunity. There is no likelihood of friction here provided the United States does not adopt the reactionary policy of using the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism to secure by treaty or otherwise special and exclusive privileges that would partially shut the door to British commerce.¹⁵ If the United States were to agree to a self-denying ordinance to this effect and at the same time assumed responsibility for an adequate measure of order and justice in the disturbed parts of Central and South America, British interests would be amply safeguarded. Under such conditions, the Monroe Doctrine would unquestionably secure the formal and full support of the British Commonwealth.

Nor is there any conflict between an English-speaking alliance and Pan-Americanism, which is not a national policy of the United States, but an American international movement to foster closer cultural, political and economic relations between all the Americas. Some ninety years ago, when this vision first took hold of men,

one of its ardent advocates, the great Liberator Bolivar,¹⁶ believed that England should take a prominent part in any union of all the American states. In fact, at the first Pan-American Congress held at Panama in 1826, the United States was not represented owing to delay in making the appointments, while an accredited British official attended the meeting, though not as a member in full standing.¹⁷ A Pan-Americanism of 1917 that excludes Canada, Newfoundland, Jamaica, Barbados, and British Guiana, not to mention the other American parts of the British Commonwealth, is a strange contradiction in terms, and is presumably unwisely and unnecessarily narrow.

In connection with South America it should be remembered that the possibilities of German expansion there cannot be ignored. The most disturbing feature about Germany's much advertised "place in the sun" was its apparently deliberate vagueness. It was nowhere and everywhere. Whenever in any quarter of the globe the political waters became troubled, Germany extemporized important interests in whose protection she was ready to shake the mailed fist. The policy of Napoleon III in demanding compensation for France whenever Prussia added to her power, has been justly denounced by German historians, but the same policy was in turn adopted by United Germany and kept the world in a continuous ferment. Despite the indefinite inclusiveness of Germany's policy, it is, however, obvious that if ever a "New Germany" over the seas is to arise, the most likely, if

not the only possible, place is Brazil, in whose southern states there is already a considerable German nucleus around which to build such a daughter nation.¹⁸ German economists and publicists have persistently painted this dream. Against its realization, however, stood as insuperable barrier, not alone the Monroe Doctrine, but, in first line, the British fleet. The grave danger is that after the war, an undisciplined and unbeaten, though not victorious, Germany may seek to retrieve her fortunes by political expansion in South America. There was considerable truth in Professor Usher's realistic words written in 1916, that "the easiest concession for the Allies to make will be the control of Asia Minor by Germany and Austria and a free hand for both in South America, leaving Great Britain and France still supreme in Africa and Asia."¹⁹ At all times, it was highly improbable that the British barrier would be voluntarily raised and, since America's entrance into the war, this has become almost inconceivable. But the direst of necessities may permit of no other choice. Such a state of necessity would, however, be extremely unlikely, and such an outcome would be well-nigh impossible were the United States to contract binding engagements with the other English-speaking peoples. But, if the United States should after this war retire to its former isolation, or even if it should merely join the proposed league of nations as the only Great Power bound by no ties of alliance to any of its fellow members, such difficulties and others of a similar nature in the Far East will in all probability

have to be confronted. In the new and in some respects intensified nationalism of the near future, it will be imperative to form durable bonds with others if American interests are to be adequately considered. Rights and interests will be fully regarded only if their corresponding responsibilities are not shirked.

In addition to the economic and political facts from which the imperative urgency of close co-operation between the English-speaking peoples springs, there is a further most potent argument for such an alliance. Hitherto, not as a result of any virtues innate in them, but rather by the accident of favoured position, these peoples have been able to escape the burdens and dangers of large military establishments. If in the future they do not fully co-operate in protective measures, it is extremely improbable that they will continue to be thus fortunate. The tendency of every human instrument is to seek occasion to demonstrate its effectiveness,²⁰ and the existence of a powerful army leads insensibly to an aggressive attitude towards weaker or more pacific states. It tends to breed a spirit that makes might the measure of right. Furthermore, it favours the establishment of a military caste that is not subject to the civil law. It not infrequently results in the subordination of policy to purely strategic considerations, as well as in the eventual control of the body politic by the military authorities. These evils of militarism are most clearly exemplified in modern Germany.

The notorious Zabern affair²¹ was an inevitable

manifestation of a system that gives the legislature virtually no authority over the army. Such control of the German army by the Reichstag would, according to Professor Delbrueck, be inconceivable. "Whoever has only the slightest feeling with our corps of officers and our staff of generals," he writes, "knows that this is an impossibility, that our army would first have to experience a Sedan in an inverse sense in order to permit that to befall it."²² Thus, in 1906, Colonel von Deimling bluntly told the Reichstag that its decision counted for naught and that he would never withdraw a single soldier from South Africa, "unless my Emperor issues a command to that effect."²³ But, in addition, the army was regarded as a means of quelling political opposition. Prince von Buelow calmly discussed the use of force "as the very last resource" against the rising tide of Social Democracy. "If the means which law and justice place at our disposal fail," he wrote, "the last resource still remains."²⁴ Equally significant is the fact that, had the German Foreign Office been so inclined, it would have been powerless to prevent the invasion of Belgium after it had become apparent that such action would bring England into the war. On August 5, 1914, the German Under-Secretary of State informed the departing Belgian Minister at Berlin that the Foreign Office was impotent. Since the order of mobilization had been issued by the Emperor, he said, all power was vested in the military authorities; they had determined that the invasion of Belgium was an indispensable military oper-

ation.²⁵ The following words of Prince von Buelow embody a grim and sober historical fact:

“The history of Brandenburg-Prussia, which achieved its first, but not its last, German triumph in founding the German Empire under Prussian leadership, is the history of the Prussian army; with its ups and downs it is the history of Prussia’s varying fortunes in war.”²⁶

It is scarcely necessary to point out that militarism is not synonymous with preparedness. But the menace of the former is inherent in the latter. One of the greatest advantages of an English-speaking alliance is that its main protective bulwark would be a most formidable, and presumably an invincible, sea power. Except to a very minor and almost negligible degree, no one of the insidious dangers of militarism is to be feared from naval armaments. Even in the most powerful navies, comparatively few men are required and its spirit cannot pervade a whole people. The British navy, abnormally enlarged as it was already before the war by the German peril, included then only 150,000 men. Hence, its political influence must be relatively slight. Moreover, a fleet is essentially a defensive weapon. Sea power can prevent an opponent from being victorious and is thus frequently the decisive factor in hostilities, but in an offensive war it is merely the adjunct of the army.

It is almost axiomatic that the military and naval forces of any state should be commensurate not only with its location and policies, but also with its alliances, understandings and friendships with the other members of the

family of nations. It is evident that if the United States should revert to its isolation or even if it should entirely trust its future to an untried league of nations, the extent of its military and naval armaments must be far greater than if it were intimately allied with the British Commonwealth. England, Canada, Australasia and South Africa are in a similar position. In any eventuality, the old days of light military burdens will in all probability not return for some considerable time. But the weight of the future load, and its exact nature also, will largely depend upon the establishment of such close and binding ties. Apparently only in this way can security be safeguarded with armaments of such extent as not to endanger the political institutions typical of English-speaking peoples. With the aid of comparatively small standing armies recruited from a manhood extensively trained to arms, their joint navies should be able not only to protect them but to ensure, as far as this is possible, the general peace of the world. Local wars in Europe, as well as elsewhere, may still occur, but as in the case of the existing conflict, so also in all probability in future international difficulties tending toward world wars, the fundamental causes will lie in extra-European conditions. When there is no hope of gaining command of the sea, ambitious designs of aggression in transmarine areas must remain innocuous in their chrysalid state.

For the United States and for the British Commonwealth future peace and security are pre-eminently essential. The democracy of the English-speaking peoples

may emerge safely from the present ordeal by battle, but much yet remains to be done to make it an adequate system of political and social organization. The less secure from outside attack the body politic is, the more attention will be diverted from social reconstruction and the less smoothly, quickly, and fully will be realized the ideals of liberty and social justice towards which these democracies are insistently advancing. In addition, each branch of the English-speaking community has its distinctive problems whose solution demands concentrated effort. The United States must seriously undertake the laborious work of Americanizing a vast multitude of foreign-born and of overcoming a distinct sectionalism. The process of spiritual, intellectual and economic integration needs the quickening of positive ideals so that the American state may acquire a distinctively national character and a unified purpose.

Similarly, the other English-speaking democracies have their urgent problems. First and foremost, is the creation of an organization that will provide for the continuous expression of their distinct solidarity and that will give to the self-governing citizens of the British Commonwealth outside the British Isles a direct control over the vital issue of peace or war. This means a voice in foreign policy and in imperial defence, together with an equitable distribution of their burdens. But far more important and far more complex even than this refractory problem is the recognized obligation to develop the character and mind of the politically backward millions in

the Dependent Empire so that ultimately they too may become fit for self-government. As this fitness is never acquired except empirically and is always accompanied by a measure of disorder and a large share of blunders, the rate of progress will be intimately connected with the degree of pressure from without the body politic. The less this pressure, the more the reins of British authority will be relaxed. But disorder within the house will not be tolerated, if the entire structure is endangered. An English-speaking alliance would not be directly concerned with the internal affairs of India. If British statesmanship could not conciliate the growing spirit of Indian nationalism, America would not be concerned, however much the outcome might be deplored. But such an alliance would presumably give the British Commonwealth sufficient security to render comparatively harmless the inefficiency and disorder that must inevitably accompany the progressive transfer of authority in India into the hands of natives. This process has been proceeding slowly; the rate was dependent upon considerations of safety, and its future progress will be determined by *post-bellum* conditions. It is literally true that the future of self-government in India will be largely conditioned by America's future foreign policy.

While security and the peace that accompanies it are essential to the English-speaking peoples, these are but negative aims, and a foreign policy based merely upon them has no moral value. It is, however, incontestable that upon the closest co-operation between the English-

speaking peoples largely depend the future freedom of Latin America from European domination, the independence and integrity of China, and the rapidity with which self-government will be established in India. Thus, indirectly, the negative policy of security will make for liberty. This ideal has been the historic goal of all English-speaking peoples and, with many aberrations, it has been constantly, though somewhat gropingly and erratically, pursued.²⁷ It must be the key-note of the proposed association, if the alliance is to work its fullest good in the world. Such an alliance can and should be the bulwark of free government not only within their own frontiers and in Latin America and China, where the material interests of the English-speaking peoples are directly involved, but also wherever the doctrines of ascendancy threaten the liberties of the world. Its available military strength may not always be able to cope expeditiously with the situation, but its combined naval and economic resources will be able to give pause to the stoutest of militaristic hearts bent upon subjugating and exploiting its European neighbours. No matter what the military outcome of the war may be, even if Germany should in the end succeed in adding to her European area, the future freedom of France and Italy, as well as that of Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian countries, is dependent upon a close association of the English-speaking peoples and upon their readiness to continue to use their combined strength against the projected hegemony of Europe by the Central Empires.

Even in the East of Europe, where their sea power cannot directly intervene, it can be effective, at least in mitigating the hard lot of suppressed and exploited nationalities, if not in securing their complete emancipation. The English-speaking peoples have in their joint grasp naval and economic weapons which those who depend upon sea-borne commerce must in the long run respect, even if military exigencies have led to their temporary defiance.

These combined maritime and economic resources cannot but provide the essential basis of any league of nations that may be formed after the war. The effectiveness of the proposed league will be directly commensurate with the vitality of the English-speaking alliance which should form its corner-stone. There are, however, various kinds of alliances. A dynastic one, of course, is out of the question. One merely of governments would be ineffective. It must be a popular association, based upon mutual sympathy and good-will, together with a genuine desire for co-operation. Only such an association offers the hope for a better future, because it contains ultimate potentialities unknown to a political science based directly upon the sovereign state of the modern era. When one surveys the entire course of historical evolution, it becomes clear that the only way in which law and justice have been established in the relations of man to man and of group to group has been by the integration of ever larger and larger political aggregates. When this process is voluntary, it distinctly spells progress. The world is just beginning to realize that the state is not

unicellular and that there can co-exist within it many and varied concurrent loyalties. The nineteenth century ideal of the national state — the co-terminous state and nation — is still quite vigorous, but the British Commonwealth of Nations is concretely demonstrating that a higher type of political association can exist in which law and justice rule over a congeries of widely scattered peoples to each one of which is assured the free and full development of its own ideals.²⁸ The outlook for the eventual reign of law and the rule of reason throughout the world would indeed be black if the future did not hold in store even more comprehensive political organizations permitting the fullest freedom to the nations and states within them, but uniting them in a common purpose for mankind as a whole. A mere alliance of the English-speaking peoples, were it to imply no more than did such arrangements in the past, would not in itself be so alluring. But one can dimly perceive in it the vague outlines of some new, unprecedented form of political association which, though preserving to each part its full freedom, will permanently unite them, not only for the defence of their own common civilization and its ideals, but also in support of the liberty of all threatened by the sword of those who worship at the shrine of organized power.

NOTES

NOTES

NOTES TO INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY

1. "Liberty and Law are interdependent; the weak state can only be secure of its liberty under the guardianship of law. In this aspect, again, the Great War appears as the last struggle of the forces hostile to the spirit of western civilization: the forces that repudiate the possibility of international law, deny the claims of weak states to the liberty that law alone can give them, decline to admit the moral basis of Law, and claim the right to return to the practices of the jungle in inter-state relations." Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism*, p. 34.

2. "In all centuries of the Middle Age Christendom, which in destiny is identical with Mankind, is set before us as a single, universal Community, founded and governed by God Himself. Mankind is one 'mystical body'; it is one single and internally connected 'people' or 'folk'; it is an all embracing corporation (*universitas*), which constitutes that Universal Realm, spiritual and temporal, which may be called the Universal Church (*ecclesia universalis*), or, with equal propriety, the Commonwealth of the Human Race (*respublica generis humani*). Therefore that it may attain its one purpose, it needs One Law (*lex*) and One Government (*unicus principatus*)." Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, p. 10.

3. C. Delisle Burns, *Political Ideals*, p. 103.

4. W. A. Dunning, *A History of Political Theories, Ancient and Mediæval*, pp. 230, 231. Dante's *De Monarchia* "rests on the fundamental conception that the world, being a thought of God, is designed for unity, the attainment of which is the chief aim of man." J. Holland Rose, *Nationality in Modern History*, p. 7. See also Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism*, pp. 124ff.

5. John Neville Figgis, *From Gerson to Grotius, 1414-1625*, p. 63.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 13. "With all reservations, there remains a broad difference between the self-sufficing unit of International Law, and the spoke in the wheel of Mediaeval Christendom," *Ibid.*, p. 20.

7. A. L. Smith, *Church and State in the Middle Ages*, pp. 134, 135.

8. Figgis, *op. cit.*, p. 88. According to Grotius, "all mankind, or at least the great part of it, constitutes a society of peoples for which the rule of a general law is indispensable." W. A. Dunning, *A His-*

tory of Political Theories, from Luther to Montesquieu, pp. 174, 175.

9. "Grotius and his successors recurred to the Law of Nature as being, according to the theory of the ancient Roman jurists, a law grounded in reason and valid for all mankind." Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, p. 602.

10. Pollock, *Oxford Lectures*, pp. 18, 19; *Cambridge Modern History XII*, pp. 712, 713. Recently, this distinguished authority has stated that "the law of nations has never professed to restrain sovereign states from being judges in their own cause in the last resort"; and he concludes his re-examination of the subject with the significant words that the near future "may see the foundations of an authentic international law, protected by organized international justice." "What of the Law of Nations?" in *The Living Age* for January 27, 1917.

11. In interstate relations, "there is no Law, in the strict modern sense because (there is) no superior authority capable of adjudicating on disputes and enforcing rules." Bryce, *op. cit.*, pp. 546, 547. *Cf.* p. 554. "The term 'law' when applied to the rules and principles that prevail between independent nations, is misleading because such rules depend for their entire validity upon the forbearance and consent of the parties to whom they apply, and are not and cannot be legally enforced by any common superior." W. W. Willoughby, *The Nature of the State*, p. 200. On the English, and also the American, conception of law, see A. Lawrence Lowell, *The Government of England*, II, pp. 471-488.

12. Oppenheim, *International Law*, I, p. 4.

13. Figgis, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

14. "Before The Hague Conference, international legislation in Conferences had taken as its most important subject the Laws of War, and again, at The Hague Conferences, if one expects arbitration, the only question really discussed and the only results arrived at concerned the conduct of nations during war. . . . What should we think of a State in which there were no laws to prevent riot and murder and violence, and no police to enforce the law, but yet there were very detailed and complicated laws governing the conduct of persons engaged in riots, murder, and violence? . . . The Laws of War should not be the first, but the last, to be made in the Society of Nations." L. S. Woolf, *International Government*, pp. 28, 29.

15. Edmond Kelly, *Government or Human Evolution*, I, p. 360.

16. As any and every dispute may be deemed to involve these factors, the effect of these treaties is greatly weakened.

17. Russia, largely at Bismarck's instigation, denounced during the Franco-Prussian War the clauses of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 neutralizing the Black Sea. Bismarck's *Reflections and Reminiscences*, II, p. 115. This high-handed act led to the declaration of the Con-

ference of London of 1871 that it was "an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can repudiate treaty engagements or modify treaty provisions, except with the consent of the contracting parties by mutual agreement."

18. To reduce this to its inherent absurdity, if Monaco or Lichtenstein were parties to a war and had not ratified a Hague Convention, it would not be binding on the other belligerents.

19. Sybel, *The Founding of the German Empire*, VI, pp. 201ff.; *Die Begründung des Deutschen Reiches*, VI, pp. 168ff.

20. Sanger and Norton, *England's Guarantee to Belgium and Luxemburg*, pp. 15-21, 77ff.

21. Gladstone's *Speeches in the House of Commons on August 5 and 10, 1870*; Morley's *Gladstone*, II, p. 342.

22. Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 93ff.

23. Hans Wehberg, *Capture in War on Land and Sea*, pp. 4, 5; T. Baty and J. H. Morgan, *War: Its Conduct and Legal Results*, pp. 166ff.

24. P. S. Reinsch, *Public International Unions*; L. S. Woolf, *International Government*, pp. 153ff; Oppenheim, *op. cit.* I, pp. 512ff, 612ff.

25. W. A. Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe*, contains an exhaustive account of this attempt. An excellent short account is available in *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* by Grant, Greenwood, Kerr, and others, pp. 1ff.

26. L. S. Woolf, *International Government*, p. 24. On the intervention in Greece during the present war, see Léon Maccas, *Ainsi Parla Venizélos*, pp. 295ff.

27. For a full account of this development, see T. E. Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question*.

28. *British White Book*, Nos. 2, 6, 9, 90, 97, 99, 120.

29. B. E. Schmitt, *England and Germany*, pp. 306-314.

30. "And again in 'foreign politics,' as we provincially call it, we suppose always that something corresponding to a 'Balance of Power' should be maintained. For if any one State were to become too powerful, even though it were still theoretically equal with the others, it could so influence the development of the others as not to leave them free. Theoretical independence is valueless unless it involves a real power to carry out one's own will; and were any one State to become supreme in military or economic power, no other State would be really able to govern itself in its own way. Quite apart from actual invasion or conquest, a preponderant influence in Europe would check local differentiation." C. Delisle Burns, *Political Ideals*, pp. 124, 125.

31. *British White Book*, No. 101.

32. In 1907, at the Congress at Stuttgart, Jaurès stated the incon-

trovertible truth: "Si une nation, en quelque circonstance que ce fût, renonçait d'avance à se défendre, elle ferait le jeu des gouvernements de violence, de barbarie, et de réaction. . . . L'unité humaine se réaliserait dans la servitude, si elle résultait de l'absorption des nations vaincues par une nation dominatrice." Romain Rolland, *Au-Dessus de la Mêlée*, p. 158.

33. Hans Delbrueck, *Regierung und Volkswille*, p. 123.

34. Pitt and his colleagues in England "verteidigten die Zukunft Englands, und sie hatten ausserdem recht, wenn sie zugleich verkuen-deteten, im englischen Lager sei die Freiheit Europas. England hat damals in einem zwanzigjaehrigen Kriege das Seinige getan, um die Zukunft der Welt vor der Gewaltherrschaft der Napoleonischen Militaerdespotie zu bewahren." Paul Rohrbach, *Zum Weltvolk hindurch!*, p. 71.

35. In 1894, France and Russia formed an alliance to counteract the military predominance of Germany which had been further assured by alliances with Austria-Hungary, Italy and Rumania. A distinguished French historian regarded this arrangement as equivalent to a league to safeguard peace. Both groups, Seignebos said, "ayant le même but déclaré, le maintien de la paix, leur opposition a produit en Europe le même effet pratique qu'une entente générale." Seignebos, *Histoire Politique de l'Europe Contemporaine*, p. 789.

36. *Imperial Germany*, by Prince von Buelow (new edition by J. W. Headlam), p. 325.

37. An article in *The Round Table* for December of 1915 called "The Harvest of the War," ably outlines this plan. Lord Salisbury held that the concert is "the embryo of the only possible structure of Europe which can save civilization from the desolating effects of a disastrous war."

NOTES TO NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY

1. F. H. Giddings, "Sovereignty and Government" in *Political Science Quarterly*, XXI, pp. 1ff.; J. M. Mathews, "Duguit's Political Theory," *ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 284ff.; J. N. Figgis, *From Gerson to Grotius*, pp. 52 *et passim*; Maitland and Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, *passim*; J. A. Murray Macdonald, *European International Relations*, pp. 94ff.; Harold J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, pp. 1-25.

2. C. Delisle Burns, *The Morality of Nations*, *passim*; L. S. Woolf, *International Government*, *passim*.

3. See J. W. Garner, *Introduction to Political Science*, pp. 237ff.; Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, pp. 503ff.

4. Romain Rolland, *Au-Dessus de la Mêlée*, pp. 97ff.

5. See especially F. S. Marvin, *The Unity of Western Civilization and the same writer's The Living Past*. "The nations of the West are far more alike than they are unlike, and their points of likeness are much more important than their points of unlikeness. Not only materially but spiritually every nation is poorer by breach of contact with any other. The sole point in which the nations are independent is that of government." G. Lowes Dickinson and others, *Towards a Lasting Settlement*, p. 26. "Religion, law, manners, customs, education — are at bottom the same in all; and in respect of them, the essential things of our life, Europe is virtually one great commonwealth of nations." J. A. Murray Macdonald, *European International Relations*, p. 77. In his cosmopolitan period, before the disaster of Jena had aroused his German national consciousness, Fichte said: "The Christian Europeans are essentially but one people; they recognize this common Europe as their own true Fatherland; and, from one end of it to the other, pursue nearly the same purposes and are ever actuated by similar motives." J. Holland Rose, *Nationality in Modern History*, p. 41.

6. Similar influences were quite active even before the modern era. Witness the effect of the Huguenot immigration upon England, that of the Palatines into the American Colonies and the wide-spread influence of the dispersion of the Spanish Jews under the goad of religious persecution.

7. For American democratic influence in the Balkans, see *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, pp. xviff.; 379.

8. Laveleye, *Le Socialisme Contemporain*, pp. xxxiiiff. (7 ed. 1892).

9. L. S. Woolf, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

10. In so far as the Universal Postal Union is concerned, "the theoretical right of the State to refuse ratification to the Convention and Règlement as voted at a Congress in practice hardly exists. The Administrations, adhering to the Union, never wait for formal ratification before putting the new regulations into operation, and the decisions of a Postal Congress are acted upon whether they are ratified or not." L. S. Woolf, *op. cit.*, p. 195. "The adherence of a State to the Postal Convention results in a surrender of its independence and sovereignty in the realm of postal communications, in its voluntary submission to International Government." *Ibid.*, p. 197.

11. "When the interdependence of States is recognized, it will follow that the philosophical idea of the State will no longer be that of a single, self-sufficient organism, but rather that of a functioning organ in a grouping more or less organized." C. Delisle Burns, *The Mor-*

ality of Nations, p. 53. See also A. H. Fried, *The Restoration of Europe*, pp. 11-14.

12. "Now the process of change which we call civilization means quite a number of things. But there is no doubt that on its political side it means primarily the gradual substitution of a state of peace for a state of war. This change is the condition precedent for all the other kinds of improvement that are connoted by such a term as 'civilization.'" John Fiske, *American Political Ideas*, p. 106.

13. P. H. Kerr's lecture, "Commonwealth and Empire," in *The Empire and the Future*, p. 86. See also his essay, "Political Relations Between Advanced and Backward Peoples," in *International Relations*, by Grant, Greenwood, and others, pp. 141-179.

14. For an excellent and full account of these problems, see Arnold J. Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*.

15. Henry Sidgwick, *The Development of European Polity*, p. 26.

16. C. Delisle Burns, *Political Ideals*, p. 174.

17. W. E. H. Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, I, p. 488. See also *Letters of John Stuart Mill*, I, pp. 276-281.

18. J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, III, p. 342.

19. John W. Burgess, *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, I, p. 4.

20. Cf. Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism*, pp. 47, 48.

21. For an admirable account of this development, see C. D. Buck, "Language and the Sentiment of Nationality," in the *American Political Science Review*, X, pp. 44ff.

22. Pierre Mocaër, *La Question Bretonne*. See also "The Small Celtic Nations" in *The New Statesman* for April 14, 1917.

23. W. E. H. Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, I, p. 502.

24. This is especially true when nationalism, as in Germany, is based upon the firm conviction of blood superiority and degenerates into what has been well termed, "racialism." Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism*, pp. 84-86.

25. *Towards a Lasting Settlement*, ed. by C. R. Buxton, p. 26.

26. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Destruction of Poland*.

27. R. A. Reiss, *How Austria-Hungary Waged War in Serbia*.

28. "In point of material force I held a union with Russia to have the advantage. I had also been used to regard it as safer, because I placed more reliance on traditional dynastic friendship, on community of conservative monarchical instincts, on the absence of indigenous political divisions, than on the fits and starts of public opinion among the Hungarian, Slav, and Catholic population of the monarchy of the Habsburgs. Complete reliance could be placed upon the durability of neither union, whether one estimated the strength of the dynastic bond with Russia, or of the German sympathies of the Hungarian

populace." Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences, II, p. 256ff.

29. J. Holland Rose, *The Development of the European Nations*, II, pp. 15-18; A. Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe, 1878-1914*, I, pp. 41ff.

30. This treaty of 1883 was only a personal undertaking of King Carol; it was not binding on Rumania, since it had not been ratified by Parliament as is required by the Constitution. Mitrany, in *The Balkans*, by Forbes, Toynbee, Mitrany, and Hogarth, p. 301.

31. "The conclusion of this Alliance came, not so much from our fear of Russia, as from the fact that our other neighbour made our life intolerable, and that we found no other means except the Alliance to make our existence tolerable." "The Policy of National Instinct." Speech delivered by M. Take Jonesco in the Rumanian Chamber of Deputies, December 16 and 17, 1915, p. 83.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 85.

33. Pierre Albin, *L'Allemagne et la France, 1885-1894*, p. 384. As a result of this alliance, "l'ère de Bismarck est cette fois définitivement close. L'équilibre rompu est rétabli." *Ibid.*, p. 378.

34. For a clear account of England's relations with the Triple Alliance, see Ernst zu Reventlow, *Deutschlands Auswaertige Politik*, pp. 8-17, 25-38.

NOTES TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914

1. "Your first Duties — first, at least, in importance — are, as I have told you, to Humanity. You are *men* before you are *citizens* or *fathers*. If you do not embrace the whole human family in your love, if you do not confess your faith in its unity — consequent on the unity of God — and in the brotherhood of the Peoples who are appointed to reduce that unity to fact . . . you disobey your law of life, or do not comprehend the religion which will bless the future." Mazzini, *The Duties of Man* (Everyman's Library), p. 51.

2. Figgis, *op. cit.*, p. 217. As early as 1713, in his *Projet de traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle*, the Abbé de St. Pierre argued that "Christianity has given to the nations of Europe, in religion, morals, and customs, and even in laws, the impress of a single society — to such a point that those peoples which, like the Turks, have become European in a geographical sense without becoming Christians, have been regarded as strangers; and between the members of this Christian commonwealth the 'ancient image of the Roman Empire has continued to form a sort of bond.'" W. A. Phillips, *The Confedera-*

tion of Europe, pp. 20, 21. For a succinct synopsis of this project, see Ramsay Muir, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-143.

3. If the prevalent view of the meaning of freedom and independence entertained by the states of Europe be a true theory, "then the binding force of the engagements which nations enter into with each other must always be weaker than the alleged necessities of the life of any one of them; and wars between them must always be inevitable." J. A. Murray Macdonald, *op. cit.*, pp. 41, 42.

4. The ill-repute of diplomacy is not due to the character of diplomats but to the fact that the international anarchy places them at times in a false situation. The diplomatic code of honour, however, varies greatly in the different states. An especially crude and cynical disregard of truth was evinced, on one occasion at least, by Baron von Aehrenthal, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, who in private life was presumably a man of honour. Just before the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, he categorically lied in his official capacity to the British Ambassador at Vienna about the impending proclamation of Bulgarian independence, although the full truth was bound to be revealed in two days. H. W. Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, pp. 250-253.

5. Baron von Hügel describes the contents of a letter received by him a few days before the outbreak of the war from a highly cultivated and deeply religious German scholar who knew England well. "It was a long, touchingly earnest, plea in favour of the justice of the German claims, especially of a cultural kind, and centred in the strange assertion and argument that German culture had by now, as a sheer matter of fact, fully assimilated all that deserved to live in the several civilizations of Greece and Rome, Italy, France, and England; and hence that the spreading and the substitution, by means even of the force of arms, of this German culture, now thus become the legitimate heir (because the actual quintessence) of all those other cultures, was both no more than justice on the part of Germany towards herself, and no kind of loss, but rather a great gain in fruitful concentration, for Europe and humanity at large." Baron Friedrich von Hügel, *The German Soul*, pp. 7, 8. This quotation is made, not because it is unique, but because it expresses exceedingly well the thoughts dominating many influential Germans.

6. Luther "paves the way for the exalted theory of the State entertained by Hegel and his followers. He is as much the spiritual ancestor of the high theory of the State, as the Jesuits and their allies are of the narrower, utilitarian theory." Figgis, *op. cit.*, p. 67. "In bringing to an imaginative synthesis what might have remained an immense diversity of enterprises, Kantianism has helped formulate a sense of a national mission and destiny." John Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, p. 29.

7. For a useful summary of the various theories of the organic nature of the state, see J. W. Garner, *Introduction to Political Science*, p. 56ff.

8. There are, Maitland says, permanently organized groups of men, of which the state is a "highly peculiar group-unit." According to Gierke, such a German *Genossenschaft* or Fellowship "is no fiction, no symbol, no piece of the State's machinery, no collective name for individuals, but a living organism and a real person, with body and members and a will of its own. Itself can will, itself can act; it wills and acts by the men who are its organs as a man wills and acts by brain, mouth and hand. It is not a fictitious person." Gierke-Maitland, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, pp. ix, x.

9. Hans Delbrueck, *Regierung und Volkswille*, pp. 131-133. According to Friedrich Naumann, another German publicist of widespread influence, "the State grows up upon the will to make others subservient to oneself. All constructions which attempt to explain the State from brotherly love to our neighbour are, considered historically, so much empty talk. The State can, when it perfects itself, be impregnated with the motives of brotherly love, at least one can attempt it; but according to its nature, the State is not love, but constraint." Baron Friedrich von Hügel, *op. cit.*, pp. 54, 55.

10. According to a somewhat idealized view, the state of English-speaking peoples "is a community claiming an unlimited devotion on the part of each and all of its members to the interest of all its other members, living and yet to live." Lionel Curtis, *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, p. 91. For further elaboration of this concept of the state, see *The Round Table*, Nos. 23 and 24, pp. 391ff., 688ff.

11. The same is true of Austria. The English and American expression "civil service" is not a synonym for "bureaucracy." The English and American service has not acquired a consciousness that it is not a service, but a government. In Austria and in Germany this consciousness exists and is assiduously cultivated. The Austrian bureaucracy "conceives itself theoretically as the executive instrument of the will of the Crown, and practically as invested with a mission to govern the public." The same is true of the German officials. "That the State exists for the service of the public is a conception foreign to the bureaucratic mind which is moulded on the principle that the community exists for the State and derives its well-being from and through the State." H. W. Steed, *op. cit.*, p. xxxi. Cf. Delbrueck, *op. cit.*, p. 141. See also some very pertinent remarks in Norman Angell, *The World's Highway*, p. 78.

12. Cf. Conrad Gill, *National Power and Prosperity*, p. 85.

13. It is significant that Professor Paulsen selected this dictum of Treitschke in order to contrast the modern German spirit with that of Kant. Friedrich Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant*, p. 359. It is not con-

tended that every German holds such views, but they are unquestionably predominant among those determining policy and deed. Opposing views might be cited, but they have as little political significance as have the sporadic utterances of English-speaking neo-Odinists. For instance, in his *Elements of Folk Psychology*, published in 1912, Wilhelm Wundt writes: "The ideal which is at present proposed for the distant future involves not the extension of any single State into a world State, but rather the dissolution of existing States and the establishment of a society of universal peace among nations, such as would render entirely superfluous any instruments of power on the part of the State itself."

14. W. F. Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, I, pp. 200ff.

15. Henry Adams, *History of the United States*, I, p. 203.

16. *Ibid.*, I, p. 214.

17. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 342.

18. John W. Foster, *A Century of American Diplomacy*, pp. 440, 441. As early as 1814, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, Pozzo di Borgo, recognized that the United States was "aiming at a complete revolution in the relations of the New World with the Old, by the destruction of all European interests in the American continent." W. A. Phillips, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

19. F. J. Turner, *Rise of the New West*, p. 203. For details of the naval and military aid given by British subjects to the revolting colonies, see Justin Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, VIII, pp. 332-335.

20. The most complete accounts of the genesis of Monroe's famous message are: Worthington C. Ford, "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," in the *American Historical Review*, Vols. VII and VIII; *The Writings of James Monroe*, edited by S. M. Hamilton, VI, pp. 346ff. The best account of the European situation that led to its formulation is in W. A. Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe*, pp. 256-291.

21. Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, October 24, 1823.

22. James Madison to James Monroe, October 30, 1823.

23. James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1823. Like Jefferson, he thought that the time had arrived "when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the U States, and in consequence, either in favour of Despotism or of liberty."

24. Henry Clay's plan was to draw the nascent South American republics, both commercially and politically, into the orbit of the United States. W. F. Johnson *op. cit.*, I, pp. 326ff; Carl Schurz, *Henry Clay*, I, pp. 165-171.

25. *Cf.* C. R. Fish, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 208-211.

26. The confidence with which the bold declarations were made in

Monroe's Message "rested more on the efficiency of the British navy than on our own strength. . . . Thus to use for one's own purposes the resources of a rival power, while yielding nothing to her rivalry, is daring; but, if justified, it is the highest manifestation of the diplomatic art." *Ibid.*, pp. 212, 213.

27. James Monroe to John Quincy Adams, November 21, 1823.

28. For the subsequent interpretations and extensions of this protean policy by Polk, Olney, Roosevelt, Lodge, and others, see H. Kraus, *Die Monroe doctrine*, and A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation*.

29. *The Letters of Daniel Webster* (ed. Van Tyne), p. 104; H. C. Lodge, *Daniel Webster*, pp. 132-135.

30. J. B. McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, VIII, pp. 144ff; J. B. Moore, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 136-139.

31. J. B. Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 131, 132. This of course did not debar the United States from acquiring large portions of Mexico and the principle was never held to apply strictly to Cuba. *Cf.* W. F. Johnson, *op. cit.*, II, p. 237.

32. D. R. Dewey, *National Problems*, p. 305.

33. J. H. Latané, *America as a World Power*, pp. 278ff.

34. Charles G. Washburn, *Theodore Roosevelt*, p. 91.

35. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution*, II, p. 285. Twenty years ago, Prof. John W. Burgess took American historians to task for passing over "our partiality for the French in the struggle to place a Napoleonic despotism over all continental Europe, which Great Britain was using all her powers to prevent." *Political Science Quarterly*, XI, p. 64. See also Richard Olney's remarks in the *Atlantic Monthly* for March of 1900.

36. Woodrow Wilson, *A History of the American People*, III, pp. 216, 217. See also Edward Channing, *A History of the United States*, IV, pp. 453, 454.

37. W. R. Thayer, *Life and Letters of John Hay*, II, p. 369.

NOTES TO THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

1. On this phase of German policy, see especially G. W. Prothero, *German Policy before the War*, and Lewis B. Namier, *Germany and Eastern Europe*. On the Balkan corridor, see Syud Hossain, "Turkey and German Capitalists" in *Contemporary Review* for April of 1915, and Evans Lewin, *The German Road to the East*.

2. John Fiske, *American Political Ideas*, pp. 143-145.

3. Britannic foreign trade was 27.4%; that of the United States

9.6%. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1915, p. 65.* The Britannic percentage would be reduced were the duplications resulting from inter-imperial trade eliminated; but, on the other hand, a large proportion of Germany's over-sea trade is with Britannic countries and the United States.

4. Two other large aggregates, a Chino-Japanese and a Latin American, were at times also foreseen by those predicting the future.

5. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1915, pp. 11, 42, 416; I. A. Hourwich, Immigration and Labor, pp. 180ff.

6. See especially J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany (4th ed.) Chapters III and V.

7. Buelow, Imperial Germany (ed. Headlam), p. 159.

8. Naumann, Central Europe, p. 91. See for details Chapter III. As has been tersely said, "German *Kultur* cannot absorb; it can only supplant." A. D. McLaren, Germanism from Within, p. 12.

9. Sir Harry Johnston, "The German Colonies," in the *Edinburgh Review* of October, 1914. See also Dr. Dernburg's sanguine estimates quoted in W. H. Dawson, The Evolution of Modern Germany, pp. 367ff.

10. Rohrbach, German World Policies, p. 5.

11. *Zukunft*, July 1, 1911, quoted in Charles Andler, Pan-Germanism, p. 53. See also other excerpts from the *Zukunft* in the same writer's *Le Pangermanisme Continental*, pp. 395, 396, and *Le Pangermanisme Colonial*, p. 281.

12. Charles Andler, *Le Pangermanisme Colonial*, p. 186.

13. Cf. Otfried Nippold, *Der Deutsche Chauvinismus*, p. 21 *et passim*. Considerable extracts from this work are available in English in Alexander Gray's *The True Pastime*.

14. See likewise "Vigilans sed Æquus" (Thomas Arnold), German Ambitions as They Affect Britain and the United States (1903), and G. Ellis Barker, *Modern Germany* (4th ed.) Chapter VI.

15. W. H. Skaggs, *German Conspiracies in America*, p. 105.

16. Gustavus Ohlinger, *Their True Faith and Allegiance*, p. 29. Since the war, the National German-American Alliance has been very active and has officially stated that it "is waging war against Anglo-Saxonism." *Ibid.*, p. 43. See also *passim*. The entrance of the United States into the war has not stopped these efforts.

17. G. Lowes Dickinson in *Towards a Lasting Settlement*, ed. by C. R. Buxton, p. 21.

18. See Goethe's remark in 1828 on the young Englishmen at Weimar. Eckermann, *Gespraeche mit Goethe* (ed. Kroeber), p. 663.

19. On this Anglo-American policy, see W. F. Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, II, pp. 285ff.

20. When, some thirty years ago, the federation of the British Empire became a live question, the English historian, Edward A.

Freeman, rejected the scheme largely because, in his opinion, it would alienate the United States. Would imperial disintegration be too dearly bought, he asked, if it carried with it "a greater chance than we now have of keeping the lasting good will of the United States of America?" Freeman, *Greater Greece and Greater Britain*, p. 143. Such sincere feelings pervaded broad circles in England.

21. On April 5, 1898, Hay wrote to Senator Lodge: "If we wanted it—which, of course, we do not—we could have the practical assistance of the British Navy—on the *do ut des* principle, naturally." W. R. Thayer, *John Hay*, II, p. 164.

22. Hay to McKinley, April 4, 1898. C. S. Olcott, *William McKinley*, II, p. 130.

23. W. R. Thayer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 169.

24. See *e. g.*, John R. Dos Passos, *The Anglo-Saxon Century and the Unification of the English-speaking People* (New York, 1903); Franklin H. Giddings, *Democracy and Empire*, pp. 285, 289. For a discussion of this question in 1894, see Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power*, pp. 107ff.

25. W. R. Thayer, *op. cit.*, II, 234.

26. See especially Lionel Curtis, *The Commonwealth of Nations*, Part I; Philip H. Kerr's "Commonwealth and Empire" in *The Empire and the Future*, pp. 69ff; "The British Imperial Problem" in *The New Republic* for February 12 and 19, 1916.

27.

	<i>Germany's foreign trade</i>	<i>Germany's exports</i>
	(In Millions of Marks)	
1914.....	22,545	10,891
1903.....	12,276	5,565
Gain.....	10,269	5,326
	<i>Great Britain's foreign trade</i>	<i>Great Britain's exports</i>
	(In Millions of Marks)	
1914.....	28,632	12,950
1903.....	18,809	7,568
Gain.....	9,823	5,382

Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1915, p. 61.* These figures were to no degree alarming, in fact they were decidedly encouraging when the disparity in population was considered and also the rapid development of British shipping and banking. For a study of this question, see B. E. Schmitt, *England and Germany*, Chapter V.

28. W. H. Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany?*, p. 159.

29. *Cf.* *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, pp. 104, 110, 214, 215.

30. For an illuminating analysis of this fundamental problem, see Philip H. Kerr's "Political Relations between Advanced and Backward Peoples" in *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* by Grant, Greenwood, Hughes, Kerr and Urquhart, pp. 141-182. Compare also A. J. Macdonald, *Trade Politics and Christianity in Africa and the East*.

31. Evans Lewin, *The Germans and Africa*, pp. 232ff. See also Louis Maurice, *La Politique Marocaine de l'Allemagne*, pp. 4-15.

32. On May 16, 1891, Lord Salisbury instructed Sir Charles Euan-Smith, the Envoy-Extraordinary to Morocco, as follows: "You will observe that it has been the constant aim of His Majesty's Government and of your predecessors at Tangier, to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Morocco, while neglecting no favourable opportunity of impressing upon the Sultan and his Ministers the importance and advantage of improving the government and administration of the country." E. D. Morel, *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy*, p. 7.

33. "Frankreich befand sich zu Marokko in einer ganz anderen Stellung wie Grossbritannien zu Aegypten. Die Englaender herrschten dort schon laengst, in jedem Sinne des Wortes und waren *de facto* auch international als Herren anerkannt. Mit den Franzosen stand es umgekehrt: sie wollten alles, aber sie besaessen nichts — als die Grenznachbarschaft durch Algerien." Ernst zu Reventlow, *Deutschlands Auswaertige Politik* (2d ed.), p. 222. Cf. C. Seymour, *The Diplomatic Background of the War*, p. 157.

34. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, II, pp. 593, 594.

35. Sir Valentine Chirol, *The Middle Eastern Question* (1903), p. 397.

36. According to a far from lenient critic, "Russia's work in the Caucasus has been the most brilliant triumph of pacification in the nineteenth century." Arnold J. Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*, p. 389. See also pp. 394, 395, and Chapter XI. An equally favourable judgment of the *Pax Rossica* is given by Sir Harry Johnston in *Common Sense in Foreign Policy*, pp. 71, 72. See likewise pp. 62-67.

37. E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*, p. 193.

38.

	<i>Area in square miles</i>	<i>Population</i>
British sphere.....	137,000	690,000
Russian sphere.....	305,000	6,900,000
Neutral sphere.....	188,000	1,910,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	630,000	9,500,000

These figures are more or less approximate. *Statesman's Year-Book* 1915, p. 1210.

39. Gilbert Murray, *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey*, pp. 83-102.

40. It was the official understanding of both Russia and England that neither Power would "interfere in the affairs of Persia unless injury is inflicted on the persons or property of their subjects."

41. The best criticism of Mr. Shuster's activities is contained in the following sentences of an American publicist. Mr. Gibbons writes: "One day in the summer of 1911, I was walking along the Galata Quay in Constantinople. I heard my name called from the deck of a vessel just about to leave for Batum. Perched on top of two boxes containing typewriters, was a young American from Boston, who was going out to help reform the finances of Persia. I had talked to him the day before concerning the extreme delicacy and difficulty of the task of the mission whose secretary he was. But his refusal to admit the political limitations of Oriental peoples made it impossible for him to see that constitutional Persia was any different, or should be treated any differently, from constitutional Massachusetts. From the sequel of the story, it would seem that the chief of the mission had the same attitude of mind as his secretary." H. A. Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, p. 91.

42. W. Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia*, pp. 53, 54, 253-261.

43. Reventlow, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-169; B. E. Schmitt, *England and Germany*, p. 151; B. L. Putnam Weale, *The Re-Shaping of the Far East*, I, pp. 352, 373, 465.

44. *The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi*, ed. by A. M. Pooley.

45. S. K. Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*, *passim*; W. W. McLaren, *A Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era*, pp. 290-298, 311-323; T. J. Abbott, *Japanese Expansion and American Policies*, pp. 66-71; J. O. P. Bland, "The Future of China" in the *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1914; Price Collier, *The West in the East*, pp. 3-22, 437-440. Mr. Pooley, a critic so decidedly unfavourable to British policy as only a Briton can be, summed up his country's policy as follows: "The only justification of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is that *existence* in Europe outweighs *interests* in Asia." *Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi*, (ed. Pooley), p. 71.

46. *Belgische Aktenstuecke*, 1905-14, p. 105.

47. For an authoritative account of these negotiations, see Sir Edward Cook, *How Britain strove for Peace, 1898-1914*.

48. Delbrueck in the *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1915, p. 531. At the outset of these negotiations, before the Balkan Wars, there was unofficially suggested on the part of England a re-arrangement of the map that would have made Germany supreme from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. The most significant thing about this episode is that the leading German newspapers were forbidden to review the

book in which these suggestions were embodied, "on account of the proposed retrocession of Metz." Sir Harry Johnston, "The German Colonies" in the *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1914, p. 303n. The book referred to is his more than generous "Commonsense in Foreign Policy."

49. See "The Anglo-German Negotiations in 1914," in *The New Republic* of December 18, 1915; *The New Europe* of December 14, 1916, pp. 257-259; Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, (ed. 1915), pp. 306, 307; B. E. Schmitt, *England and Germany*, pp. 368-373; Evans Lewin, *The German Road to the East*, pp. 69-74; S. S. McClure, *Obstacles to Peace*, pp. 39-45.

50. For a valuable account of England's time-honoured connection with the Persian Gulf—it dates from the victory over the Portuguese at Ormuz in 1622—and of the little known incidents of recent Anglo-German rivalry there, see "The Invasion of Chaldea" in *London Times History of the War*, III, pp. 81-120.

51. *Hansard* 64, pp. 115ff.

52. This settlement had been preceded by similar ones between France and Turkey and between France and Germany. *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, pp. 329, 330, 333, 334; *Belgische Aktenstuecke 1905-1914*, pp. 128-130.

53. The agreement covered many additional points. Thus England agreed to an increase in the Turkish customs without which the revenue could not have been raised to make valid the exorbitant guarantees demanded by the German company before building the railroad. "We could not agree to a 15 per cent. Turkish Customs Duty," Grey said, "if the increase of revenue was going, directly or indirectly, to facilitate the making of the Bagdad Railway, and if that were to be continued to a port on the Persian Gulf, and upset the *status quo* there, without any agreement with us. On that account, therefore, we had to oppose it, and that brought us into diplomatic opposition with Germany. It was a very disagreeable position."

54. Paul Rohrbach, *Germany's Isolation*, pp. 130, 131.

55. In the spring of 1914, the German Foreign Secretary suggested to the French Ambassador at Berlin the advisability of an agreement between France, England, and Germany about future railroads in Africa. When Cambon replied that Belgium was also planning such construction and that the conference should be held in Brussels, von Jagow dissented, "car c'est aux dépens de la Belgique que notre accord devrait se conclure." He further developed the thesis that the Congo was too heavy a burden for so small a country as Belgium. According to his views, only the Great Powers were in a position to colonize and, furthermore, he claimed that in the future the small states of Europe could not enjoy their former complete inde-

pendence. "Ils étaient destinés à disparaître ou à graviter dans l'orbite des grandes Puissances." Cambon rejoined that these were not the opinions of France nor, so far as he knew, of England either. *Royaume de Belgique, Correspondance Diplomatique 1914-1915, II*, no. 2, pp. 2, 3.

56. Rohrbach, *Zum Weltvolk hindurch!*, pp. 47, 48; *Germany's Isolation*, pp. 130, 131.

NOTES TO AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR

1. Hans Delbrueck, *Regierung und Volkswille*, pp. 133-139. See also "The German Polity" in *The New Republic* for September 18, 1915.

2. Arthur J. Balfour to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, January 13, 1917.

3. J. W. Headlam, *The Issue*, pp. 38, 39. Cf. also T. Veblen, *The Nature of Peace*.

4. For attempts to do this, see "American Public Opinion and the War" and "America's Reaction to the War" in *The Round Table*, respectively for September, 1915 and March, 1916.

5. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Failure of German-Americanism," in *Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1916; H. P. Fairchild, "Americanizing the Immigrant," in *Yale Review* for July, 1916.

6. See Charles G. Washburn, *Theodore Roosevelt*, pp. 43-56.

7. *Enforced Peace*, p. 125.

8. When so ardent an advocate of peaceful international co-operation and so sympathetic a friend of the United States as Baron d'Estournelles de Constant was asked about the future part of America in international politics and conferences, he replied: "It will be long before any American again will be in a position to lead any really great movement—there are those who would not even like to have him follow, unless at the eleventh hour—" Interview by Edward Marshall in the *New York Sun* of August 20, 1916.

9. Bolton King, *Mazzini*, p. 305.

10. This did not escape foreign observers. In his speech of December 16 and 17, 1915, the Rumanian statesman, Take Jonesco said: "How is it the conscience of the United States of America has become uneasy? Out of love for England? Nothing of the sort, gentlemen. To attack Great Britain has always been recognized as a safe and popular note by orators in the United States. . . . If the German soldier were to win to-day, the first result would be that the same military force, which is the greatest in the world, would also be the greatest naval force, and there would be no more independence,

no more liberty for any one in the world, not even for the great American democracy."

11. Charles H. Sherrill, *Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine*, p. 139. Since America's entrance into the war the ignoble suggestion has been made that advantage be taken of the needs of her Allies and that the cession of the American lands under the French and British flags [Canada excepted] be the price of full co-operation.

12. Cf. Ernesto Nelson, "Efficient Pan-Americanism" in Report of Lake Mohonk Conference 1916, pp. 187ff; Bryce, *South America*, chapter XIV; F. Garcia Calderón, *Les Démocraties Latines de l'Amérique*, *passim*.

13. Munroe Smith, "American Diplomacy in the European War" in *Political Science Quarterly* for December, 1916; "The German-American Submarine Controversy" in *The Round Table* for June, 1916.

14. For details of this organization, see Robert Goldsmith, *A League to Enforce Peace*; *Enforced Peace*; "The United States and the Future Peace" in *The Round Table* for March, 1917. For a parallel English scheme, consult L. S. Woolf, *International Government*. See also H. N. Brailsford, *A League of Nations*.

15. Address of Mr. Theodore Marburg before the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, December 8, 1916.

16. This power of injunction to stop continuing injuries under adjudication or hearing, backed by the full force of the league, is an essential part of the League to Enforce Peace programme. "It would doubtless be necessary when some issues arise," Mr. Taft said, "to require a maintenance of the *status quo* until the issues were submitted or decided in one tribunal or the other."

17. Mr. H. N. Brailsford has suggested that "no treaty of alliance, past or future, shall bind any state adhering to the League to support an ally who had engaged in war without submitting his case to a court or council of the League." This, however, does not solve the inevitable conflict of obligations.

18. *E.g.*, on May 8, 1916, before the Union against Militarism.

19. At Arlington on May 30 and at West Point on June 13.

20. Speech of Acceptance, July 31, 1916.

21. At Omaha, on October 5; at Indianapolis, on October 12; at Cincinnati, on October 26.

22. Speech to the Foreign Press Representatives, October 23, 1916.

23. This difficulty has been emphasized by an English critic, who writes: "Until the doubt as to whether the American Government could legally commit itself beforehand to go to war, if necessary, under the conditions of a League of Peace, it would appear that American participation in such a league might be an actual danger to

its other members by seeming to promise a help in case of need that might not be forthcoming." Ramsay Muir, in *The New Europe*, for February 1, 1917, p. 73. Although a constitutional amendment has been proposed to overcome this objection, the difficulty is not primarily legal in nature. It is quite easy to traverse the argument of unconstitutionality, but the political fact stated in the text remains. Without such unquestioning popular support as is accorded to the Monroe Doctrine, the entrance of the United States into the proposed league would be futile.

24. A generation ago, Gladstone proclaimed that "the greatest triumph of our time has been the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics." The content of this concept has been admirably summarized by Mr. Asquith who, in memorable words declared that public right means: "An equal level of opportunity and of independence as between small States and great States, as between the weak and the strong; safeguards resting upon the common will of Europe, and I hope, not of Europe alone, against aggression, against international covetousness and bad faith, against the wanton recourse in case of dispute to the use of force and the disturbance of peace; finally, as the result of it all, a great partnership of nations federated together in the joint pursuit of a freer and fuller life for countless millions who by their efforts and their sacrifices, generation after generation, maintain the progress and enrich the inheritance of humanity." Speech at Queen's Hall, August 4, 1916.

25. There is very little reason to assume that even a democratic Germany would soon be purged of aggressive ambitions. The cult of power numbers too many devotees. Cf. the following work by a Danish theologian, Dr. J. P. Bang, Hurrah and Hallelujah, *passim*.

26. For a clear-cut and sound distinction between the functions of the army and the police of any state, see Norman Angell, *The World's Highway*, pp. 309, 310.

27. Failure to arbitrate or even to accept the judgment would be such criteria of aggression. In these cases, non-belligerent states might be permitted to assume an attitude of benevolent neutrality and waive their rights in favour of the attacked party. Under existing conditions a grave difficulty arises from the fact that rigid insistence upon neutral rights and all the precedents of international law may defeat international justice and morality. What is needed is a flexible code of neutral and belligerent rights, for their respective importance to mankind as a whole varies with the extent and nature of wars.

28. *The Living Age*, January 27, 1917.

29. Speech of Senator Cummins, January 30, 1917. Congressional Record 54, no. 43 pp. 2520ff.

30. "A beautiful treaty for world-organization could be made in

twenty-four hours, if only the will were there to give it life and to enforce it." A. H. Fried, *The Restoration of Europe*, p. 104.

31. Lecture at the Sorbonne, January 20, 1917 in *The New Europe* of March 8, 1917.

NOTES TO THE UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES

1. *E. g.*, Charles W. Eliot, Darwin P. Kingsley, Sinclair Kennedy in "The Pan-Angles," Walter Lippmann, Herbert Croly, Roland G. Usher in "The Challenge of the Future," H. H. Powers in "The Things Men Fight For," *etc.*

2. A. B. Keith, *Imperial Unity and the Dominions*, pp. 564, 565.

3. *The Empire and the Future*, p. xiii.

4. Lord Milner, *The Nation and the Empire*, p. xxxii.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 329, 330.

6. "Even at the present day, many Americans do not clearly see that the fundamental issue in the Boer War was essentially the same for the British as the fundamental issue in our great Civil War, the issue between the higher unity of the whole and disruption by a part. . . . Fortunately, however, by a kind of sure instinct, the majority in the Empire did recognize that here was a test of unity and of the right and power to survive. . . . It needed only the sharp test of attempted disruption, supported by a historical argument no better than but perhaps as good as that of the Southern States, to give it clearness and convincing force." George Burton Adams, "British Imperial Federation," in the *Yale Review* for July, 1916, pp. 691ff.

7. See F. S. Oliver, Alexander Hamilton.

8. Lionel Curtis, *The Commonwealth of Nations*, Part I, p. 8.

9. "The Imperial Dilemma," in *The Round Table* for September, 1916, p. 691. "For men who are fit for it, self-government is a question not of privilege but rather of obligation. It is duty, not interest, which impels men to freedom, and duty, not interest, is the factor which turns the scale in human affairs." Lionel Curtis, *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, pp. 123, 124.

10. See Colonel A. M. Murray, *Imperial Outposts*.

11. Morley, *Miscellanies*, III, p. 315.

12. In 1886, Chamberlain said: "There are very many people who believe that the result would be, if we ever got into a war, that the relations between us and our colonies would be so strained that they would break adrift altogether, and I think it is not altogether impossible. My point is this, that these colonies are connected with us by ties which are really very loose, and if we got into war or anything

of that kind practically they would break adrift and become separate countries." Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches, I, p. 278.

13. Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, chapter XXV.

14. Despite the assertion of the Kaiser in his famous *Daily Telegraph* interview of 1908, that the Government's attitude was friendly, there is every reason to believe Sir Valentine Chirol's categorical statement that Germany tried to form a coalition consisting of herself, France, and Russia for diplomatic action against England. *The Quarterly Review* for October, 1914, pp. 425, 426. See also the official account of the German Government's attitude in Prince von Buelow, *Imperial Germany* (ed. Headlam), pp. 30-32.

15. See J. Ellis Barker, *Modern Germany*, Chapter VII.

16. For some actual qualifications to these generalizations, see A. B. Keith, *Imperial Unity and the Dominions*, pp. 14, 505, 516ff.

17. Maitland-Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, p. x.

18. "They did not know in Berlin and in Vienna that when peace still hung in the balance, when the British Cabinet itself was divided and hesitating, the Governments of Canada and other Dominions had cabled to the Home Government asking anxiously for immediate advice how they could best help if the war-cloud should break over England. Four days before England was at war, Canadian Ministers hurried back to Ottawa from holiday resorts and went into emergency council to plan for Canada's direct participation should England become involved. As a result, the Canadian Government offered at once, even before England was driven into the conflict, to send 'a considerable force' as Imperial troops, Canada making herself responsible for their pay, maintenance and equipment. . . . From Australia there came, four days before war broke out, the pledge of the Prime Minister that the Commonwealth would stand beside England 'to the last man and last shilling.' . . . A similarly urgent desire to help animated the Governments and peoples of New Zealand, Newfoundland, and other parts of the Empire." Percy and Archibald Hurd, *The New Empire Partnership*, pp. 239, 240. On July 31, 1914, the Prime Minister of New Zealand telegraphed to London offering an expeditionary force. *Quarterly Review* for January, 1917, p. 130.

19. The most logical solution is that elaborated by Mr. Lionel Curtis in "The Problem of the Commonwealth." This is based upon the firm conviction that anything less than organic union is a dangerous make-shift. Such also is the solution consistently advocated for years by Lord Milner. For an exposition of the solution by alliance, see Richard Jebb, *The Britannic Question*. For a programme of most moderate change, see A. B. Keith, *Imperial Unity and the Dominions*. For a Canadian proposition, see Z. A. Lash, *Defence and Foreign Affairs*. For authoritative accounts of the opinion of

Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada on these projects, consult *The Quarterly Review* for January and April, 1917.

20. Interview with Mr. Lloyd George in the *London Times* (weekly ed.) of February 2, 1917. Five days later, Mr. Bonar Law stated in the House of Commons: "The invitation which has now been given is that in the questions which specially concern them—and most questions do—they should have continuous sittings as members of the Cabinet. . . . That is an immense step forward. . . . Under the stress and strain of this war the difficulties, the dangers, and the terrible losses which have been borne in common, the whole British Empire has been brought together with a degree of rapidity and strength which nothing but this war could have brought about."

21. "The War Conference of the Empire" in *The Round Table* for March, 1917.

22. On account of the political crisis at home, Australia was not represented.

23. Speech before the Empire Parliamentary Association, April 2, 1917. After his return to Canada, Sir Robert Borden described the development as follows:

"We sat on alternate days in the Imperial War Cabinet and in the Imperial War Conference. On days when the Imperial War Cabinet did not sit the war did not wait; therefore it was necessary that the British Cabinet itself should sit on those days to deal with questions arising out of the war. This result, therefore, very early obtained: that the Imperial War Cabinet was differentiated from the British War Cabinet; that the Imperial War Cabinet sat for the purpose of dealing with matters of common concern to the whole Empire, and the British War Cabinet sat for the purpose of dealing with those matters which chiefly concerned the United Kingdom." Canadian Hansard, May 18, 1917.

24. Simultaneously, under the presidency of the Colonial Secretary, the representatives of the Dominions and of India assembled in an Imperial Conference. Although its membership was very largely the same, this body was quite distinct from the Imperial War Cabinet. It devoted itself to the same matters that had been discussed in former Imperial Conferences. This Conference reported early in May that: "The readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject to be dealt with during the war, and that it should form the subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities.

"It deems it its duty, however, to place on record its view that any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important

portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine."

25. Speech before the Empire Parliamentary Association, April 2, 1917. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lloyd George said: "When the reconstruction time comes I hope and pray that we will not dive into dusty pigeon-holes in searching for precedents for our programmes. There is a great need for revision of our ideas and our attitude toward that great Commonwealth of Nations called the British Empire." Speech at the Guildhall, April 27, 1917.

26. Sinclair Kennedy, *The Pan-Angles*, p. 190.

27. William H. Skaggs, *German Conspiracies in America*, pp. 68, 69.

28. J. A. Cramb, *Germany and England*, p. 127.

29. Lord Milner, *The Nation and the Empire*, p. xxxviii.

30. Cf. Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, p. 116.

31. A well-known French psychologist holds to a contrary view, saying "si les vivants peuvent fondre leurs langues et leurs moeurs, l'âme des morts qu'ils portent en eux reste rebelle à de semblables fusions." Gustave Le Bon, *Premières Conséquences de la Guerre*, p. 259. The established fact that musical and artistic gifts, as well as other aptitudes, may be inherited to no extent derogates from what has been said in the text.

32. D. J. Brinton, *The Basis of Social Relations*, p. 167.

33. A. B. Hart, *National Ideals Historically Traced*, p. 46.

34. New Jersey Historical Society Address, quoted by H. J. Ford, Woodrow Wilson, pp. 62, 63.

35. H. C. Lodge, *Historical and Political Essays*, pp. 138 *et seq.*

36.

English	10,376
Scotch-Irish	1,439
Scotch	436
Welsh	159
Irish	109

12,519

37. John R. Dos Passos, *The Anglo-Saxon Century* (New York, 1903), pp. 105-108; Sinclair Kennedy, *The Pan-Angles* (New York, 1914), p. 37.

38. J. McKeen Cattell, "The Families of American Men of Science," in *The Popular Science Monthly*, vol. 86, p. 505.

39. On this subject, see especially L. March Phillipps, *Europe Unbound*.

40. W. A. Dunning, *The British Empire and the United States*, p. 352. This is by far the best and most judicial account of Anglo-American relations.

41. W. F. Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, I, p. 280.

42. J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, IV, pp. 337-394; W. A. Dunning, *The British Empire and the United States*, pp. 199-264; W. E. H. Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, I, pp. 485-490; C. F. Adams, *Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity*, pp. 87-129.

43. H. H. Powers, *The Things Men Fight For*, pp. 374, 375.

44. This, of course, has for some time been plainly apparent to foreign observers. Thus, Count Reventlow said: "To base plans for future empire for Germany on the possibility of future conflict between Great Britain and the United States would be terribly dangerous, an almost unparalleled piece of Utopian folly. In future the Anglo-Saxon nations, perhaps marching independently, will stand opposed to the German Empire and people." *New York Sun*, August 13, 1916. Since April 6, 1917, the German papers have contained a number of articles to this effect.

45. "Given two democracies, speaking the same language, familiar with the same literature, having frequent and easy commercial intercourse with one another, and above all, able when they choose to make their will avail with the governing classes to whom they delegate their authority, it would be strange if they could not rise above selfish futilities of bureaucratic foreign policy, and strike up a formula of concord which they knew to be in the common interest of all." H. S. Perris, *Pax Britannica* (London, 1913), p. 296. In 1917, Professor F. H. Giddings said in a similar vein:

"The English-speaking people of the world are together the largest body of human beings among whom a nearly complete intellectual and moral understanding is already achieved. They have reached high attainments in science and the arts, in education, in social order, in justice. They are highly organized, they cherish the traditions of their common history. To permit anything to endanger the moral solidarity of this nucleus of a perfected internationalism would be a crime unspeakable." *International Conciliation*, April, 1917, p. 9.

46. "A second plausible union — under some form, no matter how loose — is that of the United States and the British Empire. Their separation was the tragedy of English history, though inevitable and wholesome in its reaction upon both. There is no possible union of major powers for which sentiment speaks so strongly, but sentiment does not form such unions, nor can it alone preserve them when formed. If the Anglo-Saxon world is ever united — a condition essential to its ultimate success — it will be through the pres-

sure of a common danger. That pressure is likely to be forthcoming." H. H. Powers, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

NOTES TO ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

1. L. March Phillipps, *Europe Unbound*, p. ix.
2. Cf. J. A. Hobson, *The Open Door*, in *Towards a Lasting Settlement* (ed. by C. R. Buxton), pp. 85ff.
3. See E. V. Robinson, "War and Economics" in *Political Science Quarterly*, XV, pp. 581ff.; Walter E. Weyl, *American World Policies*, Chapter II; Gilbert Slater, *Peace and War in Europe*, pp. 1-22.
4. "Cromwell's Policy in its Economic Aspects," in *Political Science Quarterly*, XVI, pp. 19, 20.
5. In Germany, where the neo-mercantilist doctrines have taken firmest hold, this goal dominated the colonial policy of Dr. Dernburg whose "ultimate ideal is, in fact, the economic *terra clausa*, the self-contained Empire." W. H. Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, p. 380 and chap. XIX. This idea is also present in modern British thought. Cf. Milner, *The Nation and the Empire*, pp. xvi, xxi, 463; Chamberlain's *Speeches*, II, p. 333.
6. Conrad Gill, *National Power and Prosperity*, pp. 116ff; Norman Angell, *The World's Highway*, pp. 248, 249n.
7. A. S. Johnson, "Commerce and War," *Political Science Quarterly*, XXIX, pp. 47ff.
8. Lord Rosebery, *Napoleon: The Last Phase*, pp. 195, 196.
9. Those who figure always in terms of force and neglect the moral factors forget that force begets force in opposition and that pride of power has its nemesis. In this connection, another militarist's criticism of British policy is instructive. According to Bernhardt, "since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of Secession, a rival to England's world-wide Empire has appeared on the other side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of North America, which are a grave menace to England's fortunes." F. v. Bernhardt, *Germany and the Next War*, p. 94.
10. H. R. Mussey, "The New Commercial Freedom" in *Political Science Quarterly*, XXIX, p. 616.
11. For instance, the London Chamber of Commerce in 1916 suggested a future rate of 30% on wholly manufactured goods and one of 15% on semi-manufactured goods, imported from present enemy countries. The proposed duties on importations from allied and neutral countries were to be respectively one third and two

thirds of these rates. J. A. Hobson, *The New Protectionism*, p. 153.

12. Robert H. Patchin, *The Need of a National Foreign Trade Policy*, p. 3.

13. F. W. Taussig, *Some Aspects of the Tariff Question*, p. 4.

14. Prince von Buelow, *Imperial Germany* (ed. Headlam), pp. 274-298.

15. On this entire subject, see Henri Hauser, *Les Méthodes Allemandes d'Expansion Economique*; Maurice Millioud, *The Ruling Caste and Frenzied Trade in Germany*; Ezio M. Gray, *l'Invasione Tedesca in Italia*; J. Ellis Barker, *Modern Germany*; Daniel Bellet, *Le Commerce Allemand*; Josef Grunzel, *Economic Protectionism*, pp. 220-231; Luciano de Feo, *La Lotta Economica del Dopo Guerra*, pp. 8-22.

16. The easiest method is by the specialization of duties, which was employed in the German tariff of 1902 and in subsequent commercial treaties. H. Hauser, *op. cit.*, pp. 188, 189. "In order to favour Swiss cattle rather than French, the former were included in a special category consisting of those reared at an altitude of 300 metres and having brown heads and tails." Millioud, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

17. Leo Pasvolosky, "The Situation in Russia," in *The New Republic* for November 11, 1916.

18. "What is deeply resented, however, is that the German competition is a disciplined state-aided competition, that it is collective rather than individual. The Belgian, Italian or Dutch manufacturer feels that behind his German competitor stand the gigantic power and resources of the whole German nation. It is not individual Germans who compete, but Germany." Walter E. Weyl, *American World Policies*, pp. 117, 118. For some instances of this in the trade of the Far Pacific, see C. B. Fletcher, *The New Pacific*, chapter XVI.

19. Henri Hauser, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-171.

20. Bertrand Russell, *Justice in War-Time*, p. 27. "It is said on the Continent — not only by Germans — that jealousy of Germany's economic development was an equal cause of hostility; but I believe this to be an entire mistake. America's economic development has been quite as remarkable as that of Germany, but it has not produced the slightest ripple of political hostility. The government in power, as free traders, do not believe that the prosperity of one country is economically injurious to that of another, and in this opinion a majority of the nation agree with them." *Ibid.*, p. 71.

21. Josef Grunzel, *Economic Protectionism*, pp. 138, 139.

22. "As matters stand, nevertheless, our railways, which so far dominate our whole internal distribution, are the greatest system of protection in favour of the foreigner that the world has ever seen." H. M. Hyndman, "The National Railways after the War," in *The*

Nineteenth Century for February, 1916, p. 462. See also J. Ellis Barker, *Modern Germany* (4th ed.), pp. 524ff., 563ff.

23. Price Collier, *The West in the East*, pp. 439, 440.

24. YEAR 1913

(In hundred thousands of dollars)

	<i>Total Exports</i>	<i>Total Imports</i>	<i>Exports to United States</i>	<i>Imports from United States</i>
Philippines	47,773	53,312	16,434	26,676
Porto Rico	49,104	36,900	40,538	33,155
Cuba	164,309	140,064	131,270	75,316
Hawaii (1913-4)	41,594	35,550	40,679	29,268
	<hr/> 302,780	<hr/> 265,826	<hr/> 228,921	<hr/> 164,415

Report of Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1915, pp. 8, 15; Statesman's Year-Book 1915, pp. 630, 821.

25. In 1912-3, the total foreign trade of British India with her 315 million people amounted only to £338,172,451. Statistical Abstract relating to British India (1915), p. 149.

26. F. W. Taussig, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-79.

27. Report of Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1913, pp. 7, 54.

28. Josef Grunzel, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-51.

29. GENERAL COMMERCE OF FRANCE IN 1912
(In millions of francs)

	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>
Foreign countries	9,354.8	7,801
Algeria, Tunis and Colonies	938.8	1,022.9
	<hr/> 10,293.6	<hr/> 8,823.9

The trade with Morocco is not included in this table. Arthur Girault, *The Colonial Tariff Policy of France*, pp. 165, 167.

30. Arthur Girault, *op. cit.*; Sir Harry Johnston, *Common Sense in Foreign Policy*, pp. 24, 25.

31.

OVER-SEA TRADE OF ALGERIA IN 1912
(In millions of francs)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>To or From France</i>	<i>Per Cent.</i>
Exports	499	400.5	80.1
Imports	654	568.4	87
	<hr/> 1,153	<hr/> 968.9	<hr/> 84

Girault, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-260.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 268, 269.

33. EXTERNAL COMMERCE OF THE FRENCH COLONIES, EXCLUSIVE OF ALGERIA AND TUNIS, FOR 1911

(In millions of francs)

Imports from France	261.3	Exports to France	273.4
Imports from French colonies	16.5	Exports to French colonies	10.4
Imports from foreign countries	323.4	Exports to foreign countries	357.2
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	601.2		641.

Girault, *op. cit.*; p. 169. Cf. Daniel Bellet, *op. cit.*, pp. 129, 130. There are marked discrepancies between the statistics of France and those of the colonies. See Girault, *op. cit.*, pp. 161ff.

34. EXTERNAL COMMERCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1913
(In millions of pounds sterling)

	Total	To and from British Countries
Exports	634.8	218.8
Imports	768.7	212.9
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	1,403.5	431.7

These statistics include Egypt and all the Protectorates. Statesman's Year Book, 1915, pp. 73-77.

35. J. Ellis Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-173; Josef Grunzel, *op. cit.*, p. 44; P. and A. Hurd, *op. cit.*, pp. 228, 229. In addition, these Dominions give preferential treatment to one another; and Canada and the British West Indies have effected a similar arrangement.

36. IMPORTS 1913

(In millions of pounds sterling)

From the United Kingdom	240
From British Possessions	79
From Foreign Countries	243.6
	<hr/>
	562.6

EXPORTS

To the United Kingdom	235.7
To British Possessions	71.9
To Foreign Countries	246.2
	<hr/>
	553.8
	<hr/>
	1,116.4

These figures do not include Egypt, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, and some of the Protectorates. Statistical Abstract for the British Self-

Governing Dominions, *etc.*, 1915, pp. 55, 61, 404ff. It should be noted that, as in the case of the French statistics, those furnished by the Dominions, *etc.*, do not agree with those compiled by the customs authorities in England. The causes of these discrepancies are obvious.

37.		1913	
(In millions of pounds sterling)			
The Self-governing Dominions	Imports	106.6	
	Exports	158.3	
			264.9
	56 per cent.		
British India	Imports	102.5	
	Exports	41.2	
			143.7
	30 per cent.		
The Colonies, Dependencies, Protectorates, <i>etc.</i> :	Imports	30.9	
	Exports	36.2	
			67.1
<i>Ibid.</i> , pp. 59, 65.	14 per cent.		
			475.7

38.		1913	
(In millions of pounds sterling)			
	<i>United Kingdom</i>		<i>Total</i>
Australia	Imports	41.3	79.7
	Exports	34.8	78.5
			76.1
			158.2
New Zealand	Imports	13.3	22.2
	Exports	18.1	22.9
			31.4
			45.1
Union of South Africa	Imports	23.8	42.7
	Exports	59.	66.6
			82.8
			109.3
Canada and Newfoundland.....	Imports	28.	133.4
	Exports	46.3	101.4
			74.3
			234.8
			264.6
			547.4

Ibid., pp. 217, 223, 226, 249, 253.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 69. In 1914, Great Britain has 56 million cotton spindles, as against 31.5 in the United States, 11.4 in Germany, and

6.4 in India. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1915, p. 30.* See also F. W. Taussig, *op. cit.*, pp. 279, 294.

40.

		1913		
		BRITISH INDIA		
		(In millions of pounds sterling)		
		<i>United Kingdom</i>		<i>Total</i>
Exports to	41.2	23½ per cent.		176.2
Imports from	102.5	62½ per cent.		163.6
	143.7	42 per cent.		339.8

Statistical Abstract as *ante*, pp. 199–205.

41. For details, see *Ibid.*, pp. 198–273. For self-evident reasons the trade of Egypt was not included in the foregoing statistics.

		EGYPT 1913		
		(In millions of Egyptian pounds)		
		<i>United Kingdom</i>		<i>Total</i>
Exports to	13.6	43 per cent.		31.6
Imports from	8.4	30 per cent.		27.8
	22.	37 per cent.		59.4

Statesman's Year-Book, 1915, p. 259.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 790.

43. The German colonial system is one of free trade, but unquestionably such forces, combined with the military and bureaucratic spirits, have kept foreigners from trading with the German colonies. Excluding that of Kiau-Chau, their total external commerce in 1912 amounted to 263.5 million marks, of which approximately two thirds was with Germany. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1915, pp. 463ff. Cf. C. B. Fletcher, *The New Pacific*, pp. 59, 258ff.

44. In 1892, Lord Milner wrote: "So far from unduly favouring the commercial interests of their own countrymen, the British administrators in Egypt err, if anything, on the other side; so intense is their anxiety, that in the position of trust which they occupy they should be above the least suspicion of partiality. Neither directly nor indirectly has Great Britain drawn from her predominant position any profit at the expense of other nations." Milner, *England in Egypt* (7th ed.), p. 215. England's share in the trade of Egypt before the occupation was 57 per cent.; in 1891, it was only 54 per cent. In 1913, it had fallen to 37 per cent. Yet some charges are current that favouritism is shown to British contractors. Josef Grunzel, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

45. This question is entirely distinct from the special benefits derived by some industrial and financial groups from such sources.

46. *London Times* (weekly ed.), November 3, 1916.

47. Charles Andler, *Le Pangermanisme Continental*, pp. xxixff;

Gustav Schmoller, *Umriss und Untersuchungen* (1898), p. 685; Josef Grunzel, *Economic Protectionism*, pp. 30ff; *German Ambitions* (1903), p. 25.

48. Imperial Germany (ed. Headlam), p. 59.

49. Naumann, who is of a deeply religious nature, cannot reconcile his Christian ethics and his *Realpolitik*, but he retains both despite their disharmony. "The State," he says, "rests upon entirely different impulses from those which are cultivated by Jesus. . . . The State grows up upon the will to make others subservient to oneself." He accepts the world in which he lives and contends that it "is organized according to the principle 'Thou shalt covet thy neighbour's house!'" He cannot say that Bismarck's preparation for the Schleswig-Holstein War was ethical, but he does not lament it. "Bismarck did his duty, for his avocation was the cultivation of power. But such a duty and its fulfilment are not directly an imitation of Christ." "We either dare," he concludes, "to aim at being without a State, and thus throw ourselves deliberately into the arms of anarchy; or we decide to possess, alongside of our religious creed, a political creed as well." The latter creed in interstate relations divorces ethics from politics and is completely non-moral. Baron Friedrich von Hügel, *The German Soul*, pp. 52-58.

50. Friedrich Naumann, *Central Europe*, pp. 182, 194 and Chapter VI. On this project see also "The New German Empire" in *The Round Table* for March, 1917; T. F. A. Smith, "German War Literature" in the *Quarterly Review* for January, 1917; "German Economic Policy after the War" in *The New Europe* for February, 1917.

51. On the possibility of securing copper and cotton in Asiatic Turkey, see "Germany in Asia Minor" in *Blackwood's Magazine* for February, 1916.

52. See "German Tariff Plans" in *The New Republic* for March 31, 1917.

53. Recommendations of the Economic Conference held on June 14-17, 1916. (Cd. 8271.)

54. In November of 1916, Signor Giuseppe Canepa wrote that if the victory were an incomplete one, the conclusion of peace would lead to a most severe economic conflict. Luciano de Feo, *La Lotta Economica del Dopo Guerra*, p. xi.

55. J. A. Hobson, *The New Protectionism*, pp. 42ff; L. de Feo, *op. cit.*, pp. 31ff.

56. Thus M. Clémentel, the French Minister of Commerce said: "There never was any question at the Conference of adopting a customs policy for all; each ally will remain wholly independent. Each product will be the subject of separate negotiations between the countries interested in the matter, and an infinite variety of combinations may be made."

57. On July 24, 1916, Mr. Asquith stated in the House of Commons that this Conference was "to consider the commercial policy to be adopted after the war."

58. It was suggested in *The New Statesman* of February 24, 1917, that the British Government should pay the freight on shipments from the Colonies or should give a bounty on all colonial products consumed in the British Isles.

59. White Paper (Cd. 8482).

60. While endorsing the principle of Imperial Preference, two Irish members refused to subscribe to any report that did not deal with the special case of Ireland. In their opinion, "the same fiscal liberty which is at present enjoyed by the self-governing Dominions should be extended to Ireland."

61. Simultaneously at the Guildhall, Mr. Lloyd George stated that "the system of preference can be established without involving any addition to the cost of our food." Sir Robert Borden threw some light on how this was to be accomplished. This resolution, he said, "does not necessarily purpose, or even look to any change in the fiscal arrangements of the United Kingdom. It does not involve taxation of food; it does not involve taxation of anything. As far as the fiscal system of the United Kingdom is concerned, I followed when in England precisely the same course that I have carried out in this Parliament and in this country—I decline to interfere in matters which are the subject of domestic control and concern in the United Kingdom. I declined to invite them to change their fiscal policy. These matters are within their control, as our fiscal policy is within ours. And I would go further and say that the people of Canada would not desire the people of the United Kingdom to change their fiscal policy for the purpose alone of giving a preference to the producers of this country, especially, if the proposed fiscal changes should involve any proposed injustice, should be regarded as oppressive by a considerable portion of the people of the United Kingdom. But what this proposal looks to, as I understand it, is this—that we can within this Empire get better and cheaper facilities of communication than we have enjoyed up to the present time. That, I believe, is the line along which the change indicated will proceed." Canadian, Hansard, May 18, 1917, p. 1604.

62. *London Times* (weekly ed.), January 12, 1917.

63. Sir Valentine Chirol, *Indian Unrest*, pp. 274ff.; Lajpat Rai, *Young India*, pp. 167ff.; R. Mukerjee, *The Foundations of Indian Economics*, pp. 342ff.

64. J. Grunzel, *Economic Protectionism*, pp. 21, 22.

65. E.g., *The Spectator* for March 10, 1917, and *The New Statesman* for March 17, 1917. This was denied by the *London Times* (weekly ed.), March 9, 1917.

66. Blue Book, 1917. (Cd. 8462.)

67. *The Spectator* for February 24, 1917; *The New Statesman* for February 3, 1917.

68. The pertinent resolution runs as follows:

"The time has arrived when all possible encouragement should be given to the development of Imperial resources, and especially to making the Empire independent of other countries in respect of food supplies, raw materials, and essential industries. With these objects in view, this Conference expresses itself in favour of:—

(1) The principle that each part of the Empire, having due regard to the interests of our Allies, shall give specially favourable treatment and facilities to the produce and manufactures of other parts of the Empire.

(2) Arrangements by which intending emigrants from the United Kingdom may be induced to settle in countries under the British flag.

Having regard to the experience obtained in the present war, this Conference records its opinion that the safety of the Empire and the necessary development of its component parts require prompt and attentive consideration, as well as concerted action, with regard to the following matters:—

(1) The production of an adequate food supply and arrangements for its transportation when and where required, under any conditions that may reasonably be anticipated.

(2) The control of natural resources available within the Empire, especially those that are of an essential character for necessary national purposes, whether in peace or in war.

(3) The economical utilization of such natural resources through processes of manufacture carried on within the Empire.

The Conference commends to the consideration of the Governments summoned thereto the enactment of such legislation as may assist this purpose.

That it is desirable to establish in London an Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau, upon which should be represented Great Britain, the Dominions, India, and other parts of the Empire.

The Bureau should be charged with the duties of collection of information from the appropriate departments of the Governments concerned and other sources regarding the mineral resources and the metal requirements of the Empire, and of advising from time to time what action, if any, may appear desirable to enable such resources to be developed and made available to meet the metal requirements of the Empire.

That the Conference recommends that his Majesty's Government should, while having due regard to existing institutions, take immediate action for the purpose of establishing such a Bureau, and should as soon as possible submit a scheme for the consideration of the other Governments summoned to the Conference.

That the Imperial War Conference welcomes the proposed increase of the Board of Trade service of Trade Commissioners and its extension throughout the British Empire in accordance with the recommendations of the Dominions Royal Commission, and recommends that the Governments concerned should co-operate so as to make that service as useful as possible to the Empire as a whole, especially for the promotion of inter-Imperial trade."

The scope and purpose of these proposals were lucidly explained by Sir Robert Borden in the Canadian Parliament on May 18, 1917. *Canadian Hansard*, 51, pp. 1603ff.

69. The restrictions on importations into the United Kingdom since the war, either by duties or prohibitions, were not protective in purpose, their object being to restrict the consumption of luxuries, to lessen the demands on shipping and to maintain the parity of exchange. The only real departure in policy was the imposition during the war and for five years thereafter of an export duty on palm-kernels shipped from Africa to foreign countries.

70. See the resolutions of the Association of the Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom of March 1, 1916, and the report of the London Chamber of Commerce of June 25, 1916. *European Economic Alliances* (New York, 1916), pp. 65-68. For a significant instance of conversion from free trade, see Lord George Hamilton, *Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections*.

71. *European Economic Alliances*, p. 84.

72. Annual Report on Commerce and Navigation for 1915, no. 5, p. 746; *do.* for 1914, no. 3, p. 296.

73. *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1915, pp. 286, 287.

74. Exports were 1,131 million dollars and imports were 574 millions. *European Economic Alliances*, pp. 8, 84. According to the British statistics, the exports from the Empire to the United States amounted in 1913 to 133 million pounds, as opposed to imports of 268 millions thence. *The Statesman's Year-Book*, 1915, p. xlix.

NOTES TO COMMUNITY OF POLICY

1. John MacCunn, *Six Radical Thinkers*, pp. 199ff., 208ff.; Morley Cobden, pp. 527ff.; Bolton King, Mazzini, pp. 105, 151, 170, 198; J. Holland Rose, *Nationality in Modern History*, pp. 74ff.

2. In 1894, Mahan wrote: "To Great Britain and the United States, if they rightly estimate the part they may play in the great drama of human progress, is intrusted a maritime interest, in the broadest sense of the word, which demands, as one of the conditions of its exercise and its safety, the organized force adequate to

control the general course of events at sea; to maintain, if necessity arise, not arbitrarily, but as those in whom interest and power alike justify the claim to do so, the laws that shall regulate maritime warfare." A. T. Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power*, p. III.

3. It should be noted in addition that, before the war, the share of the United Kingdom in the world's ship-building was about 60 per cent. American Whitaker 1916, pp. 74, 215ff.; Statesman's Year-Book 1915, pp. lv, 81ff.; Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1915, pp. 50*ff.; *The New Europe* II, pp. 208-216.

4. Bradley A. Fiske, *The Navy as a Fighting Machine*.

5. Writings of James Monroe (ed. Hamilton) VI, p. 362.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 391, 392.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 394, 395.

8. The comparative loss inflicted upon British trade during the Napoleonic wars was apparently about the same as that caused by submarines and mines during the spring months of 1917. The risk of capture in the former era was, however, greater than is the present risk of destruction, in so far as each separate voyage is concerned. But as a steamer makes many more voyages a year than did the wind-driven ships of Nelson's day, the relative loss in tonnage is now far greater. During the Napoleonic period that loss was much more than made good by new construction and captures. Whether this can be done at present is problematical. Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution* II, pp. 206-227; *Cambridge Modern History* IX, pp. 241-243; W. R. Scott in *Scottish Historical Review* for April, 1917.

9. During the Civil War, one vessel is reported to have run the blockade successfully 44 times and others eluded capture during as many as 16 to 21 voyages. At one time it was estimated that, in this contraband trade between Nassau and Wilmington, there was on the average but one capture in $4\frac{1}{3}$ voyages. J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States* V, pp. 399ff.

10. The German *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege* states this explicitly. See J. H. Morgan, *The German War Book*, p. 148. This contention was the basis of the Austro-Hungarian protest of June 29, 1915. Department of State, *European War* No. 2, p. 193. See also the German Memorandum of April 4, 1914. *Ibid.*, No. 1, pp. 73, 74.

11. A Japanese educator contends that, if the Allies win, then liberalism is assured of an unhindered growth in Japan; otherwise, German Kultur and military despotism will acquire added prestige there. In December of 1916, he asked a Senator in Washington who inquired why Japan was in this war, "how he would like—in view of his expressed desire for the premature ending of the war and for a league of peace—the sight of a powerful military empire

rising up in the Far East, which in all probability would work hand-in-hand with the Central Empires of Europe in the carrying out of their imperialistic ambitions." Tokiwo Yokoi, "Japan's Stake in the War" in *The New Europe* III, p. 6.

12. See *ante* Chapter III and also W. S. Robertson, "South America and the Monroe Doctrine" in *Political Science Quarterly*, XXX, pp. 82-92. In 1824, Bolivar wrote: "England and the United States protect us. You know that at present these two nations are the only two maritime powers of the world, and that no aid can come to the Spanish royalists but by sea."

13. Under the Brazilian budget law for 1917, "the preferential is a 30 per cent. reduction on wheat flour and a 20 per cent. reduction on condensed milk, certain manufactures of rubber, clocks and watches, paints and inks (not including writing fluids), varnishes, typewriters, scales, refrigerators, pianos, windmills, cement, dried fruits, furniture for schools, corsets and desks."

14. Trade of Latin America in 1913

(In millions of dollars)

<i>Total Imports: 1322</i>		<i>Total Exports: 1553</i>
<i>of which from:</i>		<i>of which to:</i>
United States	331	478
United Kingdom	323	330
Germany	219	192
France	110	124

It was only in 1913 that the imports from the United States took the first place. Pan American Union, General Survey of Latin-American Trade in 1915, p. 591.

15. See Sir Harry Johnston, *Common Sense in Foreign Policy*, pp. 15, 16, 88ff.

16. Bolivar's Code of Pan-Americanism, in *New York Times Magazine* of March 26, 1916.

17. The British representative was not to take part in the deliberations, but to give his advice when it was requested. Holland was represented in the same manner. Vidal Morales y Morales, *Iniciadores y Primeros Mártires de la Revolución Cubana*, p. 62.

18. L. E. Elliott, *Brazil: To-day and To-morrow*; F. Garcia Calderón, *Les Démocraties Latines de l'Amérique*, pp. 269-273; André Chéradame, *Le Plan Pangermaniste Démasqué*, pp. 171-173, 294-301; Evans Lewin, *The Germans and Africa*, pp. 51-55.

19. R. G. Usher, *The Challenge of the Future*, p. 231. See also pp. 314-315. For similar English statements, likewise made before America's entrance into the war, see J. H. Rose, *The Origins of the War*, p. 188; Moreton Frewen, "The Monroe Doctrine and the

Great War," in the *Nineteenth Century and After* of February, 1916, and the *London Morning Post* of November 27, 1916.

20. "To all war preparations we can apply the broad sociological principle that a social need creates a social organization, and that the social organization, once it is created, acquires an independent life of its own, which struggles for existence even at the expense of the well-being of society. . . . It is continually looking for evidence that its services will be required and its existence justified." Gilbert Slater, *Peace and War in Europe*, p. 72.

21. W. H. Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany?*, pp. 124-130.

22. Hans Delbrueck, *Regierung und Volkswille*, p. 136.

23. Evans Lewin, *The Germans and Africa*, p. 123.

24. Bernhard von Buelow, *Imperial Germany*, p. 213. His diatribes against the Social Democrats were excised from the new edition published during the war.

25. *Royaume de Belgique, Correspondance Diplomatique 1914-1915*, II, p. 45; Baron Beyens, *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre*, p. 112. On this general subject, see Munroe Smith, "Military Strategy versus Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, XXX, pp. 37ff.

26. Prince von Buelow, *Imperial Germany* (ed. Headlam), p. 129. The two chapters eulogizing militarism were added since the war.

27. For two valuable studies of this ideal in its various vicissitudes and manifestations, see Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism*; L. March Phillipps, *Europe Unbound*.

28. "Whatever may be the shortcomings of our rule in India and Egypt, it remains our object, while securing for the populace such practical securities as may add to their material welfare and prosperity, to respect at the same time to the utmost their ways of thought, customs, and faiths; that is to say, it remains the object of our government to secure for the governed the right to live freely. Moreover, if or when they develop a capacity for self-government, self-government will be granted them." L. March Phillipps, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

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